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No. 2180

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2180

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THEATER FORCES DENMARK

BRIEFS

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY ON NATO TIES—"The vehement reactions in NATO's Council of Ministers against the Danish Folketing's missile decision show how little respect the large NATO countries really have for the independence of individual countries," the Socialist People's Party's executive committee says in a statement from its meeting in Haderslev. The Socialist People's Party therefore doubts that Denmark will have any influence at all if a war or crisis situation arises in NATO territory. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jun 83 p 7] 8985

CSO: 3613/134

ECONOMIC

SIGNS OF POSSIBLE ECONOMIC UPTURN SKEN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG, BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German 22 Jun 83 p 2

/Report by goe, datelined The Hague, 21 June: "Holland: Signs of Recovery"/

/Text/ In the Netherlands, too, there are more indications that—in very cautious terms—an economic upturn can no longer be considered out of the question. The results of major firms published in recent days and weeks were bound to move even the most reserved observers to greater optimism.

In mid-May Akzo was actually able to proceed to a stock issue; Hoogoven indicated that business had slightly improved in the first quarter. Though Unilever initially advised restraint, it turned out later that the decline in its profits was in fact due to some accidental occurrences. Subsequently DSM, a victim of the depression in chemicals, announced a substantial loss for 1982 but a modest gain in the first 3 months of 1983 as well as a rise in industrial sales. Philips published a result that conformed to expectations and mentioned a possible continued rise in turnover and profits this year. The latter corporation also stated that, thanks to a slight economic upturn in the course of this year, fewer jobs would be lost in the Netherlands than had been planned. Royal Dutch, too, mentioned a satisfactory increase in profits. According to dividend statistics compiled in the Netherlands, 51 of a total of 145 company reports (35 percent) recorded higher dividends than in 1982, 56 (39 percent) announced unchanged dividends, and 38 firms recorded lower dividends.

For the first time Van Veen, chairman of the biggest employer federation, the Federation of Netherlands Companies (VNO) had something fairly positive to say on the occasion of an anniversary celebration. Some business reports, he said, suggested that some companies had proceeded to extensive reorganizations in 1982 and thereby obtained a promising springboard. They were now in a position that enabled them to profit from further recovery. This confidence was also reflected in the fact that expectations for 1983 business results were more optimistic. Van Veen underlined the OECD forecasts that mentioned a slight upturn in the United States and Japan. He recalled that developments in the EEC and the Netherlands in particular tended to be slower. And yet, he thought that in the Netherlands also the upturn was unmistakeable, although there were no indications of its assuming much strength. The increasing confidence was not confined to company reportsonly but was evident in the consumer behavior recorded by the Central Office of Statistics.

The Netherlands are already thinking in terms of the 1984 budget draft. Van Veen admonished the politicians to draw up a realistic budget instead of indulging in optimistic estimates and "built-in" disappointments. The reorganization of state finances could no longer be postponed without the standard of living being seriously affected. Minister of Finance Ruding lately also talked of the budget estimates that are always submitted to parliament on the third Tuesday in September. On the occasion of a parliamentary debate on the adjustment of the current national budget, he intimated that an estimated 10-11 billion guilders would have to be cut in the coming year. This amount might be even greater if it should turn out there there was not much willingness to reduce wages. The government would have great difficulties in meeting the 33.5 billion guilder deficit.

In an interview with the daily DE TELEGRAAF the finance minister gave more details of his concepts of the 1984 budget estimate. In addition to spending cuts, the budget would focus on tax relief for corporations in the amount of 2 billion guilders in 1984. Contemplated were employer premiums, special measures such as backing for new companies, and a reduction in corporation tax. However, he admitted that the corporation tax could not be immediately reduced from 48 percent to 40 percent, because this would throw too much of a burden on the treasury. The reduction would have to be gradual. Ruding denied that the spending cuts would adversely affect sales. The figures recorded for private consumption in 1980 through 1983 were sufficient evidence, and therefore no incentives were required for maintaining purchasing power.

As regards the planned spending cuts, the minister said there were three possibilities for them in the budget: Civil service salaries, social insurance benefits and the health service. At the present time each Netherlander was paying 1,000 guilders annual interest on the national debt, and 12,000 guilders of redemption fell to his account. At an interest rate of 8 percent and a budget deficit of 10 percent, these amounts would rise to 18,000 guilders and 24,000 guilders respectively by 1987. Even a 5.5 percent deficit would mean the amounts rising to 5,000 guilders and 19,000 guilders respectively. Ruding warned that this simply could not go on because, after all, the citizen must ultimately pay for the deficits.

Receipt of Orders: Receipts of orders by Netherland industry declined slightly in April, mainly due to fewer orders from abroad. As in March, 29 percent of the industrial firms polled by the Central Office of Statistics considered the receipt of orders small. Also as in the previous month, 15 percent of companies described inventories as unduly large. According to the latest economic report by the Office of Statistics, the stock of orders improved for the third month running, following a decline in the last months of 1982 (with the exception of essential and nonessential foods and the oil industry). The index of orders booked (September 1982 = 100) again rose by 1 percentage point. Currently it stands at 97. Stocks of orders rose especially with regard to consumer goods and intermediary goods (for further use in the manufacturing process).

Output: Industrial output in April remained more or less at the level of the previous month. Nor do Dutch firms expect much change in the coming months.

According to the data of the Central Office of Statistics, industrial output declined by 3 percent in the first quarter 1983. A greater drop than for industry as

a whole was recorded by the output volume in the textile and clothing industry, the leather processing industry, the building materials industry and the metal industry. The reduction was less serious in the printing industry. Output was more or less the same in the oil and rubber industries. Production in the first 3 months rose in the essential and nonessential food industry, the paper and chemical industries. From the long-term aspect, industrial production has remained fairly steady from early 1981 to the fourth quarter of 1982. In the last quarter 1982 it declined by 3 percent and stabilized at this rather low level in the first quarter 1983.

Industrial Production

Year/Month		1975 = 100	
1981			. 110
1982			. 107
1982	January		. 113
	February		. 110
	March		. 108
1983	January		. 107
	February		. 108
	March		. 107

The reports by the industrial associations now being published generally demonstrate moderate optimism regarding the future. This is certainly the case in the chemical industry that did quite well last year. After increasing exports in 1982, the metal and electrical engineering industries also expect a recovery of the economy and, consequently, of production and sales.

Labor market: Compared with other EEC countries, the level of unemployment in the Netherlands is very high, especially after the January 1983 change in the definition of unemployment. The level of joblessness is higher only in Belgium and Great Britain. According to the reports by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the trend of the employment situation in the Netherlands is particularly unfavorable. Only in the FRG was the rise in unemployment greater in the period from March 1982 to March 1983. In the FRG it amounted to 32 percent, compared with 29 percent in the Netherlands. Still, the rise in unemployment slowed after the first half of 1982. At that time another 17,000 persons lost their jobs each month; in the first 4 months of 1983 the average was only 12,000.

Unemployment declined less in April than might have been expected in consideration of seasonal influences. At the end of the month, 756,920 people were unemployed in the Netherlands, compared with 767,704 at the end of March. The unemployment rate dropped from 16.4 percent to 16.2 percent. Seasonally adjusted, however, 783,183 people were jobless, compared with 769,201 at the end of March. The unemployment rate thus amounted to 16.8 percent (16.5 percent). Vacancies rose in April by about 370 to 9,006 (seasonally adjusted they declined by about 300 to a total of 8,389).

Wages and Prices: In the 12 months' period to the end of April 1983, inflation in the Netherlands was lower than in all other EEC countries. According to the data published by the EEC Commission, it amounted to 2.5 percent. In the first 4 months of 1983 inflation in the Netherlands stood at 0.8 percent and was lower in that period only in the FRG at 0.4 percent. In the European Community inflation rose by an average of 3.2 percent and, in the year to the end of April 1983 by 8.7 percent. From mid-March to mid-April prices rose by 0.3 percent in the Netherlands. The prices of 41 percent of the goods and services registered by the Central Office of Statistics were on the rise, including mainly women's clothing, motor fuel, used cars and public transportation. Declines were recorded by 35 percent of goods and services, in particular pork and children's clothing.

Due to the average 4.2 percent increase in support prices for farm products agreed in Brussels in mid-May, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in The Hague reported that Dutch food prices as a whole will rise by an average of 0.9 percent in the 1983/1984 season. The cost of living will therefore grow by an estimated 0.1 percent.

Wages and Prices

Year/Month (Wages (1972 = 100)	Consumer Pric (1980 = 100)
1981	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	200	106.7
1982		213	113.0
1982 February		211	111.0
March		211	111.9
April		211	112.3,
1983 February		214	114.7
March		214	114.9
April		214	115.3

^{*} Preliminary data

Foreign trade: In March 1983, at 15.2 billion guilders, Netherlands imports were equal to those of March 1982. Exports amounted to 17,4 billion guilders compared with 17.2 billion guilders in March last year. According to reports by the Central Office of Statistics, imports rose by 4 percent in the first months 1983 compared with the first quarter 1982, to 41.8 billion (40.2 billion) guilders. In the same period, exports remained almost unchanged by comparison with the first quarter 1982 at 46.6 (46.5) billion guilders. Compared with the first quarter 1982 the share of energy and energy products in total imports and exports was smaller. As regards imports, it declined to 25 percent (first quarter 1982: 27 percent), for exports to 26 (28) percent. An increase was also recorded in imports of automobiles (plus 25 percent) and exports of flowers (plus 16 percent).

Foreign Trade

Year/Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
1981	 170.8	164.5	+ 6.3
1982	 176.9	167.1	+ 9.8
January	 14.6	12.3	+ 2.3
February	 14.7	12.7	+ 2.0
March	 17.2	15.2	+ 2.0
1983 January	 14.6	13.3	+ 1.3
February	 14,6	13.3	+ 1.3
March	 17.4	15,2	+ 2.2

Current account: In the first quarter the surplus in the Netherlands current account increased due to the improvement in the balance of trade and services. In terms of transactions (date of the realization of the transaction) it amounted to 5.3 billion guilders according to the preliminary data of the Netherlands Central Bank. In the 12 months April 1982 through March 1983 the surplus therefore amounted to 9.7 billion guilders. After seasonal adjustments, a 4 billion guilder surplus remained in the first quarter 1983, following only 320 million guilders in the last quarter 1982, 3.6 billion guilders in the second quarter and 1.7 billion guilders in the third quarter.

11698

CSO: 3620/396

POLITICAL BELGIUM

SPITAELS ON WALLONIAN COMMUNITY, ECONOMIC ISSUES

Brussels LF SOIR in French 10 Jun 83 p 2

[Interview with Guy Spitaels, president of the Socialist Party, by Guy Duplat, Guy Depas, Catherine Ferrant, and Jacques Van Solinge; date and place not specified]

[Text] Is the Socialist Party just watching developments? Not really. And in any case no more so than the other European socialist parties. Is it willing to go out into the streets? Yes, if it is to support a national action program of the FGTB [General Federation of Labor of Belgium]. However, not with the socialists of Liege, whose problems concern only their city and do not require intervention by the national level of the party.

Clearly, Guy Spitaels, president of the Socialist Party, has some difficulty in finding his footing in a political and social situation whose movement, disorganization, weakness, and even disarray he sees all too clearly. The views which he expressed to us, in the interview which appears below, and even more the tone of his remarks indicate the prudence of a man who certainly wants to act like a leader of the Walloon Left-and exclusively Walloon—but who has decided not to turn down anything or to make any definitive judgment regarding his side of the regional border.

For the desire expressed by the president of the Socialist Party to bring together "the half of Wallonia which has its heart on the Left" does not seem to him to be incompatible with the contacts which he has initiated and intends to continue with, in the political arena, with a Liberal Party which might join and comfort him in certain political struggles, against Flanders and for the steel industry.

In the struggle against Flanders, Guy Spitaels is not tempted much, at least for the immediate future, by the prospect of joining in a national government. Varying between criticism of a policy of austerity which could be handled in another way and a cold refusal to break with the Christian Socialists, the trade unions, the other progressive groups, and the constituent elements of his own party, it is really on the Wallonian scene that the president of the Socialist Party intends to operate.

And the steel industry? Guy Spitaels states that the government is pursuing a policy that is leading to a slow asphyxiation of the Cockerill-Sambre Steel Complex.

[Question] Does the forthcoming participation of the Socialist Party in the FGTB meeting mean that it accepts the trade union's views? Is the Socialist Party becoming a more active participant in national affairs?

[Answer] I don't understand what you mean. When I look at what the socialists are doing in Great Britain, in the Netherlands, and in Germany, I don't see how what they are doing that is different from what we're doing! In Belgium the Socialist Party is discreet. Meanwhile, for the past year we have been on the side of the steelworkers.

Having made that point, we must say that the present government, with half of the parliamentary term now over, has aroused feelings of deep discontent. The problems of the steel industry, the problems of national and local finance, the problems of the construction industry—all of these have continued with no solution in sight. On the other hand, even in the government parties there are people who, like us, want to see adoption of a selective economic recovery program and want to make progress on our community problems.

Regarding the FGTB, all of the Walloon FGTB, it has proposed to the movement of the Left, to the presidential majority as it was once called, to join in its demonstration. And as long as the Socialist Party does not have to agree to any particular claims, we unanimously decided to join in a demonstration whose main themes are general in nature.

[Question] Is the Socialist Party becoming a trade union?

[Answer] Our activity in companies has nothing to do with the trade unions. We will not become involved in trade union claims, but we will establish party business sections, for example, at the CGER [expansion unknown] or at Sabena [Belgian national airline], as far as Brussels is concerned.

Slow Asphyxiation of Cockerill-Sambre

[Question] Do you think that the present government is threatened with collapse?

[Answer] Its principal concern is with public finance, a catastrophic situation that is not improving. However, thanks to the special powers that

have been voted to it, I think that the government will avoid collapse from this issue. Then there is Cockerill-Sambre. In this connection I would like to make three comments. First, on 30 May Andriessen, the EEC commissioner, asked the Belgian Government to send him its plan for steel. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg have already provided their plans. We haven't done anything!

I should also comment, furthermore, on the slow but steady expansion in the role of Mr Gandois. At first he was a simple consultant. Now he has become the government negotiater with foreign countries and he even has influence on the management of companies. Will this continue from now until the end of Delruelle's term in office and toward a new episode in the waltz of prime ministers?

Finally, I must say that if it is necessary to solve the financing problem of the Gandois plan immediately, the solution will be really difficult. So, and here I am expressing my opinion, will the government decide not to answer Andriessen and let the summer vaction arrive without deciding anything? It could spend the summer with little financial dirty tricks, giving the EEC time to decide with authority and for the sake of peace and quiet, what should be done with Cockerill-Sambre. The government could then throw its hands in the air, saying that this was a decision by the EEC. That would mean continuing with the slow asphyxiation of Cockerill-Sambre.

Role of CSC Very Important

[Question] Is your participation in the FGTB demonstration also intended to bring pressure to bear to reach a decision more quickly on the future of Cockerill-Sambre?

[Answer] The key to this problem is not in our hands. It is in the hands of the government. And the role of the CSC [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] will be very important. I hope that it will take part in this demonstration. But even if it doesn't take part, its influence will be very great. The Christian Democratic cabinet ministers would be ill-advised if they pretend to see nothing of what is happening with the steel industry problem.

[Question] But does the Socialist Party have an alternative?

[Answer] I have already had occasion to say that the problem of possibly keeping a third steel plant remains before us, and that you can't completely eliminate all steel activity at Seraing. But, of course, the problem is not a simple one. Reactions to the Gandois plan are not the same in Liege and in Charleroi. Neither can we devote all the resources of Wallonia just to a steelworks, and I know the forecasts regarding the steel market. As in the case of the city of Liege, as in the case of public finance, we decline to say, regarding Cockerill-Sambre: "There's nothing more to do." We know that there are things to do.

[Question] Are you ready to cooperate with the present majority?

[Answer] We are in favor of participation in the Harmel Center which reflects on our institutional problems. But only on the condition that, first of all, there is a meeting among French-speakers. The Flemish see each other and often have the same point of view. We must have a discussion among French-speakers, without there being any question of imposing our views or reaching a consensus.

On Louis Michel's Lap

[Question] Like Louis Michel, the president of the PRL [Party of Liberty and Walloon Reform], you have called for the development of a consensus among French-speakers?

[Answer] Yes, but Louis Michel is playing a childish game. At first he calls for a consensus and then he says that Spitaels is "in a tight spot." What does he want? Does he want me to come and sit on his lap?

[Question] Has this consensus been stated in precise terms?

[Answer] The unanimous view of the Walloon Regional Executive on the regionalization of the five national sectors is very comforting. All of its members, including the two Liberals and the Christian Socialist, rejected regionalization limited to Cockerill-Sambre. I should also say that if there had been just this one decision, that would already have justified the 1980 regionalization effort. If this regional alternative power did not exist, the national government would have had its hands free to resolve the problems of the Wallonian steel industry as it understood them.

[Question] But you have two irons in the fire. You seek a consensus among French-speakers and, on the other hand, you are participating in these meetings of Walloon parties of the Left, at the initiative of the trade unions?

[Answer] I will not try to hide the fact that next Wednesday I am going to Groenendael to meet with the "small" parties of the Walloon Left--I hope they don't take the adjective "small" too badly--and with the trade unions. The CSC will be represented!

I think that these two things are not irreconcilable. We must encourage a certain kind of unity with the Left. Without wanting to act like a boa constrictor, which digests its prey, we have an interest in ensuring that relations within the Left are clear. It is important that the progressive half of Wallonia knows what it wants to do.

But on the other hand there is so little time left in the near future that I favor a broader formula. We don't want to play 50 percent of the people against the other 50 percent. I can see all the groups in Charleroi marching together to defend the interests of their city the employers included. I can hear Gol And Gillon speaking together about Liege. Why couldn't I do the same thing at the regional level?

As a Leftist, I have an interest in the coherence of the Left. But as a politician I want a broad consensus to meet immediate needs and to defend ourselves against possible future developments.

Selective Economic Recovery

[Question] And if the government should fall, are you ready to return to a position of national power?

[Answer] We are very much aware that the economic situation has deteriorated considerably. The deficit to be financed in the state budget is as large as last year's.

We can't solve all of that, all at once. However, we want selective economic recovery in carefully chosen sectors. And in terms of the EEC, in order to avoid an extraordinary mess, it will be necessary to increase the powers of the executive branch considerably.

[Question] And what about Liege? You're very discreet about this question, which doesn't seem to be seen in a unanimous way within your party?

[Answer] If I took a position, it would be the first time that the national bureau interfered in the problems a commune's socialist union. If I commented on Liege today, I would have to intervene tomorrow in the problems of Mons or Brussels.

I will limit myself to indicating two basic considerations to our office-holders at the commune level. They should not abandon what is essential for us. And I am thinking in particular of those receiving pensions, who seem threatened by the preliminary agreement reached in Liege. However, on the other hand they should not let themselves believe that everything is possible. Each one should make his own contribution to the solution.

[Question] But isn't the Liege affair a national problem?

[Answer] Above all it is a problem for Liege.

There is Austerity and Austerity

[Question] You are not proclaiming a paradise, quite the contrary, but what is the difference between Socialist austerity and the austerity of the Martens-Gol cabinet?

[Answer] ? efforts made could be organized in a different way and not deal with . essential aspect. I am thinking, for example, of the dangerous proposals for pensions which Dehaene [minister of social welfare and institutional reform] and Mainil [secretary of state for pensions] are preparing. In reality, between Martens and us I see a double line dividing us. First, there is a line of social division. We cannot raise questions about those who have already retired. I regret that some people are raising the specter of non-payment of pensions. In social security we refuse to

dismantle the system any further. The second dividing line is economic. After the devaluation of the [Belgian] franc we had to accept adjustment of the (cost of living) index. Even Georges Debunne accepted this. However, a third year of a dropping GNP and domestic consumption and a collapsing construction industry..., this can't go on. Even reports as official as those of the OECD [Organization tor Economic Cooperation and Development] have contained warnings for our country. Now we have to begin the process of selective recovery. In terms of moderation in salaries, too much is too much.

Our restrictive policies are not getting the same results as those adopted elsewhere by right wing governments. Our inflation is clearly more serious than that of our (EEC) partners. Certainly, it is largely imported. But that makes no difference. We are accumulating disadvantages: prices, public finances, unemployment. Practically the only thing to the credit of the Martens government is our trade balance.

5170

cso: 3619/72

POLITICAL

COALITION PARTIES USING SUMMER HIATUS TO PLAN STRATEGY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Jun 83 Sect II pp 1, 2

[Article by Helle Bygum: "We Are Alive and Well"]

[Text] The Folketing has been sent on vacation but the government is still at work. Tactics must be established for the late summer and fall just after the musketeers' oath of "One for all and all for one" has been sworn to.

The government is like a sundial--it counts only the bright hours.

Its trademark today is as at its start: will and optimism.

It is true that the Folketing came out of its doors somewhat headlong and inelegantly for summer vacation after a politically highly dramatic 24-hour period and it is true that not everything went according to wishes and plans, but this did not make the prime minister and his sworn ministers wince or sleep badly. On the contrary. And it is, pinpricks and rough political tackling aside, "still better to be prime minister than not to be."

This "thickskinnedness," the dogged will to endure, is not to give rise to associations with an elephant, they say in the government, but with another of the animal kingdom's less exotic and just as popular creatures—the one with many lives.

In any case the government for which was predicted the shortest life within living memory got through the first nine months even to its own satisfaction. It is alive and well and is working.

And it wants to continue to do so, for its ambition is to be an epoch, not just an episode, in Danish political history.

It is said a little cheerfully in the government that the psychological starting point was to "want to walk on water" when an exhausted Anker Jørgensen "with the customary shrewdness of a statesman" handed over the reins just as the international recovery was around the corner. The desire was to show a non-socialist alternative and the voters signed for this after the first seven months by choosing the government in opinion polls as the most popular since the Second World War.

To be sure, the international recovery must have a share in the government's success, but it is not alone in this, for had there been no inducement to be a team and play together the Quartet would not have withstood the life-threatening political attacks. With the bad experiences from the VKR [expansion unknown] remembered, wearing each other out with control ministers has been refrained from. It is possible to keep one's mouth shut. And from the start hands were shaken and promises were given to one another that here it was one for all and all for one. No special interests—neither for parties nor for ministers.

This musketeers' oath was sworn and enjoined additionally after the most recent experiences. Now it is a question of "shutting up," working, and establishing tactics which can endure just through the fall's budget debate. In these summer months a census will be taken of "friends and enemies" in the non-socialist coalition parties.

Schlüter the Success

The success is also called Poul Schlüter. Not only the government's leader in name, but to a high degree in fact. The family's beloved and respected father who ingeniously manages to be prime minister for four parties—quite as he demands that the individual ministers be ministers for four parties.

Deep within the Social Democratic Party they take their hats off to Schlüter. For his abilities in negotiations, not only with four parties, but also with the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, and the most difficult of all, the "two progress parties," the 12-man group and the "death squad" of Glistrup, Voigt and Glensgaard.

"He has the ambition to govern and does what the Social Democrats knew they ought to do but did not dare. And then he seems have and energetic and keeps himself, in contrast to Anker Jørgensen, in the background," they say at Christiansborg.

When the Radical Liberals pointed at Schlüter as the future prime minister, there was no doubt in the group. As Niels Helveg Petersen said at the group meeting, "Schlüter will be sensationally good. His qualities will be more than very suitable in the situation."

He has, they say, a distinct ability to avoid trivial conflicts and can to an exceptional degree get people to work as a team. And then he has an unoffended nature. One can disagree with him but never become unfriendly.

Tranquillity and Faith

He is undramatically inclined. Hectic, late talks around in front of an open TV screen with a swarm of journalists waiting outside are not his style. He does not want to be the man in the center and hands over even big negotiations to department ministers and takes charge only at the last minute if this is desired and required.

His purpose is to restore tranquillity and faith in the future to the people. And in the Folketing. The ministers were ordered to be finished with work before Constitution Day and the Folketing's vacation. And they were.

When it then went headlong anyway it was due to the fact that, for one thing, they say, the government fell for the temptation of resting on its laurels after the collective bargaining and of postponing major vexing problems. And that no government could prepare itself for, let alone have the imagination to envision, what the progress people could think of. Even for political opponents under the prime minister to get past the sentence of the Supreme Court in the Glistrup affair.

At minister meetings he has been praised for an adroit settlement and his cheerful friendliness is famous, but he can also be severe. Grethe Fenger Møller, for one, knows this. After an exchange of views in which Schlüter enjoined the ministers to coordinate their work with the Finance Ministry, that they are not to become "department heads," the labor minister said that this was a term for distrust of their will to save. The prime minister rapidly retorted, "That remark was out of place. Out of place." And then there was silence.

The Partnership

He has Finance Minister Henning Christophersen at his side through thick and thin. It is no State secret that the Liberal Party would gladly have had leadership of the government, but this has not had any meaning for the relationship between these two. They supplement one another, their chemistry suits one another well and they think very much alike. Exchanges like this are not infrequent: "You know, I was thinking this evening..." "That's funny, I had exactly the same idea..."

They have also the same type of humor, although Henning Christophersen's humor is reserved more for intimate gatherings—and not for TV at all—while Schlüter is the fast quick-witted remark man.

It is said straight out in the government that Schlüter obediently administers Henning Christophersen's and the Liberal economists' policy, which has been the entire foundation stone for the government up to now. That Christophersen is, to be sure, so much the backbone, but that Schlüter's manner gets the Liberal Party's bitter medicine to go down among the people, and that the government's life would have been short if the role; had been assigned differently.

Fix Point

Together with Erik Ninn-Hansen and Anders Andersen, the two parties' "national strategists," they comprise the government's fix point. The absolute center of the "little cabinet," the government's coordination committee, which has as members in addition Mimi Stilling Jacobsen and Arne Melchior from the Democratic Center Party and the Christian People's Party's solitary Christian Christensen. It is here where agreement must be reached. It is here that tactics are established and it is here that the ideas and legislative desires of department ministers are to be assessed critically and approved.

Associated with minimization of internal cooperation problems is also the fact that the ministers frequently hold meetings with spokesmen of the remaining parties. This should ensure good information.

The government has fewer committees than governments usually have. But one of the important and successful ones is the "savings gang," where, it is said, an incredible will to save and to cooperate has been displayed. It is led sovereignly by Henning Christophersen supplemented by Social Affairs Minister Palle Simonsen, but consists in addition of Bertel Haarder, Britta Schall Holberg, Mimi Stilling Jacobsen, Grethe Fenger Møller and Christian Christensen.

The fewer standing committees make government meetings of better quality and more lively. Things are discussed here, reports are not just made by ministers, and the discussions criss-cross ministers and parties. This has made one of the older ministers sigh, "This government is talkative."

Milk on the Table

Covernment meetings, where in this government there are milk cartons on the table, extend into a quick lunch, but otherwise lunch meetings and lunch clubs are not characteristic. Schlüter does not have a lunch club as his predecessor did, but he eats together with the conservative ministers and Group Chairman Knud Østergaard each Friday.

This knife-and-fork restraint should not be taken as an expression of asceticism. The government celebrates happily and willingly. After the New Year's royal banquet everyone together with their partners was invited home to Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs Elsebeth Koch-Petersen's, who then also celebrated Minister of Housing Niels Bollmann's bachelor party. A big "personnel party" has been held at Marienborg with partners, and the next is set for 9 September--after midnight the celebration of the government's first anniversary can begin.

Great importance is attached to this social getting together, which is included to give the work a more informal character and to strengthen personal relations. The prime minister and Henning Christophersen see each other four or five times some days. They telephone each other a lot and they gladly sit down with a beer and philosophize if there is time left.

Friendships

Minister of the Interior Britta Schall Holberg has introduced "open house" for colleagues in her ministry.

Bertel Haarder, Mimi Stilling Jacobsen, Tom Høyem and Elsebeth Koch-Petersen have formed a Grundtvig Committee, whose main purpose is to coordinate the Grundtvig Anniversary activities but which has also developed into an "intellectual political discussion club" over a well-provided table in homes on a rotation basis. The minister of ecclesiastical affairs has especially revealed culinary talents.

The choice of people in the government is considered fortunate, the age distribution is a good stop for rivalry, and there are many friendships. The labor minister is especially good friends with the group's wise adviser, Ninn Hansen, with the tax minister and with the culture minister. The minister of ecclesiastical affairs and the interior minister are good friends and the minister of ecclesiastical affairs has a very high opinion of the Liberal Party's legendary Anders Andersen.

Bertel Haarder, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Henning Christophersen have always "played at governing" and have been close friends, while Bertel Haarder and Tom Høyem had exchanged ideas regarding a non-socialist society even before they entered government service.

Great importance is attached to being "kind to one another." To consoling one another, as, for example, when Tom Høyem as the first minister left in a storm and his head was demanded on a platter. Then Britta Schall Holberg sent him a bouquet of flowers, and when he actually considered resigning and went to the prime minister he received a friendly pat on the shoulder and the comforting words that within a half year this will have been forgotten and that many colleagues had weathered a similar storm.

Ministers' Storms

This came true. Bertel Haarder, the government's popular instigator, has not unexpectedly been enveloped in a storm—which, however, suits his nature well; Grethe Fenger Møller has had her case with the dockworkers and Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann—Jensen got his turn in the ring from the Social Democrats and his otherwise good friend Kjeld Olesen. Totally unjustly, they say, and add that now he is not making life easier for himself because he loves to debate and the fast impudent retort and has difficulty in holding his tongue.

There is also the good note in the fellowship that if there is to be criticism the criticism should rather come from one's own group, so that "breaches" do not take place between the parties and thereby have a more vehement and "ideological" effect.

But the minister of transportation, however, experienced running the gauntlet between his minister colleagues and exposing himself to many critical questions in connection with the arrangement between the Postal Service and the Bank of Jutland, before the prime minister sprinkled sand on the floor and called upon everyone to "help the minister down on his knees." In return the "affair" was quickly forgotten.

The Competent Ones

The government's undisputed all-A's girl is the culture minister, who has lived up to expectations. She has political flair and sense to sell her views and in spite of everything she has an idea for her ministry. The somewhat cutting "in spite of everything" comes from those who think that the Democratic Center Party does not have a very forceful or easily administerable cultural policy.

The young defense minister, Hans Engell, met a little Liberal scepticism in the beginning but is also praised today. The same salute is given to the very industrious and negotiation-skilled minister of social affairs, Palle Simonsen.

Arne Melchior's spontaneity and indiscretion made some concerned, but he has proven to be very loyal and positive with respect to cooperation, they say, just as the third Democratic Center minister, Tom Høyem, is more "subdued," very willing to cooperate and happy for his normally not very esteemed Ministry for Greenland.

The bad grades are given to the labor minister, who "although she has been for a long time at Christiansborg has not really learned the art of politics," and to the minister of ecclesiastical affairs, who has an internal role as "liaison officer" but who "has not been able to distinguish herself externally"—and internally has surprised some colleagues by a "reactionary" attitude in immigration questions, for one thing.

Troubles

Of course, everything is not idyllic. Agriculture Minister Niels Anker Kofoed to a great extent represents himself in the Liberal Party and Industry Minister Ib Stetter is characterized as the government's "sourpuss"—the only one who has not really fallen into line and who in the government's first few weeks had needly toppled it from within.

While there is a tradition of party discipline in the Conservative Folketing group and where today a problem-free atmosphere prevails—"It is going well for us; it is like a business which is earning money"—there are problems in the Liberal Party's Folketing group.

The members feel that they do not get supplied with information in time and they are not sufficiently consulted. It is a "constitutional" problem in the group which has always been the most obstinate Folketing group with the ambition to want to endorse everything and have a policy in all areas.

A "bookkeeping department's mentality" which, for one thing, irritates the Democratic Center Party and individual Conservatives, who would gladly see a little more soaring over the field. It is no secret either that passions have run high between the Liberal Party's tax policy spokesman Anders Poulsen and Tax Minister Isi Foighel. When Foighel had negotiated real-interest taxation with the Social Democrats he forgot to hold a spokesmen's meeting with the parties' spokesmen to Anders Poulsen's great annoyance—so great that Group Chairman Ivar Hansen had to take Anders Poulsen to the Tax Ministry so it could be smoothed out.

New Notes

Isi Foighel, tax professor and his party's pragmatist, on the other hand, is happy with Henning Christophersen—they are like a married couple where one earns the money and the other spends it—and his predecessor in the post, Mogens Lykketoft. They understand one another as only two technocrats can do, it is said at Christiansborg.

It is the solitary minister from the Christian People's Party, Christian Christensen, who has it the hardest. Not that he does not do it well, but he must get more done than the others and he has constant trouble with his Folketing group, whose chairman, Arne Bjerregaard, often issues press releases to the effect that the party is very uneasy over what the government has just decided. It is a strain which Christian Christensen makes no secret of.

He has been a positive surprise—not least for officials in the Environment Ministry, whom he in turn has been able to curb, although this also means that he is the minister who is most a "prisoner of the apparatus."

With Britta Schall Holberg the Interior Ministry has woken up to a new day in which the "cobwebs are being removed from the corners" effectively and from which press releases are being issued as something completely new. She is said, in spite of her "schoolgirl manner," to be one of the government's men.

The same modernization attempts are being made in the Ministry for Greenland, where the instructions are now that matters are to receive an answer before three weeks. In the Ministry of Transportation, where letters are now begun with "Dear," where "unfortunately" or another form of regret is added to refusals, where "thank you" is said for applications, and where the word "one" is taboo because it is too impersonal.

Gallup Ratings

The minister of education does not want to see words like "focus" and "withdrawal" in letters with his signature. The word "interdisciplinary" is also to be used with restraint. In addition, he is trying to change the apparatus by strengthening the department and keeping the influence of the directorates at a greater distance. As a consequence of the administrative aspects of his job as minister he has begun to become interested in management theories.

It has been noticed that what is grumbled over internally in the government is the Conservative Party's generous Gallup ratings. This irritates the Liberal Party the most, which feels it to be unjust that the difficult ministries have been taken on-those the Social Democrats have the greatest inclination to lash out against—and the rewards from the people are so poor for this.

It is admitted that the Conservative Party has been skillful PR-wise. The party's image has been adroitly turned around from being conservative and reactionary to that of a modern industrial party. They have been skillful in talking about optimism and national self-respect while the Liberal Party has been unpleasantly honest and has not glossed over realities.

The Future

The government is like a toddler. A sweet little thing with lead in its behind--not in its head--which one can hammer away at again and again. It never gets up. The picture comes--without irritation--from the government's own ranks, where choices "at the wrong moment" are rejected with "seven nos." The Gallup ratings are petty spites after all.

Then there is also the broad political opinion that the government—especially after this summer vacation—will finish its term. Will even contradict the dogma that a non-socialist government cannot be re-elected. It will happen again—with all four parties.

But its life will not be without problems--for trees are not permitted to grow into the sky.

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POLITICAL DENMARK

GLISTRUP EXPELLED FROM FOLKETING AS HIS PARTY DECLINES

Glistrup Vows Leadership From Cell

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich]

[Text] Mogens Glistrup still regards himself as the leader of the Progressive Party and he will continue his political work when he begins serving his Superior Court sentence of 3 years in prison, which will probably begin in the latter half of August.

"I will continue my political work to the extent this is possible. For this reason I am naturally hoping that I will get exit permits and leaves from prison, but of course this matter has to be decided on by the prison director," said Mogens Glistrup.

Where would Glistrup prefer to serve his sentence?

"I am hoping for Horserod, which lies within a fairly reasonable distance from my home and my place of work at Christiansborg."

Christiansborg? But what about the recent Folketing vote to expel Glistrup?

"I still have two votes in Folketing--namely those of Leif Glensgard and Mogens Voigt, both of whom have pledged me their votes. Therefore my main place of work will continue to be Folketing," said the founder of the Progressive Party.

What will he do now?

"For the time being I will be writing the campaign plan of the Progressive Party prior to the EC Parliament election next year. And of course I hope to be the party's major candidate at the nomination meeting in December.

"In addition to that, I am of course hoping to run in the Lyngby-Sollerod district in the Folketing election that will probably be held in the fall

and I already have the backing of the Copenhagen County branch of the Progressive Party, which decided at its general meeting in May to back my candidacy regardless of the outcome of the Superior Court verdict.

"I also hope to be able to participate in the TV party leader debate before the election. If I am not granted an exit permit, the TV cameras can probably shift over to my cell when it is my turn in the debate. With the present technology, this must be possible," said Mogens Glistrup, who yesterday submitted the manuscript for the book, "Glistrup on the Glistrup Case," which will be published by Vendelskaers Publishing Company in the fall.

After the visit to the publishing firm, he went to Tivoli and a late lunch with Mrs Lene Glistrup. Last night, Mogens Glistrup and Preben Wilhjelm of VS [Left-Socialist Party] introduced a meeting in Vartov, Copenhagen, on the conditions for popular rule in the 1983 Grundtvig centennial year.

Folketing Replacement Pledges Loyalty

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jul 83 p 9

[Article by H. C. Hansen, Mogens Glistrup's replacement in Folketing]

[Text] First of all, thanks for the nice picture of me on the sofa which BERLINGSKE TIDENDE published on 24 June. It is a reminder that time passes and that it is some years since BERLINGSKE TIDENDE printed the photograph in connection with a statement of mine to the effect that business life was better served by lying on a sofa and having state bonds than by running a business. But when BERLINGSKE TIDENDE wrote in its headline that Mogens Glistrup's successor is a "slacker," it really came as news, even to me. As a member of the Progressive Party's Folketing group in the period 1977-79 I made decisions from one issue to the next—as did all the group members, as a matter of fact—and I have no recollection of "groupings."

If the intervening years have changed this, the terribly unjust verdict has unified the group to the extent that even BERLINGSKE TIDEN can be quite sure that the 15 of us will stick together when we vote in Folketing.

BERLINGSKE TIDENDE continued its usual sober journalism with respect to the Progressive Party in an article by "Monitor" on Monday, 27 June, which called the Progressive Party the party of distrust. "Monitor" wrote, among other things, that "voters for the party are not necessarily opponents of the welfare state. But they distrust the politicians' administration of the tax-payers' money." Now here "Monitor" has really got hold of something! The politicians and voters of the Progressive Party do have a deep distrust of politicians' administration of the taxpayers' money. On the other hand, we have strong confidence that the individual—to a much greater extent than

the public authorities—is capable of administering his own economic funds. While the Social Democrats and parts of the four—leaf—clover parties have a deep distrust of individual Danes and would love to administer their money for them, we in the Progressive Party have confidence in the people. The Social Democratic Party is the party of doomed pocketbooks. Social Democratic policy disenfranchises the individual and creates a "manager's society." A society of small cheats and swindlers whose thoughts are entirely occupied with getting as much as possible from public coffers. An attitude that already characterizes society from top to bottom which in the long run will create a population of politely bowing people with no self—confidence, eager to please the political authorities.

The lack of self-confidence destroys a people more effectively than machineguns or missiles.

It is customary to blame Mogens Glistrup for having created this distrust. Nothing could be more wrong. The well-founded distrust of the political parties then in existence, which already could be found in the late 1960's and early 1970's, was unified by Mogens Glistrup and organized into the Progressive Party, but the distrust was not created by Mogens Glistrup. We Progressive politicians will continue to protest against the destruction of society that has been espoused by the Social Democrats, in particular.

Paper on Fate of Glistrup, Progressives

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jul 83 p 8

[Editorial: "Yesterday"]

[Text] It began on 18 December 1973 and it ended yesterday. The first date is when newly-elected Mogens Glistrup spoke in Folketing for the first time. As a member of the Election Certification Committee, he fought with the committee majority for a re-election in Arhus County. Yesterday he held a fighting speech to refute the majority on the same committee who recommended his expulsion from Folketing. His mission failed in the first instance and it did not succeed yesterday either. But Glistrup used the concluding debate for a renewed presentation of his views and one more assault on the parties and the "system" in a total continuation of the campaign that began almost 10 years ago.

It was not a pleasant day for Folketing, but the decision was inevitable. The Danish Constitution states that one cannot be a member of Folketing if one has been sentenced for an action that is generally regarded as making one unfit to be a member. And the constitution says that Folketing itself must decide whether a member has lost his qualifications for election. There were good arguments for these provisions when they were introduced. There are counter arguments and they have been put forth in the current situation. But they are the law of the land at this time and Folketing could not get

around that. The members of Folketing--including Glistrup--have made a solemn pledge to stand behind the constitution. There is no basis for allegations that this was a decision inspired by a wish to get rid of Glistrup and that this is a case of political persecution. The Superior Court's verdict was a decision whose consequences had to be drawn by Folketing.

That ends a decade of parliamentary effort quite unusual in Danish tradition and history. This was not something the voters did, but Glistrup himself through the grave penalty he incurred for not obeying the laws of the land. For Glistrup it has been an effort based on the voters' lack of confidence in the parties that had shouldered the responsibility, an effort that gained broad support in a showdown that left its mark on all parties and thus made a contribution toward shaping developments. But his party remained a protest movement and the Progressive Party has had an increasingly difficult time in finding a solid foundation for future parliamentary work. To an increasing extent, Glistrup came into conflict with his own people and it is a question whether the party's continued decline would not have led to Glistrup's fall in any event.

The trial that finally was brought to a conclusion has hung over Glistrup's head during all those years in which he was active in Christiansborg. When he first asked a question in Folketing, that is what it was about. It says something about democracy that until yesterday he was able to participate in ruling the nation on an equal footing with others. Both he and others should take note of that.

Progressive Leader Defects to Conservatives

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Jul 83 p 9

[Text] The Progressive Party's "defector" in the European Parliament, manufacturer Kai Nyborg, has joined the Conservative Party, according to RINGKJOBING AMTS DAGBLAD.

Kai Nyborg left the Progressive Party a month ago in protest against the unrest and schism in the party's Folketing group.

"For me it is a political question of returning to a point of departure," Kai Nyborg told the newspaper.

He revealed that he had voted for the Conservatives all his life until Mogens Glistrup turned up and started the Progressive Party.

"My resignation has nothing to do with the Superior Court sentence on Glistrup. The resignation was the result of deliberations lasting many months," said Kai Nyborg, who will not know until January whether the Conservative Party will put him on the party's slate for the next EC election a year from now.

"And the party has neither set conditions for me nor given me any promises," Kai Nyborg said.

6578

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POLITICAL DENMARK

PARTIES ON FAR LEFT HAVING PROBLEMS WITH IDEOLOGY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jun 83 p 36

[Article by Solveig Rødsgaard: "Voter War on Left Wing"]

[Text] The market has become smaller for the far-left wing, where a new party is running for the Folketing.

The left wing is not well off in Denmark at the moment. The market is very small and both the Communist Party of Denmark (DKP) and Leftist Socialist Party (VS) can tell about this. It is a long time since voters in Folketing elections and in opinion polls have put the DKP in the Folketing and the VS also has big problems with holding members and voters.

But it is still more difficult to be the left wing's left wing. Here there are three parties for the very few members and the parties can neither stand one another nor the DKP and VS. The mutual war on the left wing is what drains the most energy from the parties, so therefore it will be a long time before the citizenry gets to see which interpretation of the revolutionary text is the correct one.

The left wing's left wing is called the KAP, SAP and DKP/ML--the Communist Worker's Party, the Socialist Worker's Party, the Danish section of the Fourth International, and the Communist Party of Denmark/Marxist-Leninist.

The DKP/ML calls itself outwardly the Marxist-Leninist Party in order to avoid confusion with the "old revisionist Communist Party of Denmark." The party has just for the first time gotten a list of signatures approved to run for the next Folketing election and at the same time has triumphantly reported that the KAP has had so many signatures invalidated in the Interior Ministry that it has not been approved to run.

And this is quite correct. The KAP has, moreover, decided to save its energy and reconsider first in the fall whether to try to collect new signatures. So if there is a fall election revolutionary voters will be able to choose only between the Marxist-Leninist Party and the SAP--if they do not go so far to the right that they end up in the DKP and VS.

The KAP ran for the election for the first time in 1979 and that time received 13,070 votes. The share of the votes dropped to 4223 in the 1981 election. In the same election the SAP ran for the first time and got 2034 votes. The DKP, i.e., the real one, got 34,625 votes and the VS 82,711.

Offerings

But what can the left wing's left wing offer Danes? For ordinary voters it is difficult to see differences in the parties' offerings. But for the initiated the difference is so great that it is deadly serious.

The KAP is the oldest party. It was formed in 1968 under the name Communist Marxist-Leninist Alliance and one of the cofounders was the well-known Maoist Benito Scocozza, who is still the party's chairman. In November 1976 the party's name was changed to the Communist Worker's Party. Today the KAP has 300 members, which is a drop from the big time of 700 to 800 members. That was the time the trade movement was afraid of the active "Chinese" at places of work.

"The alternative to the Liberals" is what the KAP has called itself and the party's main objective is socialism Danish style. That is to say, an "alliance-free Denmark which turns from both the USA and the Soviet Union and a Denmark with a people's militia defense system in a Scandinavian defense union." And the KAP goes a great deal in for work in peace movements, for one thing, in order to show that peace initiatives must come from both the USA and Soviet Union.

In the days of prosperity the KAP published ARBEJDERAVISEN [the Worker's Newspaper], which came out every 14 days, but it now concentrates its energies on the KOMMUNISTISK TIDSSKRIFT [Communist Periodical], which comes out 8 or 10 times a year.

Scocozza

In comparison with the other two ultra-left-wing parties the KAP has the advantage that it has a party chairman who outwardly displays a sense of humor and is not afraid to speak ironically of the left wing. Otherwise it is not simple humor and self-irony which characterizes the revolutionaries.

Benito Scocozza acknowledges the decline on the left wing. "These are crisis times for us, too. Nor do I believe that it is something passing. It will take some time before people open their eyes to what is happening to them under the right-wing wave. But I think we will survive."

Regarding the KAP: "We have become more realistic. This is, to be sure, the reason for the decline. We have come away from the 70's dreams about China, the Cultural Revolution, etc. We are trying to practice socialism Danish style."

SAP

The SAP is the Trotskyite party. It was formed in the spring of 1980 by the Danish section of the Fourth International, the Revolutionary Socialist Alliance. At

the moment it has about 200 members. The party holds a congress every year and the congress is the highest authority. The leadership between congresses is the central committee of about 25 members and the everyday leadership has a business committee. Mogens Pedersen, cand. mag. [Master of Arts], is one of them who most strongly characterizes the party's profile outwardly.

The most important areas of work are the trade movement and peace movements. But it is also no secret that the party knows something about BZ [expansion unknown] actions. The main task at the moment is to get rid of the non-socialist government. Besides, the SAP will fight for the working class's unity of action, which, for one thing, would be able to take place with closer cooperation between the working class's parties.

But international work also has a high priority—this is evident from the name—and the SAP says that the Fourth International is fighting everywhere to gain unity in the international struggle for socialism. The party's weekly, KLASSEKAMPEN [Class Struggle], is at the moment leading a struggle for dockworkers.

DKP/ML

The Marxist-Leninist Party was founded at the end of 1978 and most of the party's members are old KAP members. The background for the schism with the KAP was very ideological: the breach between China and Albania. The Marxist-Leninist party includes ultra-Stalinists, but how many there are of them the party will not come out with. Just as the KAP and SAP did previously, they are outwardly silent regarding the membership figure. "Because we have seen many examples of registration of progressive people."

The party has a congress every year and the congress elects the central committee which again elects a politbureau and a secretariat. The secretariat elects a first secretary who at the moment is Teacher Klaus Riis.

The Marxist-Leninist Party is fighting for a socialist Denmark under the dictatorship of the proletariat and its members work hard and concentratedly. As Benito Scocozza says, "They are fierce and sectarian. And I known them, for most of them come from us."

The party will not cooperate officially with the left-wing parties. "We have the principle that we do not cooperate with leaders of revisionist parties. But we can cooperate well in the basic sc. ame of things, for example, regarding demonstrations."

Otherwise the party has as its program preparation for the proletarian revolution, "overthrow of the bourgeois dictatorship through armed revolution and establishment of the new class supremacy, the new State of the proletarian dictatorship."

The party's ideal country is Albania. "The true vitality of socialism, its life force and complete supremacy are demonstrated today by socialist Albania, the world's only socialist country in which the supremacy of the proletariat is a fact," as it reads in the central committee's report to the party's Second Congress.

The Marxist-Leninist Party publishes the daily ARBEJDEREN [the Worker].

DKP and VS

If voters do not find the supply sufficiently convincing on the left wing's left wing, the DKP and VS are left. Unless it is as in the last election that the SF [Socialist People's Party] becomes the top scorer among worker's parties. The three parties, moreover, have practiced a form of cooperation by for the first time in many years celebrating the First of May in common, and this is very sensational in these circles.

But otherwise members and voters are filtering off from the VS, which in the next election will also have the problem that parliamentary veterans Preben Wilhjelm and Steen Folke are not running again. The mood is also somewhat dull in the DKP. In connection with the party's congress it was emphasized many times that there are problems, for one thing, because of the "smear campaign against the DKP and the Soviet Union."

8985

CSO: 3613/134

POLITICAL DENMARK

BRIEFS

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S YOUTH ORGANIZATION CONGRESS—Young Socialist People's Party members disagree with the parent party. The national leadership of the Socialist People's Party's Youth Organization has come into opposition with its parent party. The SFU [Socialist People's Party Youth Organization] disagrees with the decision which the party's national congress made regarding the fact that not all wage earners should receive full wage compensation when the work week is reduced to 35 hours a week. "Only with extensive mobilization out around places of work can the demand for shortening of the work week with full wage compensation be fought through in collective bargaining," the SFU says. From a meeting over the weekend the SFU states that it is not to become a cushion for the trade movement, that the Socialist People's parent party will raise the work week question in the Folketing. [By dax] [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jun 83 p 7] 8985

CSO: 3613/134

GREENLANDERS INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT WITH EC ON STATUS TERMS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jun 83 p 9

[Article by Nils Morten Udgaard: "Greenlanders Tired of Waiting for EC"]

[Text] The patience of the Greenlanders with the EC, which they would like to withdraw from, is about to run out. There are half-hidden rumors floating around Brussels that the world's largest island is going to pull out of the community "unilaterally," if the EC does not manage to clarify the resignation issue before 1 August of this year.

The EC's geographical area will be more than cut in half when Greenland, with its 2.2 million square kilometers, resigns, leaving "the ten" with their remaining 1.7 million square kilometers. This is a loss of political prestige which hurts here in the EC's capital, but there is no doubt that the community will honor Greenland's democratic right to resign. This was formally stated by the EC's foreign ministers at a meeting as recently as 25 May of this year. The argument no longer has to do with the principle of the thing but rather with more practical interests: to what degree will the EC countries be able to continue fishing in Greenland's waters?

It is the Danes in Brussels who are now representing Greenland's interests in the EC, since the election over continued membership held in February of last year resulted in a 52 percent majority in favor of withdrawing from the European Economic Community. The Greenlanders do not wish to weaken their ties with Denmark, which has sovereignty over the island, or their ties with NATO—the Americans have some important bases on Greenland. The Danes, on the other hand, perceive that Greenland's actual dependence on Denmark is increasing, especially since the island was given the right to govern itself internally in 1979. This is attributed to increasing demands for comfort, accompanied by the need for Danish assistance. The resignation from the EC strengthens this trend. "Greenland has grown too cold for the Greenlanders" is what commentators said when a group of the island's elderly citizens awhile back petitioned for admission into a retirement home—in Denmark. They had every right to do so, just like any Danish citizen.

Here is a little example showing how the need for assistance is likely to remain strong in the future: there is currently one Greenlander studying law in Denmark, out of a total population of 40,000 native Greenlanders and 10,000 of

Danish descent. The 2 billion Danish kroner sent annually to Greenland from Copenhagen takes care of a good half of each person's net income. That is subsidizing at a high percentage rate.

It was not economic calculations which determined the resignation from the EC, but the feeling that the Greenlanders were not properly understood, especially in Brussels. "Without freedom to do as we please in order to survive in our surroundings, our people would have a lot in common with a seal who notices in the middle of a really cold winter that his breathing hole has frozen over," said the island's prime minister, Jonathan Motzfeldt. He was backed up by his colleague in government, Moses Olsen: "We have learned, down through the centuries, how Europeans think and reason. But they have never learned or understood how we think and feel." The mental separation is just as great as the geographical one: a trip from Greenland to Brussels and back, even today, can often take an entire week.

It doesn't help much that the EC is emphasizing what generosity Brussels has shown to Greenland--assistance amounting to much more per person than is given to any other "developing area" in the community, and nine times the average support level to the inhabitants of such areas. Nevertheless, it is the support from Copenhagen which really counts, since more money comes from there in 1 year than has come from Brussels in the course of a 10-year EC membership.

The EC commission has suggested that Greenland should be given OLT status—as "overseas lands and territories," on the order of Brunei, the Falklands, French Polynesia and other former colonies. The Danish foreign minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, also tried to present Greenland's resignation as a natural step in decolonialization, when he spoke in May in favor of giving the Greenlanders good terms at the meeting of the council of ministers. Under OLT status, Greenland could trade without tariffs with EC countries and also receive developmental assistance. But now several countries in the EC, led by the West Germans, are demanding that Greenland in return will have to give the EC countries long—term fishing rights (they are talking about 20 years) in Greenlandic waters. West German fishermen can take, according to the EC's common fisheries policy—a compromise, only recently thrown together—34,000 tons of fish in those waters, since the Greenlanders' own catch in the course of a decade has risen from 35,000 to over 100,000 tons.

Motzfeldt, in an interview with the Belgian press, has labeled the German demand as "totally unacceptable." Both he and the Danes say that it has not been customary "to pay anything" in order to get OLT status. The actual purpose behind Greenland's resignation was to gain full control over the fisheries, which bring in 70 percent of the island's subsistence income. The EC countries can, at the most, be permitted to fish that portion of the biological quota which the Greenlanders themselves don't manage to fish, according to one suggested compromise. Brussels hopes to have this argument cleared up before the EC's summer recess begins on 1 August. Once more, fisheries are being given a decisive political significance, having no reasonable relationship with their modest economic significance in the EC--something which also happened, by the way, in the course of Norwegian negotiations with the EC.

9584

CSO: 3639/124

POLITICAL

FDP'S RASCH ON STRATEGY IN LOCAL ELECTIONS

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 3 Jun 83 p 26-27

[Interview with FDP Chairman Walter Rasch by Ralf-Dicter Brunowsky: "Now the Situation is Much Better;" in Berlin, date not given]

[Text] In the opinion of Walter Rasch, the FDP's chairman in Berlin, the FDP must own up to its role as majority procurer in order to be able to return to the state parliaments. In an interview with WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE Editor Ralf-Dieter Brunowsky, Rasch also describes necessary policy trends.

[Brunowsky] Mr Rasch, the FDP is no longer represented in most state parliaments. Only in Saarland and in Berlin does it have a voice in government. Does this situation and the coalition in Bonn suffice for its political survival?

[Rasch] Without a sufficient representation in the states, the FDP is merely a part-phantom: real in Bonn, but non-existent otherwise. If the FDP is interested in its long-term survival, it absolutely must get back into the state parliaments in order to be able to present to the voters its two essential elements: its function and its platform.

[Brunowsky] What the FDP considers to be its function seems clear: to have as strong a voice in government as possible.

[Rasch] That is of course the aim of every political party. A ruling party is always at an advantage when it attempts to sell its policy. When a minister announces an act of parliament to the public, he always receives more public attention than the one who had submitted the proposal to parliament.

[Brunowsky] But in most states the FDP has no voice in government.

[Rasch] That is precisely the reason why the FDP's function must be explained to the voter. We are not a party which can gain an absolute majority, but rather a party which can create a majority. This the FDP must acknowledge more strongly than it has done up to now. That is an independent role which the citizen influences by giving more votes to one of the two large parties, thus forcing the FDP to give the majority to that party.

[Brunowsky] In other words, the citizens set the trend, and the FDP follows through on that trend?

[Rasch] This is how I see it. The trend favoring the CDU was clear throughout the nation, and the DDP would have lost its function if it had stuck with the SPD forever.

[Brunowsky] This means then that recently the FDP has only made wrong alliances in the states?

[Rasch] In my opinion, yes. It is not our objective to become a CDU appendage everywhere. That would be a big mistake.

[Brunowsky] What is the individual FDP state organization to use as its point of orientation regarding coalition statements?

[Rasch] It must decide, based on objective facts and its own program, with which party it can best pursue liberal policies.

[Brunowsky] How did the FDP go wrong in the states?

[Rasch] In Lower Saxony, it was a mistake not to make a clear statement in favor of a CDU coalition only because chairman Juergens did not like the CDU. There would not have been any problems regarding policy. In Hamburg, neither function nor policy were correct. Although it was clear that an absolute SPD majority was no longer desired by the voters, a conditional SPD coalition was declared.

[Brunowsky] In other words, always leaning towards the CDU.....

[Rasch] In Bremen, a coalition with the SPD would be feasible.

[Brunowsky] As long as the ruling party does not get the absolute majority as in Rhineland-Pfalz.

[Rasch] OK, it won't hurt the FDP to play the opposition role for once.

[Brunowsky] And how should the FDP act in Hesse?

[Rasch] In Hesse, conditions are ideal. There the FDP can rightfully point out that without it there can be no majority capable of ruling. During the last election, the entire republic was in a towering rage, everybody looked to the test in Hesse and the party had no other choice but to come out with a declaration for the CDU, no matter how mistaken that was. And for that it was penalized. Now conditions are much improved. There the party must put its main emphasis on its function.

[Brunowsky] In helping whom get a majority?

[Rasch] The CDU.

[Brunowsky] Do the left wingers go along with all that?

[Rasch] Their criticism of the changover regarding the FDP function continues. But they fully lentify with the platform, e.g., increased personal responsibility in cultural policy.

[Brunowsky] But in terms of platform, the FDP gives the impression of being more concerned with the economy.

[Rasch] This impression must be avoided. Economic questions, especially the stabilization of national revenues, were the reason for the change in Bonn. But equally important are questions of health, welfare, environment and domestic policy.

[Brunowsky] And where can one make out liberal positions in those areas?

[Rasch] Everywhere where personal responsibility and the freedom of the individual in relation to state or social groups play a role. This can be information power. Data protection plays a role there. This can also be the power of labor unions or the power of the state itself. We must fight for that which protects the individual against the power of others.

[Brunowsky] Increased personal responsibility--even subsidiarity--those are positions which the CDU has been supporting very vocally in recent years.

[Rasch] Yes, but that was mostly a contribution to mirth. This was done in theory only; in reality the party here in Berlin and elsewhere is completely caught up in the Public Service, Transportation and Communication Union. It is totally committed to popular positions in accordance with the motto "We cannot alienate the workers," which, by the way, is totally wrong in my opinion. The CDU pays mere lip service to "more free market, less government." But it makes no move in that direction.

9328

CSO: 3620/387

CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONGRESS BEATS DOWN CHALLENGE TO LEADER

MP Attacks Nicaragua Aid

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 26 May 83 p 11

Article: "Coalition's Junnila Offended by Nicaragua Support
□

Text Conservative member of parliament Tuure Junnila is irritated by the fact that many Finnish parties have expressed their support for democratic development of the Nicaraguan state in a joint statement.

Junnila complained about the statement to the government in a parliamentary inquiry and tried to obtain from the government a condemnation of the statement of support.

In responding to Junnila's complaint, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen (Center Party) observes as briefly as possible that the government does not consider it appropriate to take a stand on the statements by private citizens' organizations or by political parties.

Party Now Acceptable to USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 May 83 p 23

Text The National Coalition Conservative Party will meet next weekend in Lahti for their party congress with a bad political hangover. The incipient intoxication felt before the parliamentary elections have been replaced by one of Kalle Tappinen's Monday mornings. Election victory did not come. No one cared about the Conservatives during the government negotiations. The humiliation was only increased by the fact that the SMP Finnish Rural Party of the Conservatives was accepted instead into the government as a symbol of a change in the winds.

So it would have been really amazing if no challenger to chairman Ilkka Suominen, 44, had appeared. One who dared to volunteer was Pertti Salolainen, 42, of the party's parliamentary delegation, who has represented Helsinki many times. Of course he also tried to get into the game four years ago, but threw his support to Suominen already before the party congress.

Now again Salolainen entered the ring very late. He was responding to teasing for having turned tail last time around. But the situation now is different than four years ago when Harri Holkeri got Suominen as his successor without a floor fight or a vote.

Suominen's burden in Lahti will be the squandering of an election victory that was considered certain. It may have resulted from Suominen's weak effort in the great television debate or generally from an unsuccessful campaign strategy, but in the opinion of his critics, the conclusion is clear: if the party does not succeed it is the chairman's fault, and it is time to change chairmen.

"Suominen has taken the Conservative Party back who knows how many years, and it will take years before we are even in the same position as when Holkeri left the party chairmanship in 1979," thundered retired colonel Tauno Kuosa in the Helsinki district meeting.

Foreign-Policy Dimensions

On the eve of the March elections, everyone—especially the Conservatives—was sure that nothing could prevent the party from winning. The Conservatives, who had been kept in continual opposition for all of 17 years, seemed to be growing constantly as if in accordance with some law of nature.

Growth since the low point of 1966, 26 members of parliament, has been impressive. After a jump of 11 seats in the early 1970's, the number of seats remained the same, but in the 1979 elections the party increased to a total of 47 seats.

It was believed that in the March elections the barrier of 50 would be broken, and the Conservatives were thought to even threaten the Social Democrats' position as the largest party.

Before the elections, there was excitement mainly about how they were going to keep the Conservatives out of the government picture this time around. Even though no one wanted to speak openly about general reasons, one thing was as clear as could be: If the Conservatives were taken immediately into the first government of Mauno Koivisto's term as president, there could be an incorrect conception abroad about violent change in Finland after Kekkonen.

There is no longer any doubt about the qualifications of the Conservatives for the government. The SMP was able to enter the government, and Ilkka Suominen will be the first Conservative chairman to accompany a president to the Soviet Union when the new president makes his first trip.

But Koivisto has gone to a lot of trouble to emphasize continuity in foreign policy. For that reason he surely didn't want to have as his first task the situation where leaving the Conservatives out of the government would have seemed unnatural and unreasonable.

When it was suspected that Koivisto was getting into a difficult position, the Social Democrats practically shut the door beforehand to government cooperation with the Conservatives.

Of course Suominen, firmly anchored in the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, understood the foreign-policy dimensions and did not imagine much that the Conservatives would march straight into the government after the elections. But he certainly had the right to do his best to show that the Conservatives would be a worthy government party. That has been one of the party's central goals ever since the first half of the 1970's.

In order to get out of being excluded from the government, the Conservatives have tried since the time of Juha Rihtniemi to associate themselves with the politically safe Kekkonem -line, and in domestic politics their guideline has sometimes been to go so far to the left as to make the Center Party shudder.

The Conservatives have not really been an opposition party, rather they have tried the whole time to stay as it were at the entrance to the government. Instead of a policy of hard opposition, it has strived continually for mutual understanding with governments of the center and the left. The concept of mutual understanding or consensus illustrates Finnish parliamentarism, which does not recognize options.

The program of the Conservatives in the March elections was prepared so that the party could not be pushed aside in negotiations about a government program with any logical reason. The election tactic was well illustrated by people in the inner circles of the Conservatives rubbing their hands anxiously and wondering, "what will happen when Suominen plops himself down at the negotiating table; he will approve everything and not go anywhere."

Everyone has seen what happened. Neither the Social Democrats nor the Centrists even bothered to go to the same negotiating table with Suominen. The Conservatives were not asked about anything. Instead, the second minister of Finance and the Labor minister were selected from the ranks of the SMP, which made a lot of noise about the MP scandals in the opposition.

Even though the Conservatives increased their number of votes somewhat, the loss of 3 seats in Parliament instead of the predicted gain of 3-5 seats, was a savage blow—especially psychologically. The party had labelled the election as a government election, and they were defeated; the leading goernment party SDP Social Democratic Party clearly strengthened its positions.

To the Conservatives the situation probably appears more hopeless now than ever in a long time. The Social Democrats have made it clear that they were not the least interested during the whole campaign in cooperating with the Conservatives.

The despair of the Conservatives is increased by the fact that all this has been possible even though there is a greater non-socialist majority in Parliament than before. As long as the Center Party chooses the Social Democrats over the Conservatives, it would seem nothing can be done.

"We must set a new goal for four years from now," says Ilkka Suominen as an experienced realistic politician. Suominen seems to have overcome the post-election depression quickly. He said he got through it with only a one-day hangover.

The challenge of Pertti Salolainen has steeled the man.

Suominen says he listened humbly when he and the party were criticized. The road taken by the party was clearly wrong, if election results are the measurement. But in Suominen's opinion the whole country has benefited by the fact that the parties have co-existed peacefully.

"We have stumbled just into resolving the government crises, and we have not presented our own options sufficiently clearly. The voters haven't been able to get interested in the problems of who should have the burden of managing the government; rather they needed statements on concrete questions that touched them more closely.

"From now on the policy of mutual understanding is a past life, and we must charge ahead into strict opposition policy, most of all in the Parliament," says Suominen.

Listening to Suominen's speeches after the elections, one is reminded that he is really approving Tuure Junnila's criticism presented in the 1970's. This man from the right wing of the party was amazed already then at the fruitless following that failed to lead the party to its desired political objectives.

Suominen, who started out as a reformer in the left wing of the party, is not offended by the comparison. But he wants to emphasize that he is still at odds with Junnila on the content of domestic policy, to say nothing of foreign policy.

Field Pressures

Many Conservatives in the field are of the opinion that it is impossible for the party to change its form in a believable way unless the chairman, vice—chairmen and party secretary are changed.

Not even those who are trying to push Suominen aside are willing to speak earnestly about changing the basic line, which has been earnestly constructed—at least of all Pertti Salolainen.

But television-viewing citizens identify party ideologies with the chairmen, first of all, and they should explain the problems of society that are more complex than before and should inspire trust. Suominen has not been able to do this completely. He has been felt to be too weak-blooded and too distant a person, and he hasn't had enough weighty things to say.

Pertti Salolainen, who has risen to challenge with the support of the Helsinki district, took off on his career as a politician precisely with

television. As a young man he became known to the viewers as a newscaster and London correspondent. On that basis he also got many of the older generation voters behind him, and he has represented Helsinki continually since the early 1970's. In the last elections he received twice as many votes as Suominen.

Salolainen's weakness has been seen in the fact that he hasn't been out in the field of the Conservative Party except in Helsinki, and thus he is unknown to a large portion of the people in the field.

Thus for the last 2 weeks or so Salolainen has been busy travelling around in the districts laying foundation for the party chairman election.

The party machinery appears to stand quite solidly behind Suominen, however, people in the field even outside Helsinki have supported Solalainen. It is annoying for Suominen that even the parliamentary faction has not very prominently taken a stand on behalf of the acting chairman.

A week before the Lahti congress, Salolainen's supporters calculated optimistically that at least 400 of the 1000 delegates were ready to replace Suominen with Salolainen.

But is Salolainen in fact a real option? He himself emphasizes that in all central matters he follows along the same lines as Suominen. Salolainen is not a brilliant, charismatic representative of the opposition. Just the opposite, before the elections he seemed to be more interested in the portfolio of the Ministry of Finance in the next government than in brightening the profile of the party in opposition.

Salolainen appears to be a bad choice also to those who want a clearer ideological look for the party.

It is bothersome to Salolainen, who started from the same reform line as Suominen, that he has collected the support of a group that wants to shift the Conservatives' political line to the right.

It is true that, in line with the spirit of the times, Salolainen himself has become enthusiastic in denigrating Kekkonen's period and boasting of a new freer atmosphere, in which matters are called by their correct names. He would like to have some of these new winds blow also within the Conservative Party.

Salolainen's chances of displacing Suominen are considered to be almost non-existent. But the membership of the Conservatives have not been able to vote for a chairman in ten years. This time the pressures are stronger than usual, and they must be allowed to break forth.

Whether Suominen or Salolainen leads the party after the Lahti congress, assurances of formal changes in the party and a new alternative opposition policy will hardly color Finland's domestic politics. For that a politician of a heavier caliber would be needed, and none such has announced as a candidate for chairman.

Party Weighs Center Ties Against SDP

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Jun 83 p 8

Article by Erkki Pennanen and Ritva Remes: "Frustrated Conservatives Begin: 'Only Cooperation between Conservatives and KEPU will Cut into Social-Democrat Hegemony'"

Text The Conservative Party's three-day congress opened Friday in Lahti in a mood of political frustration after the elections.

In spite of a clear non-socialist majority in Parliament, developments seemed to be leading toward a minority hegemony of the Social Democrats. "There is only one antidote to Social-Democrat hegemony, and that is political cooperation between the Conservatives and the Center Party," admitted Matti Jaatinen, chairman of the party's parliamentary delegation, and he again offered the hand of cooperation to the Center Party and especially to its chairman, Paavo Vayrynen.

Useless to Expect Cooperation with Social Democrats

Jaatinen perceived that at this time it is completely useless for the Conservatives to try for cooperation with the SDP, Decause the Social Democrats' "no" was so strong after the elections. "They completely turned their back to us and were ready to give guarantees for the SMP."

In Jaatinen's opinion, a "thousand-dollar opportunity" is developing for Vayrynen, a chance to correct his political image with a single stroke...
"He now had the possibility of performing a statesman's act. That is, non-socialist government cooperation, with which the Social Democrats' thirst for power can be quenched."

Jaatinen demonstrated that it should be rather easy for the present Center leadership to draw a conclusion in light of the Social Democrats' concentration of power. For cooperation with the Social Democrats plays into the hands of a political minority, whereas non-socialist cooperation would benefit the nation's political majority.

Also in the opinion of party secretary Juusi Isotalo, the SMP has succeeded in obtaining more political power for itself than any other party before now in the history of independent Finland.

"It has lead the SDP into such an arrogant state of complete power that it cannot fail to influence its government partners toward a desire to seek a new basis for cooperation in the non-socialist field. In the 1970's the Conservatives were looking for such cooperation, now it seems to be the turn of the Center," Isotalo thought.

"KEPU a Vampire"

Isotalo warned the RKP [Swedish People's Party] and the SMP about the fate of the Liberals and the Christians, because "the KEPU [Center Party] is a political vampire of center cooperation, having to suck its companion's blood dry in order to live a full life itself."

On the first day of the party congress, the main question of replacing chairman Ilkka Suominen with challenger Pertti Salolainen was hardly mentioned at the podium. Debate on the matter will take place on Saturday, when the voting will also occur.

In his opening address at the congress in Lahti's great hall, Suominen acknow-ledged that as chairman he bears the main responsibility for the election results that have proved disappointing.

"I myself have gone through all the phases of self-criticism," Suominen admitted humbly. He said he had been listening in places where the Conservative tune is not yet sounding with the brightness that it should.

"I think I have found that missing tune," Suominen announced pompously, and in this manner he tried to prove that the party congress had no need to replace him with Salolainen.

Suominen and other representatives of the party leadership defended their line up to now with the claim that a party representing over 600,000 voters cannot be led with populist slogans. The party's responsibility is to act as a national conscience and to remember that the interest of the country and the people comes before everything else.

The speeches reflected the political inability of the Conservatives to function in the present circumstances. Even a sharpening of opposition policy threatens to collapse in weak parliamentary debate.

In order to polish his spurs for the chairmanship, Pertti Salolainen announced as a "news item" to the congress audience that his own initiative had led to Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa giving written orders on Friday to the ministers in his government requiring them to participate in sessions whenever bills from their field are to be discussed. According to Salolainen this will give the Conservatives excellent opportunities to practice effective opposition policy.

The most debate subject on the first day of the congress was in itself a rather remote one: the new railroad-car factory in Rautaruukki. Most speakers opposed it sharply.

Long Night of Caucuses

The thousand delegates to the Conservatives' party congress were getting ready Friday evening for a long night of caucusing. Chairman Ilkka Suominen's

position vis-a-vis his challenger, Pertti Salolainen, appeared to be secure. Of the 18 district delegates to the election committee, only one, from Helsinki, supported Salolainen.

Some breaking up of Salolainen's district was observed during the day, but on the other hand it was believed that Salolainen could achieve surprising numbers when the voting for chairman is reached on Saturday.

Salolainen's numbers contain the crux of the whole chairmanship battle: it is not at all a question of firm faith in Salolainen, but of opposition to the party hierarchy. The targets are the party staff and Suominen, who leads them.

Salolainen's vote total was also believed to be increasing because there is room for protest, since Suominen will be elected in any case.

Women Split

The position of vice-chairman Tapani Morttinen, who lost his seat in Parliament, was safe. Some were even ready to believe in a unanimous election.

During the evening and night Martti Ursi of Oulu was, for one, going to see if he could find support for a candidacy. The young people were thinking about nominating Jouni J. Sarkijarvi, but possibly for the position of second vice-chairman.

Of the two vice chairman ships in the Conservative Party, the other is reserved strictly for the women. But the women are having difficulties. The incumbent vice—chairman Elsi Hetemaki—Olander wants to look out for her chances to the bitter end.

The board of the women's union did not promise anything good for Hetemaki-Olander. Nine of the women wanted a change. Six of them supported Tuulikki Petajaniemi and three Aila Jokinen. Hetemaki-Olander received the support of five of them.

Since the women were divided, the congress delegates saw the situation just as vaguely. In the opinion of some, it is time for Elsi to leave. Jokinen, chairman of the nurses' union, was seen as the union activist that has long been needed in the Conservatives' leadership.

But when one tried to get down to brass tacks, the answer was often: "Look at these fools. The surname law will settle the matter." Jokinen and Petajaniemi were seen as supporters of the failed surname law, Hetemaki-Olander as an opponent of too much radicalism.

Pressures from various regions, trades, and others for going into a third vice-chairman ship ended up with the congress rejecting the establishment of a third vice-chairman's position.

The motion for a third vice-chairman would have required a 2/3 majority. About half the voters supported the proposal, half were opposed. Also the party board was against the proposal.

Suominen Beats Back Challenger

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Jun 83 p 8

Article by Erkki Pennanen and Ritva Remes: "'Erkki, Why Did You Speak as Speaker of Parliament and not as Pystynen?': Salolainen Shakes Off His Disappointment."

[Text] Conservative chairman Ilkka Suominen's challenger, Pertti Salolainen, admitted to the thousand-delegate Conservative Party congress that he was disappointed after the vote for chairman.

The reason was not the vote itself, but the speech by Speaker of Parliament Erkki Pystynen just before the vote. Pystynen supported Suominen in his speech, and said a change in chairmen would be harmful to the party.

Speaker Pystynen said he rose to speak after Salolainen's address because of requests. He said he spoke as Erkki Pystynen, who happens to be Speaker of Parliament. Pystynen surely thought his speech would affect those who were still undecided about their choice.

Pertti Salolainen spoke of the speech as a disappointment: "I would have approved your speaking as Erkki Pystynen, Erkki, but not as Speaker of Parliament," Salolainen said.

It was believed among the Conservatives in attendance that the speech of the popular Erkki Pystynen had eliminated Salolainen's chances for an upset. The vote totals between Suominen and Salolainen were in fact according to predictions: 613 for Suominen and 365 for Salolainen. Two votes were rejected, and Pystynen received one vote.

Aila Jokinen, 49, is chairman of the nurses' union. She rose from an unknown to the leadership of the Conservatives with the help of the recent nurses' strike.

Jokinen was elected a member of Parliament for the first time in 1979, when she knocked Tuure Junnila out of Parliament in Satakunta. Jokinen was to have gone to Brazil for an international conference of nurses during the time of the Conservative Party congress. She cancelled the trip when she started to feel she had possibilities.

Before the election of the women's vice-chairman, Tapani Morttinen was elected to continue unanimously. Morttinen has been a vice-chairman since 1975.

Suominen Received Thorough Tongue-lashing

Chairman Ilkka Suominen became the target of perhaps the worst tongue-lashing of his career before his reelection by the party congress. Suominen was criticized in dozens of speeches for various deficiencies, and supporters of Pertti Salolainen observed that the change in image needed by the Conservatives could not be believable without replacing Suominen.

Suominen's supporters, on the other hand, considered it unfair to place responsibility for the weak election outcome solely on Suominen's shoulders. Replacing Suominen would be interpreted as a sign of a change in political line.

Reijo Taittonen of Vaasa hoped that the Conservative Party would no longer contain contemptible knife-wielding bullies. Suominen should not be stabbed in the back right after the first setback. One should see the forest in spite of the trees....

Member of Parliament Ilkka Kanerva wondered what change was being talked about. Besides, Salolainen was questionable as an alternative. That's why Suominen's leadership should be continued

Member of Parliament Heikki Jarvenpaa warned that those who are seeking a change in policy are now seeing an opportunity to attack Suominen. If effectiveness is wanted, the choice should go to Suominen.

Matti Niiranen of Uusimaa expressed amazement about the loose talk of effectiveness and supported Suominen.

Fero Tamminen of Kulosaari did not approve of claims that Salolainen would mean a change in the party line. The "Holkeri-Suominen clan" has, however, forgotten party democracy and dictated the line to the membership from above. The voice of the field has not been heard.

Pertti Karhu of Helsinki thought it strange that Holkeri was again trying to interfere in the election. The party congress can surely make its own decision about its chairman, which it was not able to do in 1979 on account of Holkeri.

Torsten Forsellman of Siltamaki was also satisfied that the members at last had the right to choose for themselves. According to him, Salolainen would be able to attract voters from other parties also to their party's ranks.

Ritva Sjoholm of Helsinki complained that the party leadership had forgotten the ordinary Conservatives before the elections. The believability of new promises would require a personnel change. Juha Rihtniemi brought Salolainen into Conservative activities long ago, now it was time to elect him to the party leadership.

Matti Korkiala of Kokkola stressed that the party chairman is a mirror of the party's image. Therefore a person would be needed who could unite all the non-socialist parties. Salolainen would be such a person.

Risto Lahnalampi of Toholampi said that the paid party workers were quite unanimous in their opinion of Suominen's outstanding qualities. The people in the field thought otherwise. If the Conservatives had a leader like Rihtniemi, the party would be larger than the SDP.

Jorma Urkko of North Hame warned party members against dirtying their own nest by stigmatizing Salolainen on foreign policy, since there were no differences of opinion on foreign policy.

Pentti Rajaheimo of Jarvenpaa blamed Suominen for the fact that under his leadership the voice of the field has not been heard in the party. The chairman must not travel his road so evenly that his head can't even be seen. If in four years he hasn't been able to demonstrate his abilities, there apparently aren't any.

Martti Talsi of Kymenlaakso was one of those in whose opinion a change in chairmen would be interpreted as a change in party line. Such weapons must not be given to the opponents, and therefore Suominen should be allowed to continue.

Kaarlo Erjala of Kuopio observed also that it is useless to talk about foreignpolicy changes in connection with Salolainen. Salolainen is needed in the party leadership because he can sell the party's message better.

Jaakko Pajula, representing the youth, pointed out also the central significance of the information media, which increases the importance of the person chosen as chairman, especially from the point of view of uncommitted voters. Therefore Salolainen would be better than Suominen.

Jarmo Sareva of the Conservative Youth was ready to support Suominen, but he gave him a serious charge: get closer to your own field and keep in contact with the basic organizations.

Olli Puputti of Riihimaki did not approve of doubts about Salolainen's orthodoxy in foreign policy. We are not choosing a foreing minister now, but a Conservative Party chairman.

Eino Saarinen of Jaala supported Salolainen because the Conservatives' line has been too vague, too distant from ordinary people.

Kalevi Heikkila of Kuortane observed that placing the blame on Suominen's shoulders would be like Pilate washing his hands. Jorma Lehtonen of Jarvenpaa was, however, of the opinion that a new broom always sweeps better than an old one. He was pleased also with Salolainen's honest conservatism.

Anna-Liisa Linkola, former vice-Speaker of Parliament, observed that the debate about Salolainen was a sign of the congress-participants' twisted attitudes.

They have not been able to detach themselves from unrealistic election expectations, but have kept trying to find a scapegoat. "Who of you seriously believes that 4 or 5 more seats would have smoothed the way for the Conservatives into the government?"

Kalle Hurme of Hameenlinna appealed to the Conservatives' own campaign slogans "you have a right to something better" and "state power belongs to the people." These should also be followed within the Conservatives' own circle, or in other words to get to vote in favor of Salolainen. To be sure, there should have been a right to have someone better than either Suominen or Salolainen.

Paper Comments on Leadership Fight

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Jun 83 p 2

Æditorial: "Suominen Gets Time to Seek"

Text The campaign for chairmanship of the National Coalition was decided in the Lahti party congress in the expected manner: Ilkka Suominen received a commission to continue for two more years, but only after a heated debate and voting. Things did not go quite as well for the two vice-chairmen, one of whom had to relinquish her seat to a challenger.

The final results of the ddcision about the chairman did not contain any real surprise. It was according to predictions and according to the will of the party machine, supported by state party subsidy. The attempt of Pertti Salolainen, who had challenged Suominen, did not succeed, but the number of his supporters shows his strength in this campaign, which turned out to be a mismatch in the end.

Salolainen's opposition candidacy was still not just a one-man-show doomed to failure. For there was a clear connection with the well-known results of the parliamentary elections. They tell of 30,000 additional votes, but also of the loss of three seats in Parliament and thus of a reduction in the party's political power in the law-making process.

Rather frequently changes in party chairmen are caused precisely by election defeats. In this case, dissatisfaction in the chairman on the part of the field did not become sufficiently strong. Or rather, there was no time to direct it in favor of a sufficiently convincing alternative, a situation that was only weakened by the sameness of political lines between the candidates.

In any case, democracy has at long last again been working in the decision on the Conservatives' chairman too. The field was able to express its feelings and to grumble by voting. However, the voting does not necessarily mean dissension within the party. It tells of differences in viewpoint and opinion typically connected with leadership, just as in other parties as well.

But this election was without doubt a blow to chairman Suominen, notwithstanding the predictable results, a blow that could be felt and that carries with it

responsibilities. He will have a gigantic task when he tries to return the party back to the course of growth from which it fell, perhaps fatefully, in the last parliamentary elections.

The task will require that the Conservatives first find themselves and sharpen their own profile with a firmer opposition policy, which has indeed been promised. The transition to that will mean in practice a rejection of the long-standing policy of consensus in law-making, but not, hopefully, a harmful increase in conflicts within the life of the state.

Chairman Suominen Addresses Congress

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Jun 83 p 9

Article by Ritva Remes: "Conservatives Searching Out Non-Socialists: Hand Extended by RKP Still Just 'Internal Discussion'

Text Lahti (Ritva Remes) The Conservatives staked out party growth and strengthening on non-socialist unity as the main directions for their opposition policy in their party congress, which ended on Sunday. Par Stenback, chairman of the RKP, which was holding its own party congress in Kirkkonummi, extended a hand of non-socialist friendship to Ilkka Suominen and received an appraisal from Suominen: Stenback's speech served the RKP's internal needs.

Conservative chairman Suominen presented his evaluation at a press conference marking the conclusion of the three-day party congress. Suominen guessed that Stenback wants to emphasize non-socialist cooperation. "Perhaps there has been criticism in the RKP for lack of that," said Suominen.

Par Stenback, chairman of the Swedish People's Party had told his own congress the day before that he and Suominen had explored together the possibilities for regular meetings.

Suominen did not add any details about the contact. "We'll meet one another in Parliament $t\infty$," said Suominen evasively, and he added that discussion can and should be practiced.

The Conservatives spoke of promoting non-socialist development and strengthening non-socialist unity in their public communique outlining the points of emphasis for activities in the near future.

Alternatives to SDP Welfare State

Under the title "Directions for Opposition Policy," the Conservatives tell about promoting non-socialist development: "In opposition activities this means presenting alternatives that strengther citizens' initiative, self-reliance, and decentralization of power instead of the government policy under Social Democratic leadership that strives for a welfare state and concentration of power."

In its communique, the Conservatives approved as their opposition line an alternative policy that aims at increasing intellectual and material security for the citizens, environmental quality, humanity, decision-making ability for society, and openness.

The Conservatives promised to monitor government activities closely and to use their power to prevent tax evasion and to lower the costs of housing. The Conservatives want to return the health-center fee and to restore the religious week-day holidays to their former places. Valuable buildings for cultural history should be protected by law, and Yleisradio broadcasting system should be separated from government guardianship and placed under control of Parliament.

The party congress also made a "statement on international politics." The party of Suominen, who will travel to Moscow accompanying President Mauno Koivisto, approved a foreign-policy paper whose introduction was modelled after the program of the government led by Kalevi Sorsa (Social Democrat). Thus the Conservatives decentralized the term Paasikivi-Kekkonen line:

"The National Coalition's goal is to secure Finland's independence as a state and its national interests as well as to promote international detente. The basis is the established policy line of active and peaceful neutrality worked out by Presidents J. K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen."

In the rest of the statement they promise to support President Koivisto's work to implement a line in accordance with Finland's basic interests. The YYA Friendship, Cooperation, and Assistance treaty, development of trade between Finland and the Soviet Union, Nordic cooperation, and a nuclear-free Nordic zone will be continued in the traditional manner.

Greenness, Softness

The Conservatives' new opposition policy remained somewhat undefined in the congress. It was mainly left to pet demands for "effectiveness" and decentralization of Social Democratic power.

Suominen, after criticizing the government parties, ended his speech on the political line by asking what the Conservatives' alternative is. He answered by saying that the Conservatives would have followed a different kind of policy. Competitive ability, employment, and a tighter state economy should have been emphasized along with other things.

"Now that we are here, we must try to correct what we can in the affairs of the country and to take a new direction, definite and optimistic," Suominen concluded enigmatically.

In the first part of his speech on the political line Suominen spoke about the nearness of the Green movement to the Conservatives, about peace, nature, the need for small groups such as sewing circles, and the right to painless childbirth.

Suominen demanded a billion of markkas in next next years national budget for health, the effects of which he considered to be more far-reaching than the four billions requested by Labor Minister Urpo Leppanen of the SMP of innish Rural Party to create sheltered workplaces.

Suominen, who called the SMP's policy two-faced, promised that the Conservatives would not depart under his leadership from the path of consistency and credibility.

"Instead, our responsibility is to uncover dishonest maneuvers in the behavior of other parties," Suominen added.

Suominen returned in his speech also to the early days of the campaign, to the accusations that the Conservatives received on a false basis. "The Social Democrats and the Center Party did not wish to admit the Conservatives into the government—to restrict taxes, cut expenses, and weaken social security, as they expressed it—they want to do it themselves."

Television Practice

In a short discussion of the political line, Kimmo Sasi, a freshman member of Parliament who called himself a future party secretary, wanted the line to have directions in the form of some kind of feedback from the people. According to Sasi's model, it would operate somehow so that the people would be fed dissatisfaction, which would result in feedback of new stimuli for the Conservatives.

During the congress Sasi practiced appearing on television by sitting firmly in the background whenever the TV cameras pictured the leaders.

Last week Sasi gave the Conservative delegation to Parliament a proposal in which he proposed training for Conservative members on television appearance. Sasi referred to U.S. President Ronald Reagan's appearances and encouraged the party to make its choices for representatives in public debates on the basis of the results of the showmanship training.

Sasi did not receive a single supporter for his proposal from among the delegation.

(2) Article by Erkki Pennanen: "Leadership Problem Makes It Difficult to Straighten Up"

Text If the frustrated Conservatives meant to get a new intellectual start in the direction of straightening up for the much-debated policy of opposition, then their success at the Lahti party congress was questionable. The participants, whose ranks were much thinned by Sunday morning, listened to Ilkka Suominen's speech on the party line with yawns, not interrupting the speech with even polite applause.

Demands for the right of every mother to painless childbirth or for limiting the import of protein were not enough to arouse the people from their exhaustion after the previous day's election for chairman.

Only after Suominen finished his speech did his challenger, Pertti Salolainen, arrive, whom Suominen had beaten by a vote of 613-365 and had thus received authority to continue in the party leadership for the next two years. With the chairman's party line speech still echoing in their ears, even many of Suominen's voters must have thought that the Lahti party congress did not bring a real solution to the Conservatives' leadership problem.

Suominen's victory in the voting for chairman was indisputable, and Pertti Salolainen, in spite of his broad support, probably played himself permanently out of the chairmanship picture. Still the support received by Suominen reflects a dissatisfaction that, on the basis of speeches from people in the field, cannot be stifled just like that.

The people in the field seem to have been infected with the spirit of protest and belief in the power of the voice of the field from the KEPU and SMP. The field, disappointed in the election results—and not just the Helsinki district—feels that Ilkka Suominen is not the right man to sell the party's message to a society where the importance of television and other information media is strongly increasing. He is too anemic and distant for that.

Suominen was saved this time again by the party machine, and the field's fears that a change in chairmen would be interpreted wrongly as a change in party line with far-reaching consequences. It could have been a leap into the unknown after all the trouble it has gone through to build its present position.

Suominen received the support of Speaker of Parliament Erkki Pystynen. He asserted with the prestige of the speakership that a change in chairmen at this stage would be of great harm to the Conservatives' position and policy.

He was probably correct, even though when viewed superficially the position of the Conservatives is not all that good: they continue to be excluded from the government and the SDP has turned its back on them more clearly than ever before.

The Conservatives hardly have any other choice than to wait and hope that the Center Party would experience such a strong disappointment in its cooperation with the Social Democrats that it would be ready to become interested in cooperation in Parliament based on the non-socialist majority.

The strengthening minority hegemony of the SDP is the bugaboo with which the Conservative leadership is trying to frighten the KEPU. Suominen's speech on the party line of Sunday does not really contain any other keys to solving the problem than an appeal to wholesome reason and thinking on the part of others.

Satisfied Suominen

Suominen himself radiated satisfaction, heedless of a hard reprimand, after making sure of another term in Lahti. Up to now, Suominen's critics had spoken

of how four years ago Harri Holkeri arranged the party leadership for him without any kind of a vote. Now he has secured his place in an honest vote by a clear margin.

Sucminen's first task as Conservative Party chairman will be to accompany the President Monday morning on his state visit to Moscow. In his statesmanship and the deliberateness of his statements, Suominen would qualify beyond doubt as a foreign minister just as well as any Stenback or Vayrynen--if only the party had sufficient general qualifications.

In Saturday's chairmanship debate, Suominen handled with great style his challenger's attempt to make headway with foreign-policy innuendos. After the battle was over, Salolainen was ready with advice for the chairman on the state visit: "Tell your hosts there in Moscow that the Conservatives stand one hundred percent behind the official foreign policy."

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POLITICAL FINLAND

SUOMINEN EMERGES STRONGER FROM CHAIRMANSHIP FIGHT

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 10 Jun 83 pp 45-46

[Article by Hannu Savola: "Cards Were Dealt at Conservative Party Congress"]

[Text] The rank and file has spoken: Ilkka Suominen may continue for the next 2 years in the leadership of the Conservative Party, which is becoming hardened as an opposition party. After vigorous criticism and a vote, his position is stronger than before.

The Conservative Party aired all its faults and grievances in Lahti last weekend. The past summer has been traumatic for the party:

The Conservative Party was supposed to receive 53--55 MP's, but the number elected was 10 less than expected. After an election victory that was considered to be certain, the Conservative Party, which has been out of the government for 17 years, was finally supposed to receive the reigns of power, but it was made the fool: the Vennamoites [Finnish Rural Party] are now siting in the government.

A Conservative becomes upset even over smaller things. Chairman Ilkka Suominen was made the scapegoat for everything. He was too limp and soft, lacked emphasis in his television appearances, ambiguous, ridiculously jovial, even overweight -- and not at all firm.

Also the Conservative Party's policy was incorrectly implemented. There has only been harmony and conciliation with the government. Not enough of the party's own alternatives were presented.

All this became clear shortly after the election results were disclosed. Until then the rank and file had been quite satisfied with Suominen and the Conservative Party. No dissenting voices were heard, even the Gallup polls promised an election victory.

The heads of party leaders have rolled for even lesser reasons, why not also in the Conservative Party. The more rightwing elements observed an opportune situation in which to attempt a coup-d-etat. MP Pertti Salolainen was persuaded to be a challenger.

Contrary to Suominen, he, indeed, was eloquent, enthusiastic, and charismatic. A natural leader, unambiguous, popular -- and above all, an excellent television performer. And firm on top of everything else.

These were the attributes flying around the congress in Lahti. No actual differences were found in the politics of the men, not even in foreign policy although such an attempt was made. There was nothing Salolainen could do about the fact that certain individuals with a bad foreign policy reputation had decided to support him even before the congress. However, the Junnilas, the Maki-Hakolas, and other extreme rightwing elements became silent in Lahti.

A Surprising Number of Disenchanted

The number of disenchanted among the Conservative Party's active members was in the final count suprisingly large. This was brought to Suominen's attention during a three-and-a-half hour discussion. Saliva from the critics nearly showered the front row. The disenchanted did not mince any words.

The situation seemed to be so alarming that Chairman Erkki Pystynen had to be called up to resolve the situation. Conveniently, his turn to speak turned out be the last on the agenda.

Pystynen made an appeal on behalf of Suominen in the name of party unity. He stated that changing the chairman in this situation would be a great misfortune for the Conservative Party.

Pystynen seemed to confuse his roles and gave the people in the hall to understand that he was speaking more as a chairman of parliament than as a representative to the party congress. His speech gave cause for offense even among Suominen's supporters.

Bank Director Harri Holkeri, who had placed Suominen in the leadership of the party 4 years ago and who walked about the meeting hall in a sharply tailored light blue summer suit as if he were an exclamation mark of the importance of maintaining the political legacy, also made an appeal for the reelection of Suominen a couple days before the congress.

After a vehement discussion, the rank and file voted on a chairman for the first time in 10 years: Suominen 613, Salolainen 365 votes.

The concern of Suominen's supporters was not in vain. A couple hundred more votes for Salolainen would have brought about a change of power. Suominen's relief was expressed in a behaviour considered to be highly exceptional and unruly for Suominen: he threw his bouquet of bachelor's-buttons into the air three times! Also his wife, Riitta Suominen, who did not want to hear the criticism directed at her husband in the hall, seemed to be relieved.

Tough Policy -- and Soft

The result of the vote for Pertti Salolainen was respectable: 37 percent of the votes is a good showing in a contest against an incumbent chairman.

With his campaign Salolainen raised his profile in the capital city where his voice has been heard even before.

Salolainen accumulated considerable sympathy by arranging a chairmanship election that relieved some of the pressures for the party. The congress was able to vote its mind and feelings.

Ilkka Suominen has good reason to be satisfied after the vote. His position is now stronger than before. The umbilical cord to Harri Holkeri has finally been severed: the crown prince is making it on his own.

Salolainen promised to support the elected leadership and gave the assurance that the struggle is now over for the time being. He probably will not be able to present a tougher opposition to Suominen in the future. Even otherwise, the rightwing is suffering from a shortage of leaders.

At the press conference after the elections Suominen confirmed that the Conservative Party's internal situation is good. No one needs to depart Lahti with their fists clenched or in their pockets. He points out that the party's rank and file did not come to Lahti to change the party's policy line, but its procedures, a process that was begun already before the congress.

Suominen promised that the Conservative Party's activism will be increased at all levels. The party will put distance between itself and the government and will present a counterforce to the guardianship and hegemonic aspirations of the Social Democrats. The consensus policy of recent years will disappear and the Conservative Party will become a bold critic of the government. In spite of a tough policy, an attempt is being made to make up for the black image hiding in the party with an emphasis on green and soft values.

Middle Class Party Leadership

In addition to Chairman Suominen, pressures for change were also directed against the 8-year term of Vice Chairwoman Elsi Hetemaki-Olander, who did not, however, understand in time from where the wind was blowing. Thus she had to make an ignominious announcement of her resignation just as the elections were beginning.

Elsi's statement about the necessity of rotation sounded somewhat hollow when one takes into consideration that the importance of rotation did not become clear to her until the morning meeting of the election committee, at which support was in name only and even her own district had abandoned her.

The congress elected a new type of Conservative leader as the new vice chairman. MP Aila Jokinen, 49, was one of the strike leaders in the recently concluded nurses' strike. She will commence to direct the Conservative Party's struggle for the souls of white-collar workers and the traditional trade union rank and file.

Only Tapani Morttinen, a farmer was reelected unanimously. The ruddy-faced Morttinen with a sunny disposition suggested that this was the result of pity.

The rank and file did not want to further punish a vice chairman who had lost his seat in parliament.

Morttinen had his own proposal regarding the unsatisfactory television appearances of the party leadership: send the whole bunch to acting school for a week!

The composition of the chairmanship is most likely a considerable disappointment for those who attempted to alter the party's course to the right. The only change was the replacement of conservative Hetemaki-Olander with the progressive Jokinen. Thus it was more of a change in the direction of the left.

The professional and educational background of the Conservative Party's leadership attests to the fact that the party is becoming a middle class party: the party's chairmen are made up of a merconom, a farmer, and a nurse, and the party secretary is a merconom.

Looking Toward the Center Party

After the events in the spring, the Conservative Party has finally given up hope that it will enter the government together with the Social Democrats. The Conservative Party is not at all acceptable to the Social Democrats. Thus the SDP was criticized in Lahti at least as severely as Ilkka Suominen.

Now the Conservative Party is looking more hopefully at the Center Party. Chairman Matti Jaatinen of the Conservative Party's parliamentary faction stated that Paavo Vayrynen would now give a thousand dollars to mend his poltical image. According to Jaatinen, the Social Democrats' thirst for power could be extinguished by non-socialist government cooperation.

The Conservative Party is bitter about the SMP [Finnish Rural Party], which has had a change of fortunes and is now in the government. Suominen figured that all the people may be fooled some of the time, some of the people all of the time, but not all of the people all of the time. Thus he believes the results of a conscious two-faced policy will betray the SMP.

"As mobile voters thirst for a change in policy, consistency may sometime seem to be monotonous. Nevertheless, under my leadership the Conservative Party must not deviate from the path of consistency and credibility," assured Suominen.

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POLITICAL FINLAND

PAASIKIVI SOCIETY, USSR FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY HAVE POLICY ROLES

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 10 Jun 83 pp 52-53

[Article by Mikko Pohtola: "Unofficial Pursuers of Foreign Policy"]

[Text] During the recently concluded visit to Moscow by the Finnish president and his large retinue of aides, opinions were heard from the highest leadership of two such organizations whose area of concern lies in the terrain between public civic activity and foreign policy. The Paasikivi Society was represented on the trip by Chairman Jan-Magnus Jansson and the Finland-USSR Society was represented by Chairman Martti Miettunen. The chairmanships of both men will come to end before the current year is out.

In many countries there are semi-official institutes whose unstructured area of activities provides opportunities for making contacts, among other things, outside of the official framework as well as opportunities to act as a kind of mediator. Frequently, these opportunities also include such forums in which broad international questions can be discussed. The National Press Club in the United States and Concordia in Austria, among others, are well known. Statesmen as well as researchers who have received international recognition have willingly appeared as guest speakers at such occasions.

In Finland there is no corresponding institution that is somewhat unlimited with respect to the scope of its actitivities, but in a certain sense the Paasikivi Society has adopted such functions, partially from the Political Science Society.

The close cooperation of the Paasikivi Society and the Foreign Policy Institute has given it a foreign policy imprint and emphasis with respect to its area of interests. This is already a part of the society's functional concept.

During President Urho Kekkonen's era the Paasikivi Society also functioned in the area of domestic policy. As a society it also was involved in Kekkonen's election campaign work and not just in the form of volunteer work by a few trusted individuals or functionaries. In the last presidential elections the chairman of the society was also a presidential candidate. Particularly in the final phases of the election campaign there were many in the society who actively worked to make him a bourgeois candidate as a counterweight to Mauno Koivisto.

However, these domestic policy goals remained unfulfilled, for the most part, but the RKP [Swedish People's Party] acquired new voters from the Finnish-language segment of society with the help of Jansson. Some of them also remained faithful to the RKP in the parliamentary elections last March.

The Society has offered to the present President of the Republic as well as to President Kekkonen a forum in which to present their own views on timely questions. The president cannot discuss all issues on television. A proper place and time must be found.

Invitations from the Paasikivi Society -- sometimes as festive evenings and sometimes as more serious luncheons -- have brought together its members and the press to hear presentations by domestic as well as foreign policy experts. The most recent guest was Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme, whose speech on the current prospects of a Nordic nuclear-free zone filled the hall.

Present relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union, President Koivisto's visit to Moscow, the continuation of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact and the visit of the U.S. secretary of defense to Norway formed an interesting and timely background. Not all of these issues were the topic of current interest at the end of last year when Palme promised to speak at the 20th anniversary of Kekkonen's candidacy.

Jan-Magnus Jansson has been in the leadership of the Paasikivi Society for a respectably long time, as vice-chairman in the years 1958--64, as chairman in the years 1964--66, and again as chairman since 1975. His actions have, in general, been constructive, but in connection with the society's recent trip to Moscow Jansson was subjected to severe criticism by some of the people on the trip for his excessive arbitrariness in arranging negotiating sessions, among other things. There has been a verbal as well as written explanation of this matter. Those opposing Jansson have threatened to replace him as chairman in the fall. Jansson is ready to leave, but stated that there is no connection between his possible departure and the events in Moscow.

Bank Director Jaakko Iloniemi has been presented even in public as a possible candidate to the chairmanship. Social Democratic Iloniemi is one of his party's most talented and capable individuals who has acquired long-time experience in foreign policy as well as practical diplomacy as an acting diplomat. Now he has completely left the foreign service to manage the public relations of the SYP [Unified Bank of Finland]. Thus it is understandable that he himself could be interested in some kind of a connection with foreign policy issues, for example, the leadership of the Paasikivi Society.

In Finland the strong hold of the Social Democrats on the management of official foreign policy is apparent in the indefinite future -- "as far as the eye can see". In the opinion of many it would seem reasonable that an unofficial organization dealing with foreign policy affairs, in this case the Paasikivi Society, would become a kind of base for neutral observers -- a base directed by others than leftists.

If after his long period in the society's leadership Jan-Magnus Jansson himself wants to retire from the active leadership of the society, a suitable individual capable of meeting the challenge can surely be found. Such an individual, for example, ould be Par Stenback, for whose candidacy support can already be found within the society's board of directors.

The Finland-USSR Society is an interesting rganization. Its paid officials are divided and classified so strictly in accordance with the power relationships in parliament that no one dares to disturb this structure, in which the Conservatives are represented by Center Party members and the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] is represented by Taitoites; otherwise, the whole house could fall.

The problems of the Finland-USSR Society have been treated in public with kid gloves and no one has even made any references to personality conflicts, which are, however, evident at nearly every event and even between events.

The strict Taistoite General Secretary Christina Porkkala, whose retirement has been awaited for years already in certain quarters, has kept the public side of the SNS [Finland-USSR Society] under a certain control. Now that her retirement is approaching, the discussion around her successor has also been linked to the present situation in the SKP [Finnish Communist Party].

Porkkala's own choice for her successor, Timo Karvonen, the son of former General Secretary Toivo Karvonen, who is presently in the service of the society, is now being left in the dust of Chief Editor Erkki Kauppila of the majority Communists. The jovial Kauppila, who speaks Russian, could be a suitable candidate for both factions of the Communists in connection with the reduction of the size of KANSAN UUTISET and the clarification of the SKP's internal questions. The proposed merger of KANSAN UUTISET with TIEDONANTAJA is a prospect which will scarsely entice Kauppila to remain as chief editor also from an editorial point of view.

In the highest leadership of the SNS the elderly Counselor of Mining Martti Miettunen will probably continue as chairman for yet another term since the Social Democrats did not consider the installation of Pirkko Tyolajarvi in the leadership position to be a politically wise move at this time. Moreover, the chairman of the society's board of directors is Social Democratic Olavi Hurri.

On the other hand: Esko Ollila's denunciation of retired politicians begun in the administrative organs of state-owned companies should in the opinion of many at some point also be extended to state funding with respect to certain important organizations and institutes.

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POLITICAL FINLAND

STALINIST ORGAN EDITOR JOKINEN INTERVIEWED

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 10 Jun 83 pp 52-53

[Article by Anneli Sundberg: "On Guard Day and Night"]

[Text] There is not much rest for the kind of Communist that Urho Jokinen is. One must always be on guard in order to root out foreign policy weeds. They seem to be of the same sort as quick grass; however much Jokinen may weed them out, there are always a few left.

Urho Jokinen has something in common with President Mauno Koivisto. Both are barefooted Western Finns and both vigilantly oversee the purity of Finland's foreign policy, one as the chief editor of the country's least read newspaper, the other in the presidential palace.

There the similarities end. It is not appropriate for the president to be suspicious of the people and suspect influential citizens of undermining foreign policy. It is, indeed, appropriate for Jokinen.

Recently, he spiced up the foreign policy discussion with an interview of Ahti Karjalainen in a style unique to Jokinen. In it, it was alleged that schemers who consider Finland's relations with the East to be too warm were behind Karjalainen's dismissal.

Jokinen, as the 59-year old chief editor of TIEDONANTAJA, the chief organ of the minority Communists originally christened as the Stalinists of the Communist Party and then later as Taistoites, is a suspicious man.

His X-ray view finds enemies of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and rightwing advocates there where others do not seem them.

Jokinen seriously suspects that there is an attempt in Finland to guide Soviet relations in a new direction, and all directions -- except for the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact line -- are incorrect.

No change has yet taken place in the policy line. This Jokinen admits, but attempts have been made.

"UUSI SUOMI -- whatever the hell the club is -- proposed more openly than anyone else that there really is no Paasikivi-Kekkonen line any longer and

that no one is even talking about it any more. Thus it is a question of an attempt to change Finland's foreign policy line and not of the fact that something has already taken place. I consider these attempts to be dangerous even though these forces have not accomplished much for the time being."

Jokinen vehemently denies that he doubts the president's ability to keep possible dissidents in line.

"He is capable of holding the line, but it is not just a question of Koivisto. If the matter depended on him alone, the issue would be clear, but there are other forces on the scene and I have no doubt that these are forces which are capable of exerting an influence."

What these forces are and where they are hiding emains somewhat unclear. They are, however, in the "machinery" and they who control the machinery can do anything according to Jokinen's interpretation.

But What If ...

Jokinen and TIEDONANTAJA participated in Finland's presidential elections by supporting Ahti Karjalainen at least as enthusiastically as Paavo Vayrynen if not even more enthusiastically.

Is Chief Editor Jokinen still of the opinion that Karjalainen would have made a good president for the country?

Jokinen does not like the question. In his opinion it is not worth considering. It is better to ask fter a few years what Koivisto has accomplished.

"It could be said of Karjalainen that he would have abstained from alcohol and would have conducted himself as a head of state if he had become president. It can just as easily be said, as has been argued in certain newspapers, that he would have begun to drink more and would have made mistakes at every turn. Whatever the conjectures, these questions are irrelevent and still up in the air.

"If the question is about Koivisto, I would say that I support him, but no one can go out on the limb for him and guarantee his performance."

By the same token Jokinen wants to correct information made public recently, according to which he supposedly stated in Moscow prior to Finland's last presidential elections that one cannot trust in Koivisto's abilities to guide Finland along the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

"It has been alleged that I answered Ponomarev's question about Koivisto in Moscow by supposedly inimating that he is perhaps not capable of continuing the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. On the other hand, it was also alleged that Aalto answered the same question in a positive manner. The truth is that neither one of us remembers having uttered a single word about this matter, neither I or Aalto. Only Saarinen, Pessi, and Ponomarev participated in this discussion."

However, Jokinen cannot help but wonder why Urho Kekkonen has become the subject of criticism. What sense is there in this, asks Jokinen, that Kekkonen should only be criticized and Koivisto should only be praised.

Jokinen does not see any kind of great secret society for changing Finland's policy line, but he sees more of a rightwing trend.

"Indeed, everyone would admit that there is a rightwing trend in every party, the Center Party as well as the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. In the Conservative Party Salolainen is being promoted with a fury. The effort to promote his chairmanship already means that the party line will soon have to conform to the direction that he represents."

Even though Karjalainen, who enjoys the trust of the SKP's minority, resigned from the Center Party, Jokinen does not feel that the Center Party has lost its resolution with respect to foreign policy. He is not as ready to give a personal guarantee regarding the Conservative Party not to mention the Finnish Rural Party. For him, the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] is a revenge-seeking party, whose inclusion in the government has tainted Finland's reputation.

In the Finnish Communist Party Aarno Aitamurto, chairman of the Construction Workers' Union and who has been predicted to become the party's next chairman, and Arvo Kemppainen, the key figure in the Lapland axing [expulsion] movement, for example, represent a rightwing trend as far as Jokinen is concerned. Neither of these names are new on TIEDONANTAJA's black list and neither individual is apparently too concerned about being on this list.

"Minority Becoming Majority"

The SKP's future causes Jokinen to contemplate. On the one hand, he sees the forces of unity becoming stronger -- the SKP's minority calls the forces of unity those forces which are slipping away from the party majority -- and on the other hand, the danger of a real dissolution.

"There has never been a more dangerous phase in the SKP. Dissolution is a real possibility."

Jokinen considers it possible that the present majority will become a minority at the SKP congress a year from now. This view is based more on feelings and hopes than on actual information on a change in power relationships.

Among the party's present majority leadership only Chairman Jouko Kajanoja receives any kind of recognition from Jokinen.

"A pleasant, fair, and straightforward fellow, enterprising, but inexperienced. He is attempting to grow into the challenge. I do not know whether he will be able to do this, but he is at least taking his job seriously."

Jokinen's newspaper, TIEDONANTAJA, has been one of the hottest issues of the SKP conflict. In addition to members of Finland's bourgeoisie, the newspaper also angers a rather large segment of Finnish Communists, who consider

it to be glaringly false. The cessation of the paper has been demanded, but this will never happen according to Jokinen. The paper may change its format, but it will not die, argues Jokinen. There are no advertisements in the paper so that one would think it would die of natural causes, but, apparently, normal economic laws do not affect TIEDONANTAJA.

Jokinen gives an extensive and long answer to the question regarding the finances of TIEDONANTAJA. One is left with the final impression that it is, apparently, the world's only newspaper which is kept alive by May Day greetings and New Years greetings.

"Advertisements would come, but there is no space for them," grins Jokinen.

He himself is enjoying a pension for journalists from the state after having been a chief editor for a total of 18 years, first in the now extinct UUSI PAIVA published in Turku and then in TIEDONANTAJA.

Jokinen's other pursuits have entailed political work and study at the Sirola Institute and in Moscow.

In the bourgeois press Jokinen has been criticized for attacking bourgeois society from the security of a pension granted by a bourgeois state. It has been more or less discreetly demanded that he resign from the leadership of the newspaper now that he has been given a pension.

Jokinen pacifies those who are incensed by stating that he will leave as soon as the medical examination is completed. He is not yet able to give a date, but, on the other hand, he does not intend to hang around for years at the Lauttasaari newspaper office, which the SKP's minority inherited from the Simoslainen Social Democrats.

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POLITICAL FINLAND

STALINIST ORGAN COMPLAINS OF PARTY PRESS POLICY

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 10 Jun 83 p 3

[Editorial: "Axing Policy Rejects Finnish CP Newspaper"]

[Text] The axing policy movement is rejecting the proposal of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] press work group to establish the party's own weekly newspaper and subsequently to make the transition to the publication of a chief SKP organ to appear four times a week.

In its last issue, NY TID, the Swedish-language paper of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], devoted several columns to a presentation of axing policy views. Chief Editor Johan von Bonsdorff of NY TID justifies his position opposing the press solution by the fact that NY TID is "close to Eurocommunism", a premise which is rejected by the press work group.

In the NY TID article Chief Editor Yrjo Rautio of KANSAN TAHTO, which is published in Oulu, considers that the publication of a SKP newspaper appearing four times a week will reduce the size of newspapers already appearing in the People's Democratic movement.

Rautio is also afraid that editors whose views represent the concepts of TIE-DONANTAJA will join the editorial staff of KANSAN UUTISET.

NY TID is also publishing SKDL General Secretary Jorma Hentila's position in which the proposals of the SKP's press work group are criticized. Hentila's stand was also published on Thursday in KANSAN UUTISET.

The proposals of the press work group also criticized Chief Editor Erkki Kauppila of KANSAN UUTISET, who initially stated that he considers the proposals to be a blow to his own newspaper.

Kauppila is afraid that the implementation of the work group's proposals will mean that KANSAN UUTISET will become more and more a publication of the SKDL and is thus afraid of the problems this will cause since the SKP would acquire its own newspaper.

However, the chief editor of KANSAN UUTISET interprets the press proposal presented in the SKP Central Committee to mean that it would supposedly create some kind of opportunities for the suspension of TIEDUNANTAJA.

NY TID has also induced the secretary of the General Union of Journalists, Editor Maija Aalto of KANSAN UUTISET, to criticize the proposal. In Aalto's opinion the proposal of the press work group contains the negative factor that the press question is being examined only from the point of view party unity.

In addition, Kauppila criticizes the proposed editorial principles considering them to be foreign to the work of a journalist. Indeed, Kauppila consiers that they will disappear in the course of practical newspaper work.

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POLITICAL FINLAND

STALINIST ORGAN DEFENDS ROLE AS 'ONLY' PAPER TRUE TO CP

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 10 Jun 83 p 5

[Commentary by Editor, Urho Jokinen]

[Text] More people than usual are now interested in the affairs of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. The reason can be found in the SKP's present situation and in certain policies which affect the press.

The press question is of vital importance to the SKP. Even though it has been justifiably assessed that the vast decline in support for the SKP is a consequence of a policy causing a lack of confidence, the relationship between this issue and the unsatisfactory situation in the press has been little noticed. The press will not make a bad policy good, but it can, indeed, promote and support a bad policy and thus multiply the unsatisfactory effects of an unsatisfactory policy.

The Communist Party needs a revolutionary theory, a class-conscious policy, and a press that will implement these theories and policies in practice at a level commensurate with party policy and tasks. For this reason the press question is an important issue for the SKP.

The press is in a key position. If it can multiply the effects of an unsatisfactory policy and thus cause more harm than the bad policy itself, it can also offer invaluable service to a class-conscious policy.

The SKP has had and has many good decisions. But the SKP, more precisely stated its Central Committee, has not had and does not have a press commensurate with the level of these decisions. The decisions are lasting, their presentation or rather their misrepresentation in the press is unbelievable. No party can withstand this kind of a situation.

Even other parties need a press corresponding with their best decisions. No party can manage without this. Would it be possible to imagine an SDP without a mammoth media network, of which DEMARI is only a small part? Or the Conservative Party without UUSI SUCMI, KAUPPALEHTI, NYKYPAIVA, and HELSINGIN SANOMAT, which is frequently also said to be an organ of the SDP, an so on?

As far as the independence of some newspapers is concerned, everyone knows that appending the word independent to a certain newspaper does not make the

newspaper independent. Political alignment frequently develops because of a confused position.

Even though a portion of the SKP leadership has in many ways pushed aside TIEDONANTAJA, the newspaper has, in fact, been the only organ of the press that has consistently adhered to the SKP's line and decisions. Without such work the SKP would have been completely alienated from the truth and its membership and friends from a policy opposing big capital. In its place there would have been "an outward change through internal change", which has always been fashionable in the absence of any future prospects.

TIEDONANTAJA's activities have demonstrated that the SKP needs a chief organ that will promote its own party's policies and decisions in practice. The more evident this issue becomes, the better TIEDONANTAJA feels it has accomplished its tasks.

The demand of Arvo Aalto and several others for suspending the publication of TIEDONANTAJA is not because of the fact that this newspaper does not correspond with the SKP's line, but because of the fact that this newspaper is in harmony with this line. Those who are dissatisfied with TIEDONANTAJA and are demanding its cessation supposedly for the purpose of restoring unity to the SKP are dissatisfied with everything that the newspaper represents or the SKP's line. Very little significance is given to the way in which the newspaper carries out its editorial policy. What is most important and thus the worst is that the newspaper exists.

For this reason Aalto has said what he said. But the voices of class-conscious Communists and their friends should also be heard.

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POLITICAL GREECE

BASES NEGOTIATIONS ISSUE RAISES COMMENTS, OPPOSITION

'Illogical' Aspects Questioned

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 25 Jun 83 p 4

/Commentary by V. Filias: "The Seven 'Illogical' Aspects in the Bases Discussions"/

/Text/ One could with great difficulty dispute the fact that the most successful headline dealing with the deliberations over the bases was the one carried by PONDIKI last week: "Negotiations Over the Bases are Continuing at Dafni." A headline that was very succe sful and at the same time prophetic, coming after the provocative sally by the new KHORA that in some way belied the "rounding out" appearance of the issue by the prime minister on television.

I believe that, in truth, it is in the long run unproductive for one to discuss the bases issue having ideological-political assessments and preferences as a guideline. Things would be much more simple if one were to adopt a clear-cut and not at all complex analytical methodology.

In my opinior, and I will attempt to provide bases for it, this entire negotiating serial comes close to being a theater of the absurd and that is why I agreed so much with the PONDIKI headline.

The absurd thing in this matter has a deeply-scaled classification that is worth looking at within all of its levels:

First of all, there is a universal and an extremely deep-rooted anti-NATO feeling in the Greek people. An explainable feeling that is not impulsive in nature and that is prompted by two events of major significance:

- 1) The imposition of the dictatorship by the colonels.
- 2) The "Attila" attack and the dismemberment of Cyprus.

The Greek people --regardless of ideological and political views-- very correctly consider NATO and the Americans as direct accomplices in these two matters and not merely as instigators. Here, then, is the first element of the illogicality. We are negotiating with those who have deeply hurt us, ignoring one of the most tragic and traumatic experiences of our people in recent history.

Point Two: We are negotiating within the context of an "alliance" in which the primary and the more favored fellow-guest is Turkey which claims sovereign rights in the Aegean "by land, sea and air." Turkey which is occupying and is colonizing 40 percent of Cypriot territory and is establishing an independent Turkish Cypriot state. Turkey whose aircraft every now and then skim over the roofs of houses on Samos and Mytilini and we have to be on constant alert "to check" violations by air and sea. Turkey, finally, despite all the trumpeting and "confirmations," acts, if not always with the approval, nevertheless having as a given fact the forebearance of NATO and the Americans. This, then, is the second illogical element.

Point Three: We are seeking --and very rightly so-- a maximization in our relations with the Arabs on whom we depend for our fuel supplies, whom we ask to make investments in our country and to whom a sizable portion of our exports goes. On the other hand, we are negotiating over bases one of the two primary goals of which is the forced intervention in their region and the support of the policing mission of Israel to their detriment. This, therefore, is the third illogical element.

Point Four: We want --and we have every right to do so-- excellent relations with our socialist neighbors to the north. Even for stricly military reasons, i.e. in order for us to be able to employ all our forces to the Turkish side, inter-Balkan understanding is absolutely indispensable. And yet we are negotiating over bases the second primary goal of which is to hit these countries and the Soviet Union directly and fatally in case of war. So, of course, we ask ourselves, what is the meaning of the prime minister's proposal for a denuclearized Balkans when these bases will nevertheless contain --regardless of "reassurances"-- nuclear weapons. This, then, is the illogical element, indeed, in double form.

Point Five: Talk is heard about the payment of 500 million dollars a year in rent. What is the advantage when the greater part of this money will go back --as it appears that "it has been agreed upon"-- to the United States for the purchase of weapons, aircraft and all kinds of materiel. And if this does not increase to the attreme the dependence of our armed forces, and consequently of the country, on America, then what does? This is the fifth illogical element.

Point Six: This is all well and good, but we nonetheless secure the maintenance of the 7:10 ratio. Of this already tampered with ratio, through a thousand and one "sidetracks," that permits a whole gold mine of American and German war materiel to go into Turkey through the back door. What are our gurantees that this door will be shut? So, here is the sixth illogical element.

Point Seven: The bases, we say, will be withdrawn following "discussions" after a 5-year period of time. In principle, who and under what general and specific conditions will negotiations take place in 1988? After the continuous deterioration of the international situation, the substantive burial of detente and the continued strained atmosphere of provocation, exactly in the Middle East, what will happen in this 5-year period, what will foreign bases on our territory be used for and in what will they entangle us? We are talking about a 5-year period of time as if it were a question of a 5-month period....This, then, is certainly the last and biggest illogical element.

Perhaps the government will make objections to us that it cannot do otherwise, that we are bound hand and foot for a whole series of reasons. So, let the government tell us what they are so we may know because in such a situation it is not to be understood that we will be victims of a rape continuously and to appear from above as being usurpers.....

Makhairitsas, Andrikos Alleged Opposition

Athens AKROPOLIS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 26 Jun 83 p 18

/Text/ Two of the prime minister's immediate associates are "responsible for" the postponement of the announcement of the bases agreement that had been planned for Tuesday before last and that was finally put off because significant differences on important issues had been found. These included the balance of forces in the Aegean, the known final date of the existence of the bases on Greek soil, as well as the possibility for Greek access to and control over the activity of the bases so that it could be ensured that they would not be turned against the Balkan and Middle East countries with which Greek maintains friendly relations.

As is known, another issue, among those that would have led to a wrecking of the negotiations, was the one that concerns jurisdiction by the Greek and American sides as to extraterritoriality.

At nearly the very last moment the text of the agreement was given to the prime minister's two associates --Mr Makhairitsas who is the director of the diplomatic office and Mr Andrikos who recently retired as an air force colonel and who remains in the prime minister's office as an adviser on defense matters. Both advisers have full knowledge of all the issues related to the bases since they had been involved in similar negotiations that had taken place under the G. Rallis government and that had not gotten any results.

Up until the time the text of the agreement was given to Messrs Makhairitsas and Andrikos, both had not been given any detailed briefing on what Mr Kapsis had been discussing with Mr Bartholomew.

Nonetheless, while they were studying the text of the agreement that was about to be signed they found that it contained provisions and expressions that neither safeguarded the Greek side nor corresponded to Mr Papandreou's policy on the bases issue, at least as far as these two advisers understood it.

The "Red Light"

From that moment on, the alarm "red light" began to go on everywhere. The prime minister was notified and was informed about the weaknessness in the agreement, as his two advisers judged them. And from then on began the new marathon Kapsis-Bartholomew talks and the return of the American negotiator to Washington for new instructions.

Before he left and after the two advisers of the prime minister had put on the "red light" for him "special" activity had been observed in the Maximos Building where the political office had been set up and where an all-night meeting of the government's leading officials was being held. These officials were Messrs Koutsogiorgas, Gennimatas, Tsokhatzopoulos and Laliotis.

And then began the "war of messages" that were being sent to Mr Kapsis who was continuing his talks with Mr Bartholomew.

No one was in a position at that critical hour to know if the messages were coming from Kastri or at least which of them had been sent from the prime minister's home.

Nonetheless, Mr Kapsis received them whether or not he wanted to. And he lay them out on the negotiating table. And when in the long run Messrs Bartholomew and Berlin realized what exactly the government wanted in addition they were astonished. The surprise was expressed by Mr Berlin who observed that: What is being sought through the messages is less than what has already been discussed and agreed upon.

No one yet knows how correct this is. However, it is clear that a postponement was noted and now the government is waiting for Washington's final answer that is expected to be satisfactory.

This feeling is based on the evaluation of informed sources who maintain that the differences remaining to be cleared up are small. Consequently, it would be difficult to anticipate a wrecking of the talks over the bases. Perhaps for that reason the American officials are not especially worried about the fate of their bases in Greece.

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POLITICAL

KARAMANLIS SPEECHES SEEN HEATING, COOLING POLITICAL CLIMATE

Moderation Recedes in Background

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 26 Jun 83 p 8

/Commentary by Panos Loukakos/

/Text/ If Mr Menios Koutsogiorgas had not said what he said in Patras and Aigion, if Mr Giannis Alevras had not made the statement he made on the occasion of the conclusion of the parliamentary session, if the KKE had not made another strong attack on the government and if Ankara had not sent yet another war vessel into the Aegean for a sail I would have spent a quiet week. But all of the above occured and last week was anything but quiet. Indeed, to the contrary, it was one of the most "lively" in recent months.

The fuse was ignited last Sunday in Patras by Minister to the Prime Minister Koutsogiorgas who, while speaking to a partisan audience, hurled a thunderbolt with very great charges against everybody, Right, Left, EEC, personages and things.

New Democracy at once called Mr Koutsogiorgas "Papapdreou's champion in vulgarity," while the context of the speech resulted in opposition even from pro-government newspapers.

One of these newspapers commented, "The characterization by government officials of a given party as engaging in quisling activities, a party that through the mandate of the people governed Greece until just recently, is foreign to the principles of democracy and alien to the need for supporting the regime."

Less than all, Mr Koutsogiorgas, in his speech, insulted President of the Republic Karamanlis. Nevertheless, his references to the president in connection with the entry into the EEC appears to have provoked opposition from the sovereign leader, opposition that Prime Minister Papandreou hastened to calm down. The latter stated:

"The mingling of the name of the former prime minister and the current president of the republic, as well as critical commentary on his work, do not echo the government line."

Opposition newspapers hastened to write, "Menios is out of line." Indeed, they announced his resignation beforehand, but Mr Koutsogiorgas himself, on his

return from Paris on Thursday, stressed that there was no such issue and he then added the following:

"It would not be logical for me to make any kind of statement before I am informed, but I do believe that they are prefabricated stories and they come within the context of ND's creating tensions."

Nevertheless, newspaper editors have requested an official meeting with Mr Menios Koutsogiorgas so that he may once and for all clear up what has been attributed to him as saying or not saying. Of course, there does not seem to be any question of his resigning.

After the latest statement by Mr A. Papandreou, there no longer appears to be the slightest problem in the relations between the president of the republic and the prime minister. In that statement, Mr Papandreou had very strongly condemned the mingling of Mr Karamanlis' name in everyday political life.

The Return of the Prodigal Sons

If Mr Koutsogiorgas' attacks on personages and things were particularly strong, Mr Evangelos Averof's, New Democracy leader, were not far behind in tone. At a meeting of the ND parliamentary group Mr Averof said —in essence— that with the PASOK government "we are beginning to assume a national socialist people's democracy format."

The situation would be tragic if one were to take the words of Mr Koutsogiorgas and Mr Averof at face value. This is so because the picture that emerges from them is a country with a national socialist government and a quisling opposition. And surely things cannot be exactly like that.

For the rest, Mr Averof explained to his intra-party opponents that when he was ill and he wanted to leave they did not let him, but now that he had recovered he does not intend to do them that favor regardless of how much they want it. This explanation was linked to Mr Averof's anticipation that sudden elections cannot be ruled out and, indeed, with an electoral fraud system. It was also linked to a bitter potion which Mr Giannis Boutos will be called on to drink in the first 10 days of July.

He will greet and salute Mr Averof in Kalamata where the ND leader will deliver a political speech. However, Mr Boutos was the one who, with the intervention of the then ND leader, Mr G. Rallis, had thwarted the appearance of Mr E. Averof in Messinia during the pre-election campaign period. Times change....

Exactly this show of force by Mr Averof against his intra-party opponents coincides with certain information that he has secured "support from above," at least for a period of many months so that he may prove (now that he is healthy) his leadership qualities and be able to supervize his party.

In this way, once again Mr Mitsotakis is limiting his struggle to taking over the second-in-comman, position, openly siding with Mr Averof and secretly attacking the founder of New Democracy, Mr K. Karamanlis. As for Mr K. Stefanopoulos, just a few days ago he made a declaration of loyalty to his leader in a speech at Metaxourgeion Square.

Thus, the prodigal sons are one by one beginning to return. As soon as the last one returns perhaps then Mr Averof will slaughter the fatted calf to celebrate the event. And according to all predictions this calf will be the presumptive second-in-command Mr K. Mitsotakis.

However, it is not only a question of the internal developments within New Democracy. There is also its foreign policy:

On Thursday, Mr E. Averof, who was sojourning in London, had his party join the European Democratic Union that aspires to become the equal of the Socialist International in the conservative sphere. And all of that with a fiery anticommunist speech by Mr Averof that made Mrs Thacher and Mr Kohl (who were present at the meeting) feel almost like social democrats.

Opening by the KKE

The communist party too did not remain outside of the political bridal chamber that week. On Wednesday, it made public the decision of its central committee's plenum with which the government is criticized for "abandoning the positions of change."

The KKE maintains that "the latest developments show that the government is today moving along a path of compromise with monopolies and imperialists, that it is coming into open confrontation with the workers and that consequently it is assuming great responsibilities vis-a-vis the people that voted it in to bring about a real change." At the same time, it is making an opening toward the popular grassroots of PASOK and also of New Democracy.

RIZOSPASTIS has written that the communists will strengthen democratic dialogue and common action with PASOK's militants but they will also develop, on a larger scale and without prejudice, dialogue with citizens of conservative persuasion. The newspaper announced that this summer, when PASOK, ND and KKE cadres will make outings into the provinces, confrontation in the region --both in coffeehouses and squares-- will be especially strong.

It is, nevertheless, a fact that during the summer months the KKE will avoid sharp reckoning with the summit but will, to the contrary, address itself to the grassroots with a goal having a solid game plan around fall when people will come back from vacation and begin thinking about how they will get through winter. KKE's threat that it will promote strike movements, indeed ignoring the notorious Article 4, still remains strong.

Mr Alevras' Problems

In all of last week's turmoil, Mr Giannis Alevras, president of parliament, while making a review of the past session, thought of the mild political atmosphere and realized that it no longer existed. The president's realization and his statement that "every government wants to produce more legislative work, a fact that means a curtailment of the rights of the opposition," was interpreted by pro-New Democracy newspapers as an oblique attack on PASOK. Indeed, together with the inclusion in these matters of the fact that Mr Alevras is no longer attending meetings of PASOK's executive committee, certain of these newspapers published various scenarios about an "Alevras uprising," "movements within PASOK," etc.

Of course, the president of parliament did not answer any of the above -- the constitutional right of each person is in the long run to freely and in an unconstrained manner voice his opinions-- but how much truth there is in all of this each reader understands. (The press conference of the president of parliament is published on the last page).

At any rate, Mr G. Alevras is carrying out his duties in such a way that he is getting general approval from all sides of parliament. It is indeed being said that President of the Republic Karamanlis had previously told friends of his that the current president of parliament is carrying out his duties better than the former president, Mr K. Papakonstandinou.

According to accounts by his audience, the president of the republic had added, "But I do not say that more widely so as not to hurt my good old friend."

Mini-Crisis Fades

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 3 Jul 83 p 9

/Commentary by Pavlos Loukakos/

/Excerpts/ A speech delivered by the president of the republic last Tuesday in Serrai caused an uproar. A second speech, also delivered by Mr Karamanlis last Thursday in Drama, brought about a relaxation of tensions. Much occured between these two speeches and much more had been promoted. Everything, however, shows that political life, following a "hot" two-week period, is returning to its normal rate and that the cycle that began last Sunday in Patras, with Mr Menios Koutsogiorgas' speech, ended in Drama with the "fire fighting" speech by Mr Karamanlis.

In Serrai, Mr Karamanlis wanted to provide an answer to what he himself considered as personal attacks against him by the government party. In Drama, he gave a second answer to those in the ND camp and to pro-ND newspapers that wanted to misinterpret his speech as a declaration of war on the government, a war that clearly they themselves are not in a position of waging. So, balance prevailed in the long run.

The newspaper EXORMISIS, PASOK's journalistic organ, characteristically observed:

"We more than anyone else --certainly more than New Democracy-- want the president of the republic to remain unhurt by fire of the political opposition, that as time goes on is ever increasing, just as he remained unhurt during the 1981 pre-election campaign, something that contributed to normalcy and the free expression of the popular will....Normalcy and a mild political atmosphere constitute a condition for the confrontation of the major domestic and foreign problems and for the course toward change. Others have interest in fishing in the muddy waters of tensions and troubles."

It is becoming clearer each day that New Democracy is not a successful honorable opposition. The range of its criticism is clealy limited and does not convince anyone. And it is also clear that its intra-party rivalries have a priority position in the minds of its leading cadres who practice opposition tactics not for the purpose of convincing the people but for strengthening their own personal positions, both from today's and for the future's, in their internal reckonings.

But this is not the only thing. There is also a long-time tradition in the Right that desires that the leader of the state be its own party leader. In the past, the party leader role had beer played by the palace, and today ND would have liked the presidential mansion to play a party leader role.

So, when the government party rightly criticizes New Democracy's past, Mr E. Averof and the pro-opposition newspapers talk about an "attack against Karamanlis," attempting to fortify themselves behind the authority and equalizing role of the president of the republic. The only thing is, however, that the presidential office of its founder cannot irrevocably cover all those things for which the Greek people voted against it 2 years ago.

When Mr Karamanlis decides to settle certain of his own differences with the government, they undertake massive efforts to participate in a game that is taking place over their heads and that at any rate is not for their account and that, as is demonstrated, they cannot even play the role of accomplice.

This, then, was the scene and behind the scene of the crisis that broke out last week and that already appears to be waning.

The president of the republic comes from a party other than the one that won the 1981 elections. It is altogether natural, therefore, that he disagrees with many of the government's handling of issues —the opposite would have been illogical. It is also natural that he would want to express his views in the way he himself chooses, directly or obliquely, indeed, a right and duty granted him by the existing constitution. But also natural are that the final political choices belong to the government that is judged by the people.

The issue, therefore, is not if disagreements exist but if the president harmoniously works with the prime minister despite the fact that he comes from a different political arena. And until now this harmonious cooperation exists. Indeed, despite the existing differences, everything shows that it will continue. This at any rate was revealed by the recent crisis and the manner in which the two sides managed to moderate it.

Popular Devotion

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3-4 Jul 83 p 16

/Editorial: "Real Proof from the North"/

/Text/ Only the microphones "were not at their best," as Mr Karamanlis jokingly said on a Drama balcony. Because everything else, the flood of people on Elevtheria Square, the cries, the ethnarch slogans and the exaltation of the applause in the end caused the president of the republic to thank them because "you have given me the most beautiful moments of my life." And this love of the people continued all through his stay in the north. His close entourage admitted that never had the president been so satisfied over the real proof of the love of his compatriots as on this trip. "Two thousand to 3,000 persons --men, women and children-- continually waited outside the Xenias Hotel in both Serrai and Drama when Karamanlis stayed there" -- an honor guard for the number one citizen (and fellow-countryman) of the country. The demonstrations in both Serrai and Drama had the element of spontaneity. There was no mobilization, no buses were used, there were no placards and there were no organized units. Characteristic perhaps was the fact that when the mayor of Drama referred to the prime minister during his address to the president of the republic no applause was heard. Each person can make his own deductions.

Karamanlis' Personal Feelings

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 3 Jul 83 p 3

/Article by Giorgis Massavetas/

/Text/ The outburst by the president of the republic in Serrai was not a "thunderbolt out of the blue." For those who know all he confides to friends, associates and guests at Sunday dinners --where journalists are often invited-all of this time after the elections the explosion in Drama is simply the public manifestation of all Mr Karamanlis says. Perhaps it was an outburst.

Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to contend that the Koutsogiorgas affair was the cause and not merely the occasion for the public outburst by the president of the republic who had created a state precedent, a constitution. I form of jurisprudence. The president asserted "my right" "de facto" to publicly judge the government's choices.

Much has been promoted. Disagreements that had become the subject of frequent confidences by Mr Karamanlis. And it is these confidences that I have tried to bring together in this report. And I give them with every reservation not for the essence of their contents but for their exact verbal expression.

Everything starts out with the understanding that Mr Karamanlis has with regard to his assigned role, his powers and jurisdictions according to the constitution. Taking as an opportunity all that he said in his public speech in Kalamata and all that had been attributed to him by newspapers of the Right as to his intentions vis-a-vis the armed forces, commentaries were given which maintained that these issues had been handled, according to the constitution, by the government that had been elected by the people. And mingling the name of the president of the republic, whose constitutional role is something other, is not permitted.

Karamanlis, therefore, reacted by saying:

"You should learn constitutional law. You should get hold of the constitution and study it. I have a right to speak. The constitution says that I make proclamations, issue orders, that I have a right to come out with bills, to appoint governments. I am not irresponsible of principles. I am responsible."

In another instance he warned: "Do not look when I contain myself and do not speak because I do not want problems to be created. If I am forced to, I will do it." And he did.

In his distinctive facility, Mr Karamanlis maintains that it is also a question of the acceptance or not of premature elections. When he was once asked by a journalist if he would accept a request for premature elections in November by Papandreou he answered in one word: No. A little later he explained the reasons for his refusal: "The government is strong. Unless, of course, it wants to resign. Then, of course, there will be elections officially."

To the observation that he too had asked for premature elections in 1977 from the president of the republic of the time, namely Mr Kon. Tsatsos, and that his request had been accepted, Mr Karamanlis had his explanation ready: That he had already been in government for 3 years and that he had requested the renewal of his mandate for a specific reason that did not exist when the elections were held: namely, to put the country back into NATO.

Foreign Policy Relations with Andreas

At the basis of the whole issue, of course, is the fact that there are differences of opinion between the government and the president as to what are the goals of foreign policy. And foreign policy is exactly the area to which Mr Karamanlis gives greater importance. He puts the handling of domestic matters in a seconday position. He is accustomed to saying:

"What the government does in domestic matters is of secondary importance. At the most, the country could move 3 years forward, 3 years backwards. National issues are what are critical. They are the ones that determine the future of the country."

He considers as national issues relations with Turkey, with NATO, the EEC, the United States, the Cypriot question, etc.

Besides, it had become evident that this had been discussed between Karamanlis and Papandreou long before the 1981 elections. He had left it clearly to be understood that he had PASOK's president in mind when one evening he had invited newspaper political editors over to Kastri "for a drink."

At that time, Mr Papandreou had emphasized that he did not see any difficulties in the cooperation of a socialist government with Mr Karamanlis. That the program of a socialist government did not appear to bother the president. And that what was evident of concern to him was "not to harm what he considered as his own personal work, work with which he wrote history. In other words, entry into the EEC and relations with NATO."

It was exactly these accomplishments that Minister to the Prime Minister Koutsogiorgas contested. And it provoked his outburst. And it was these accomplishments that he defended in his speech in Serrai. His positions on these issues are, of course, well-known from older texts of his. He does not, however, lose any opportunity to repeat them today in unofficial talks with his guests.

He often stresses that:

"Our geopolitical position does not contain margins for us to make selections as to camps. Only with the West will we find it. With the EEC, NATO and with good and sincere relations with the United States."

And raising his voice he concludes:

"We are continually embittering our allies. And that is bad. Since we are forced to be with them, let us do so magnanimously and not pusillanimously. So that they may pay more attention to us. Turkey, in order to get where she is openly and unreservedly has secured many advantages. And I do not believe that the Americans love the Turks more than us. That is nonsense. To the contrary, because of its history, they think of our country highly. But regardless of anything we do, Turkey has a special use for their strategic goals both because of its size and position."

"Since We Need Them Let's Not Insult Them"

Recently a person with whom he was talking observed: You should not be dissatisfied with the government. And Article 4 too should satisfy you, and there seems that there will be an agreement on the bases.... "Mr Karamanlis then cut him off by saying:

"No. Despite everything, I am uneasy. Because we have to decide that we cannot play with our allies. We cannot say to the community, yes, I am in the EEC but at the same time create problems on a daily basis. Yes, I am in NATO but every day I clash with NATO. Some day these things could create problems for us. Where will we go? With the Third World, with the fourth, fifth world, with the Warsaw Pact? Let's say it if we want to. Not half-mouthed."

And smiling sarcastically he mentioned the names of a few Third World countries that are encountering great problems at this time and that have become embroiled in bloody events. He finally asked:

"In other words, do we want to have the same thing? Here we have a stable situation. Tied to the the EEC chariot as equal members. Tomorrow we become its president. I do not understand why we want to get out of that.

"We are the most isolated people on earth. We do not have 'relatives.' We do not belong to any same nationality such as the Anglo-Saxons, Slavs, Latins, Arabs, etc. Nationally, linguistically, religiously, we are isolated. That is why we need supports."

Mr Karamanlis' "disagreement" with the minister to the prime minister dates from even before the Koutsogiorgas speech in Aigion. Nor, of course, is it the only instance of a minister whom he had judged as "having it in for me." Another time, at a reception in honor of a foreign guest, he "grabbed" a minister "by the sleeve." And amidst the many guests he said, "Stop digging constantly into the past. Stop having it in for me. When you fight my work you are fighting me."

A behind-the-scenes item on the Karamanlis-Koutsogiorgas relations: Shortly before Christmas, the president was "embittered" by a decision of the minister to the prime minister: he had cut off overtime for employees of the prime minister's office without informing him.

He had also manifested his opposition to the minister to the prime minister in another instance when the public administration law was being voted on. At that time he said:

"What they are doing these days are not good things. You cannot pursue your opponents. I did not put only my own people in high positions. Angelopoulos in the National $\overline{/Bank/}$ was not my man. Nor Kyriazis in the Bank of Greece, nor Pepelasis in the Agricultural $\overline{/Bank/}$. What they are doing is a mistake."

There were times when the president of the republic --as he confides to close associates--"helped" the prime minister to overcome problems on his relations with the EEC, the United States and NATO. Indeed, he characteristically mentions how much "he worked for the government" when he visited Brussels shortly before Mr Papandreou went to London to participate for the first time at an EEC summit meeting. Clearing up the issue of his position vis-a-vis foreigners with regard to the government's task, Mr Karamanlis maintains:

"I can differ with the government on certain topics but when I encounter a third party I always play the role of the government's lawyer. As far as the outside is concerned, I am always with the government."

Despite everything, the government has the impression --and information toc--that, if not from him personally at least from the entourage of the president of the republic, information and views had been given to the foreign press and particularly the French press when Mr Karamanlis was in Paris to the effect that they clearly crea — the feeling of disagreement between the sovereign leader and the prime minister (LE MONDE, LE FIGARO, etc.).

Nevertheless, Mr Karamanlis himself invariably repeats to all with whom he speaks, both at home and abroad. that his relations with Mr Papandreou are excellent and that they are working together admirably.

As for the electoral system, Mr Karamanlis has many times expressed his opposition to the simple proportional system. He says:

"It is a mistake. It will lead us to non-government, to anarchy and it could lead us once again to some kind of junta. We need strong governments. We have not reached the level of the northern Europeans who are governmed by coalitions. Here we do not leave such margins. Parties cut off bridges. When someone comes out and insults you as a traitor, a quisling, a dependent, you cannot work together with him. There, things are not like that. They leave bridges. They can work together. Despite everything, weaknesses are known. Every now and then they change governments. Look at what is happening in Italy. We need s strong government."

The single-seat constituency but with a second round so that the parties might count their forces and so that a strong government might be formed. For him, nevertheless, the best system still is the one that had been used in 1956 thanks to which he took over power despite the fact that he got a smaller number of votes than the Democratic Union to which nearly all the parties belonged, ranging from G. Papandreou to Dino Tsaldaris, from the EDA to Tourkovasilis. That is the mixed electoral system where in some constituencies the simple proportional system is used while the majority system is used in others.

He also considers the abolition of the preference cross as a mistake.

"It, of course, has its advantages but despite everything we do the parties are becoming more and more commanding, more of a matter of the leader than it was previously. And the leader shoulders responsibilities that he did not have before. While he could, in certain circumstances, escape and leave the choice to the judgement of the people. Now it will be difficult to find people of industry who would want to "fill" a ballot without hope of being chosen. Who would accept coming in last on a ballot of multi-seat constituency? Only ridiculous persons who would look forward to some prominence or some other benefit. However, in this way parliamentarianism is downgraded."

He Disagrees Too with Television

His views also differ on the matter of radio and television programs. The president of the republic does not hide his differing position on this issue:

"A lot of communism goes throuth the /television and radio/ channels. Taking everything into consideration, they are not all communists. Twelve percent are, at the most 15. Because all the others look and hear compulsorily whatever a few communists like."

Of course, Mr Karamanlis never says that he has shown any inclination to intervene in the contents of the television and radio programs. Such insinuations, however, have been made from other sides. Recently, Mr K. Beis, ERT /Greek Radio and Television/ president, explained to a general assembly meeting that "suggestions from above" did not permit ERT to give a full picture of the resistance. And the insinuation was formulated in such a way that it revealed from where these "suggestions from above" came.

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CSO: 3521/366

POLITICAL

NEW APPOINTMENTS IN COUNCIL OF STATE

Appointments Listed

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 6 Jul 83 p 1

/Excerpt/ After suggestions made by Minister of Justice M.A. Mangakis, the ministerial council last night appointed Themistoklis Kourousopoulos, second vice president of the Council of State, to the position of president of the Council of State. Appointed to fill the three vacant positions of vice president were Messrs G. Skourtsis, K. Lassados and V. Rotis, councilors of state. Minister of Justice Mangakis made the following statement: "The government has fulfilled its constitutional duty and has appointed the new leadership of the Council of State. With this selection, an institution, that especially embodies the independence of justice and thus serves our democratic system of government, is continued and is strengthened."

Legal circles had reservations last night over the government's selections and over the great satisfaction voiced by the minister of justice.

Nevertheless, there was general "hope" that the task of the Council of State would continue undisturbed, where the primary promotions were made through selection and not through seniority.

Members Biographic Data

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 8 Jul 83 p 8

Text/ Themistoklis Kourousopoulos. Appointed by the government to the position of president of the Council of State; premoted through selection. Mr Kourousopoulos was born in Athens in September 1921. He studied law at the University of Athens and did post-graduate work at the University of Paris. He became an examiner on the Council of State in 1951, associate judge in 1958 and councilor of state in 1969. He has written a study titled "The Inconsistencies of the Parliamentary Office." He is a member of the Administrative Studies Association. He speaks French and German.

G. Skourtsis. Appointed vice president of the Council of State; promoted through selection. He was born in Dafni, Kalavrita, in January 1917. He studied law at the University of Athens from 1933 to 1938 and at the University of Paris for 1 year (1964-1965). In 1939, he was appointed a lawyer in Athens and practiced law until 1945 at which time he was appointed justice of the peace. He returned to the practice of law in 1947 and continued until 1950 when he was successful in the competition for the appointment of councilors on the Council of State. He has held that position since then. He has written articles on legal matters that have appeared in specialized periodicals and encyclopedias. He speaks French and Italian.

Konstandinos Lassados. Appointed vice president of the Council of State; promoted through selection. He was born in Amfilokhia in January 1922. He studied law at the University of Athens and did post-graduate work at the school of law of the University of Paris. He began his career as a lawyer in 1949 and came to the Council of State as an examiner in 1951. He became associate judge in 1962. He was chairman of the educational council of the Civil Servants Training School, chairman of the Administrative Advisory Council and chairman and member of many other councils. He was secretary general of the Ministry of Justice in 1967 and vice president of the board of the Agia Sofia Children's Hospital (1967-1969). He has taken part in congresses of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (Dublin 1968, Rome 1971 and Dubrovik 1976), as well as the conferences of the European Law Committee of the Council of Europe.

Vasos Rotis. Appointed vice president of the Council of State; promoted through promotion. He was born in Athens in March 1922. He studied law and political and economic sciences at the University of Athens from 1935 to 1946 and did post-graduate work in administrative and public law at the University of Paris for 1 year (1959-1960). At first he worked as an employee at the Athens mortgage registry for 7 years beginning in 1941. He practiced law from 1948 to 1951. He was an examiner on the Council of State for 10 years, 1952-1962, and associate judge from 1963 to 1973. He has written many studies: "Subjective Elements of Invalidation Petitions" (1960); "The Possibility for Repealing Decisions on the Imposition of Disciplinary Punishme t" (1961); "Reasonable Time in the Jurisprudence of the Council of State" (1976) and other works. He has been awarded the gold medal for bravery, military crosses 3rd class and medals for exceptional deeds.

ND Opposition

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7 Jul 83 p 1

/Excerpt/ The day before yesterday's decision by the ministerial council to appoint, through selection, the new president of the Council of State and to fill the three vacant vice president positions has brought about a strong confrontation between the government and the honorable opposition.

In an announcement issued yesterday, New Democracy criticized the government for abuse of its constitutional right and for upsetting a long-held tradition according to which high-level positions on the Council of State were assigned by virtue of seniority. Furthermore, ND, linking the decision of the ministerial council with the well-known decision with regard to the anticonstitutionality of the framework law on institutions of higher learning, charges the government with making partisan selections since it had been annoyed by the many invalidating decisions of the Council of State.

Following the day before yesterday's retraction on the issue of the framework law, the government gave its answer in a similar strong manner. Speaking for the government yesterday was Minister of Justice Mangakis who criticized ND for creating a controversy "without bounds" so as to acquire small-time party benefits.

The strong confrontation of the two big parties, as noted by political observers, comes at an unusually delicate period of time when the Council of State's leadership will be called on to convene next Tuesday to assign the chairmanships of its various units to its vice presidents and to determine the issues related to completing work pending in the highest court.

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CSO: 3521/367

POLITICAL NETHERLANDS

TENSION BETWEEN LEFT WING, REST OF CDA

Controversies on Issues

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 20 May 83 p 8-10

[Article by Gerard Driehuis and Frenk van der Linden: "The CDA and the Legacy of Willem Aantjes"]

[TExt] The heavy land which almost-Commissioner Dries van Agt once used to pull in the reins on the loyalists continues its grip. Whereas the party bosses deny any problems, the left wing is attempting to defend the last bastions and avoid the CDA's [Christian Democratic Appeal] becoming bogged down in "doublespeak formulations and compromises." Can the CDA be replaced by a department of the National Information Agency? Here are the latest reports from the front. In the following interview, Willem Aantjes reveals that he considers a split in his CDA Party as virtually certain. This would create a new party. And who knows? If it needs him...

"I'm almost starting to get homesick for Dries van Agt," says Dr Sytze Faber. If he is homesick for Dries van Agt, it must be pretty rough going now to be a member of the CDA Party in Parliament and at the same time be considered a leftist. "With van Agt, there was at least a certain ethical ambiance. With him, there was more to it than just the 'here and now.' I would rather have a CDA boss with an ethical aura I don't agree with than a policy that reacts only to the events of the day. At least then there was still something at stake," lamented Faber.

There have been sure indications for weeks now that the CDA is going about clearing away the last strongholds of leftist sentiment. One incident has followed on the other, with the left-wing obstructionists being the clear losers each time. Each time there is a vote, they are in the minority and therefore wrong. It all began about the time of the last election when both Dries van Agt and Jan de Koning in advance placed the blame for the election defeat on the left-wing movement. (Although the left does not like the term left wing, we will use it here because it is shorter than their preferred description "the Party members who, on the basis of radical Christian principles and in view of the CDA platform, etc., etc.") Since

then the situation has grown worse by the week. It has been so bad that CDA committees have surfaced on the right that call simply for expelling the left wing (the so-called Gijsen group, for instance) so bad that within the party the option of removing Jan Nico Scholten and his followers is being discussed openly (a discussion spearheaded by Wim Mateman) and that many on the left are either losing courage or candidly making plans for a new party (the latter tendency is clearly shown in the interview below with Willem Aantjes).

Meanwhile, the conflict between left and right-or rather between the left and the rest of the Party-is dragging on from one incident to another. The event-of-the-week award went to Stef Dijkman, who this time scored twice in 1 week. First, he sharply reproached the party (most of all, party leader Bert de Vries) for allegedly banning Chamber members from attending a meeting with Bishop Gumbleton from America. Second, he protested (we could say loudly) against the fact that he is no longer permitted to be party spokesman for housing. The collision with the official party line was in both cases so complete that, in talking with DE TIJD, Dijkman and the proverbally calm De Vries made each other out to be liars.

This is shown in the following dialogs. We are speaking first with Bert de Vries and then with Stef Dijkman.

[Question] "Mr Dijkman says that you banned the party members from attending the meeting with the American peace bishop."

[De Vries] "Mr Dijkman might say that but if he does, he's not telling the truth. I don't blame him though. He became emotional and went too far. But that can happen."

[Question] "When people go around telling things about each other this way and they aren't true, isn't something basically wrong?"

[De Vries] Yes, I do think something is wrong when I see how things have been going the past weeks. ESpecially between Scholten and Dijkman on the one hand and the rest of the party on the other. That is not good. It is structural, too. I regret it especially because I think a left wing is needed in a party like the CDA."

Now Stef Dijkman speaks on the same incident.

[Question] "De Vries claims that you are not telling the truth."

[Dijkman] "If De Vries said that he didn't tell the party not to go to that meeting, then I'm at a complete loss for words; I am stupified beyond speech. There was a discussion about this matter, and it resulted in Scholten and me being the only ones to turn up at the bishop's meeting. Did all these other party members by some coincidence have an appointment somewhere else then?"

Concerning his removal as spokesman on housing, Dijkman frankly speculated on the possibility that it was a retaliatory measure for his having voted for the CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands] motion earlier in the week: "According to some party members, that's exactly the way it happened."

[De Vries] "Nonesense."

Two Dissident Elephants

So, it has reached the point where they are calling one another liars. Dijkman's excitement becomes somewhat more understandable when one knows that De Vries did not even stay during the conflict in the commission. It was a matter of high principle for Dijkman, and De Vries walked away. But Dijkman remained cool-headed enough to call a reporter from TROUW, and the row was born. Many of the other party members on the left speak sympathetically about the intentions of Scholten and Dijkman and can be heard to say that the two dissident elephants are making an awful mess of things as they move through the Christian Democratic china, that they are too confrontational or that they do not show enough concern for first getting a larger following. A prime example of this last method was the vote on the freeze motion, where at least 15 DCA members voted against the party line. A lot of lobbying went into that. But Scholten and Dijkman do not have the patience for that. They speak their minds even without support.

The list of incidents goes on. We could report about former minister Van Dijk's tirades against the left wing or about the difficulties over El Salvador, but the question is whether there is any rhyme in all the squabbling. Party leader De Vries believes that the reason lies simply in the left wing's overestimation of its own importance: "I thought things were going tolerably well these past months. But you can never get your own way by just shining and badgering. And that's what they want to way, apparently. Scholten and Dijkman have a false perception of their own position. When they don't always get their way, they don't see what kinds of concessions were made by others. They just don't see them. There's not much to be done about it."

Hans de Boer, now feeling completely at home in his new mayorial post in the polder, has this to say: "It has nothing to do with the fact that it is a minority but with the fact that it's not a minority on the right, for they are universally tolerated. The one can steal a cow (here I have the dissident on the right, Mateman, in mind), whereas Scholten and Dijkman are not permitted even to look through the stall window."

Course Remains Totally Unclear

Sytze Faber, the party member with the most clout in the left wing, says: "For some time, the CDA has been doing nothing mroe than defining itself in terms of the VVD [Labor Party] on the other. It remains totally unclear what our own course is. Actually, this is the legacy of Willem Aantjes. At its founding, it was he who forced the CDA to define the

program much more precisely than was actually intended. The CDA has thus become a party that claims always to conduct politics according to the principles of Christianity. Experience shows that this can hardly be done by a party at the center of power. If you rule and have a say in NATO, you just have to get your hands dirty. Maybe it's impossible to do what the platform prescribes. But you don't have to do what's happening now; what you have to do is change the platform. Then you show that you're giving up the pretention and no longer intend to be a party acting on Christian teachings.

"Nuclear weapons are a splendid example. Almost all institutes of the Christian faith teach that the Gospel does not permit you to have offensive nuclear weapons. But in the CDA, there is too much readiness to negotiate the point. IN [expansion unknown] thinkgs that it is acceptable to wait and see what the outcome is at the Geneva talks. I can sympathize with such a tactical position. But is it consistent with the Gospel to consider seriously the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons?"

Discussion Is Dangerous

[Question] "The Bible also supports those who claim that it is."

[Sytze Faber] "But you don't hear me saying that people who reach a different conclusion are inferior Christians. I have an awful problem with the fact that you can scarcely even mention anymore what the Bible has to say about political activity. That is almost a taboo. If the CDA wishes to continue the claim that it is based on Christian principles, there is a choice of three options: first, we can become a witness party on the periphery; or we can say that we are Christian but that this hardly has any importance, that it's more for campaign purposes than for serious politics; or, third, we can really attempt to do what we now claim we're doing, namely, to exercise power according to biblical principles. But that's precisely when you must continue to talk and not denounce anybody with a different opinion whenever he opens his mouth. For the very reason that the Bible does not furnish unambiguous answers, a Christian party must be tolerant when not everyone always reaches the same conclusion. But in the CDA, you can scarcely oppose anything. The leaders perceive discussion as a danger, claiming that the party constituents will lose patience if we are not always unanimous. But the opposite is true: in our disunity, they will recognize their own struggle for the truth.

"The crisis is also connected with the personnel policy of the CDA. Earlier, the leader of the Antirevolutionary Party and also those of the Catholic People's Party and Christian Historical Union regularly—sat in the Chamber. That's the place where a party can gain profile. Now the premier is the party leader. By definition, he has to make compromises. The party threatens to become second-rate, one that can just nod yes to the premier. If this keeps going on, you can replace the CDA Party in Parliament and have the National Information Agency perform the same function."

"So Many Tensions...."

But it is becoming more and more quiet in the left wing. The natural leader, Willem Aantjes, was the first to disappear, for other than political reasons. (However, Aantjes has said: "EAch day I understand better that political motives played a much larger part than even I had thought possible.") Next, the second leader, Hans de Boer, was gone. For reasons of health? Sytze Faber seemed on the verge of being mayor of Leeuwarden, and just as we happened to be wity him in his office, the report came of the appointment of the competing candidate. So Faber came close to leaving as well. Some of the other "dissidents" are keeping remarkably quiet, and the duo, Jan Nico Scholten and Stef Dikjman, seems to be hellbent on making themselves impossible. After that has happened, it will be calm in the CDA for good.

The sitting "leftist" Chamber members are still trying to avoid the outcome of this process but do not deny that it is becoming increasingly difficult to hold their heads above water. On this Sytze Faber said: "You have no idea how many tensions it causes if you stand in the breach again and again out of love for the party and how they pitch into is again and again without so much as offering a handshake. There's no denying it: this produces so much stress that your enthusiasm abandons you. This doesn't detract from the fact that I find much satisfaction in being a Chamber member in order to make some kind of effort to free politics from the temptation to talk exclusively about the day's delusion, from exclusive concern with tactical tricks and election gimmicks. Politics should have some philosophy to it, should erect a bulwark against nihilism, against the dispair of massive unemployment. The CDA could do that, but politics is bogged down more and more in doublespeak formulation and compromises."

"I'm Sticking It Out"

Party leader De Vries does not understand very well the excitement of his left wing: "In my opinion the position of the left wing is not at issue. The party members, those both in and out of office, attach a fair amount of importance to having a distinct left wing. But there should be loyalty toward one another. I don't like a party that veers more and more to the right. I don't believe that the position of the left wing is hopeless, but such a group cannot have more influence than the power alignment allows."

[Question] "The left objects that the right wing, especially Wim Mateman, is being given free rein."

[De Vries] "I don't admire the extremes Mateman is going to and I've never concealed that fact. He grants these interviews once in a while, and they disturb me very much. I'm not doing anything at all to frustrate Scholten and Dijkman. Now and then, they think they have to vote across party lines, like just last week when they voted for a CPN motion. I don't appreciate that at all but I did not say nasty things about it, in public or in private."

[Question] "Dijkman was removed as spokesman for housing a few days later."

[De Vries] "There's no connection. If Mateman wants to make a speech in just his name, we won't make a spokesman of him either. When Dijkman does something like that, the same thing happens. If he wishes to address the Chamber completely on his own behalf, then he is not a spokesman. That has nothing to do the right or left."

[Question] "So they shouldn't harp so about it because they have latitude in practice."

[De Vries] "Yes. If they want to isolate themselves in this way, they have only themselves to blame."

[Question] "What do you mean 'in this way'?"

[De Vries] "This way of doing things, all the excitement in the press, it only causes more irritation in the party. And I can understand why. When I see all the liberties that Mr Dijkman takes in the media, I cannot believe my eyes."

For the time being, the diehards are avoiding questions about the future. Dijkman does say: "It would take a lot to make me leave here, to badger me into leaving. I am a good parliamentarian and the CDA cannot change that. I'll stick it out. There's no such word as suicide in our vocabulary."

Aantjes on Possible Schism

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 20 May 83 pp 10-12

[Interview with Willem Aantjes, member of the CDA Party Council, by Gerard Driehuis and Frenk van der Linden: "Willem Aantjes and the New Party"]

[Text] Mr Willem Aantjes, member of the Party Council of the CDA and former party chairman, clad in casual dress worthy of a chairman of the Kampen Council, had written down a few points beforehand. "Then we won't forget anything," he explained. It can be assumed that the CDA Party leaders will read this and find that virtually nothing was forgotten. Here is a little prelude to start things off.

Aanjtes: "You have only to call somebody leftist in the CDA and he is under suspicion, just like that. The rightists get away with everything. You have to do something very extreme to be called rightist, like Mr Mateman. But even that doesn't cause too many problems. There is room for the right, but not for the left. An air of semi-socialism hangs over the leftist, whereas Mateman can freely mix with VVD members on the floor. There's apparently nothing wrong with that. In the CDA, you can bring people under suspicion merely by calling them leftist. You can easily criticize some of the things that Scholten and Dijkman do, or one of the

others. They are now trying to isolate the two, making it all the easier to make them scapegoats. But there are others too. You can be critical of these people, but they are representative of a CDA movement, and you do them a great injustice when you act as if they were a socialist fifth column. Whoever is not for the VVD is considered ipso facto a PvdA voter. It isn't a question of left or right, but of program and policy.

"A prime example is what happened to Dijkman. I think an inevitable result of this is that the socialists introduce some motions in the debate that Dijkman will support. The PvdA is that clever, you know. But this confirms the idea that Dijkman really belongs in the PvdA. The Socialists often submit motions that are really more Christian Democratic than Socialist, but no one notices that. The majority in the CDA exerts pressure to vote against them."

Hedging by the Leadership

Through the open window can be heard a car radio playing "De Rooie Haan" with jokes about Dijkman. We continue in earnest, as Aantjes says: "I must be careful not to lose my temper. The majority doesn't determine who is right and who is wrong. The program does. The custom today is to count noses, and the majority determines what the CDA stands for, making the minority dissident by definition. But the minority is often much more faithful to the CDA program and therefore has more right to say: 'We are the CDA.' If Dijkman can wave the program in his hand and argue that his vision is that of the CDA, then he is certainly speaking for the CDA, even if it does embarrass the administration.

"Here's another example. Using a tactic of endless repetition—as steady drips of water can hollow out a stone—the CDA is out to persuade everyone eventually that the outcome in Geneva will decide whether we deploy new nuclear weapons. That's not right.

"Our program applies quite different criteria; Geneva is only one. I helped put the program together and know exactly what I'm talking about. But no one talks about the program anymore. The party has again risen to the occasion. At a party council in Hatten, a motion was passed calling attention to the nuclear weapons plank in our platform. And then you say this hedging by the leadership again. As soon as they say that they were losing, they got behind the motion. But they're trying something else now.

"The same thing happened with the Middle East policy. It wasn't a year ago that the election program stipulated that the Netherlands would not enter into official contacts with the PLO as long as the PLO program advocated the destruction of the Israeli state. Not a year later, the government, at the behest of the CDA, is approaching the PLO. If a minority now wanted to abide by the program, it would be dissident.

"There is something tragic going on now. In exercising leadership, you should surround yourself with quality, not with mediocrity. In the party, preference is being given to mediocrity. You can say what you want about

a man like Dijkman, but he knows what he is talking about, and I don't know who Mr Wolters is (the man who replaced Dijkman as CDA spokesman on housing--gdlfvdl). I don't like to talke about people, but more and more often I see CDA spokesmen and think: 'That's the result of the quest of mediocrity.'

"It is a perception of the roles assigned to the party and to the cabinet that was evident in the Lubbers interview in DE TIJD last week, a vision that casts the party in the role of stage decoration. This is deadly for the Parliament. Jelle Zijlstra said some very intelligent things about this recently in HP [Haagse Post].

"Not that I have any doubts about Lubbers. I thought that he, and not Van Agt, should be our number-one man back in 1976. I paid dearly for it then, too. Besides being able to perceive things quickly, you also have to know the right time to talk."

Commissioner Van Agt

Replaying the event, Aantjes muttered toward the stubbornly leaking radiator heater that his lips were sealed better than that now. There are always times when one must carefully heed the consequences. Continued Aantjes: "Now everyone feels embarrassed by Van Agt. Then it was that pesty left wing that didn't understand. Now the truth is out. I am a member of the Party Council and there is great embarrassment about the way Van Agt dealt with the CDA. First, by letting himself be elevated to leadership and bragging about it, then by emotionally appealing to the whole club when there was criticism. He hadn't left yet before he chose VRIJ NEDERLAND as a forum for making very cynical fun of the way he had played a game with the CDA. Some in the party would deny that they were being abused all those years and are trying to tell everybody that this is Van Agt's unique brand of humor. If it is, it's certainly....

"The way he becmae a party member just to make the CDA feel obliged to find a position for him, because otherwise he could become troublesome any day. Scandalous! There were major problems with his nomination to the post of Queen's Commissioner because he refused to surrender his directorships."

[Question] "His other jobs in businesses."

[Aantjes] "Yes, I know very well. It's the old tradition of the Catholic People's Party. First, you get in power and then cash in power for money. That's a kind of mentality, and there are other examples of it, not just in the old CPP, to be sure. It's simply more obvious there. I think that's the way it was with Van Agt. He receives the post and wants to keep his other jobs."

[Question] "To get him out of The Hague."

[Aantjes] "Yes, but that won't happen. Wiegel from Friesland is in the picture now too. They'll both be doint it soon."

Tremendous Demotivation

[Question] "There was more elbowroom for the left wing under Van Agt than now."

[Aantjes] "Not due to Van Agt's premiership, but to the chairmanship in the party conducted by Ruud Lubbers. I notice also, even in my contacts within the party, that there is a great loss of motivation. People are giving up. There is great mental pressure in always being put in the dissidents' corner, while trying very seriously to abide by the program and principles of the party.

"You have to be mentally very strong to do it. In the first year, it was a threat, indeed. But I was party chairman. That gives you a strong position. But as an ordinary party member, you have to be very strong to keep on going. I come across people everywhere who are giving up. Faber, who wants to be a mayor, is not the only one. There are others who are saying that they're going to leave as soon as they get a chance."

[Question] "And that will be the end of the Christian radicals. But there is still a kind of last bastion."

[Aantjes] "They can see the time coming in 4 years when everyone with a personal opinion will be scratched from the list. That is to say, they won't all be thrown out in a bunch; not all their names will come up; they will be purposefully selected. One dissident will be played off against another. Those who want to keep their seat will then be tempted into bringing down all their wrath on those candidates for expulsion. And, naturally, these will be Jan Nico and Stef. They will be sure to get some dissidents to return to the fold so they can say that these steps were taken not against the dissident movement but against personalities. They'll be badly needed in the election. This is what worries me."

[Question] "Some of the leftwingers are letting themselves be pressured rather easily into this role."

[Aantjes] "It's all very tragic. The movement no longer has a leader. First, there was I and, then, Hans de Boer. There were two leaders of the movement and they both quit politics in different ways. I in my way—and I wasn't innocent in the matter. Every day I feel more and more that political motives played a larger part in it than even I had thought possible. The nervous way the CDA still gives me wide berth shows that. They are still jittery.

"It hurts me to see how the discussion on the nature of Christian politics has deteriorated so completely. It has now been converted to the question: who has the majority? The mentality of the old Catholic People's Party reduces everything to majorities and minorities."

Civil Disobedience

"Take the discussion concerning civil disobedience. The PvdA says, 'We are going to undertake an investigation,' and Van Thijn and Dales are appointed to head it. That was a clear choice. Completely trustworthy people who are totally democratic. At that moment, De Vries—and Bukman right behind him—start to exclaim that the PvdA cannot be allowed to destroy parliamentary democracy. 'That's the way it started in Germany in 1933,' Bukman adds. Unheard of. I think it's utterly disgraceful to say such a thing about a man like Van Uyl, a man so clean on that point, a man whose face registers discomfort even at being seen with a Communist. That anyone dares to compare such a man with the Weimar Republic and all that followed it. But that was the only point that brought applause to Messrs De Vries and Bukman. The only point. That'll do the trick beautifully at a party council like that. When you take a potshot at the socialists, it puts you in good stead.

"Now that Van Thijn and Dales have reported the findings, it turns out that the PvdA is very restrained on the matter of civil disobedience. And what does De Vries do? Offer his apologies? Forget it. He says: 'It's a good thing that we sounded the alarm.'

"I'm not saying that the CDA has turned into the CPP. But they both have the same mentality: your position determines your authority. There is a strict hierarchy and your rank determines the worth of your arguments. In the Antirevolutionary Party, things were done totally differently. There, any decision was preceded by a penetrating exchange of ideas. Now they are voting right off."

Looking at the Radiator againg to remind himself to be careful about running on, he continued: "It reminds me of—they might find it blasphemous, but I don't mind—the Crucifixion trial. Pilate wants to hear arguments and be given reasons for Jesus's execution: 'For I find no guilt in this man. Give reasons.' Then the leaders go among the people, saying: 'Call out that he must crucify him.' Don't discuss, just vote. Vote! Away with this man. The majority rules. It's a risque example. Jan Scholten, of course, is not God. Now it'll be said that I think so. But is true that there is a parallel. Those who don't agree with the majority, those who depart from the norm, are dissidents."

Need for a Different CDA

The apotheosis: Aantjes, speaking on the future of the CDA: "You might be wondering what I am worrying about. I helped found the CDA, and now the CDA is being taken away from us. The people who are leaving the party now act as if the party originated with them. And that is not true. By doing that, they are making the atmosphere ripe for an alternative CDA. It only creates a need for an alternative CDA. A market is being created for an alternative. I think that's terrible. I prefer the CDA. I don't like schisms. After all, I didn't go over to the CDA without a reason. But now that they're at it, it's almost inevitable that a new CDA will form. The demand is growing. I see the split coming."

[Question] "You'll be involved in it then."

Aantjes, laughing uneasily: "No, not me. I have my Kampen Council."

[Question] "Then you're not joining the schismatic party you foresee coming?"

Aantjes, looking at the still leaking radiator, the table and the interviewer and finding no comfort: "I'm a dyed-in-the-wool antirevolutionary. If you cut me open, an antirevolutionary will come out. But if this split comes, if it adopts this tradition, and if they really do need me... if it were a party that accommodated the tradition of the Antirevolutionary Party...." Silence.

The Rupture Is Approaching

Aantjes: "But I think rather that I would then cease all political activity. I will postpone the time that I leave the CDA for as long as possible, simply because I know it would make lots of people very pleased."

[Question] "Isn't the official party line actually correct as far as the voters are concerned? The gap is in the direction of the right; that's where the votes can be gained."

Aantjes: "At this rate, it'll be more and more so. It's still frowned on, but Mateman and his followers are getting what they want. The CDA is shifting more to the right, though it's taking its toll at the poll and cost us seven seats. It's causing concern. Soon they'll start yeeling and the next time they will stand on the left leg, costing the party seven seats again. The whole CPP process that began back in 1963 is being repeated. It is already happening now; we've already fallen behind considerably. Lubbers—that was clear, too, in the DE TIJD article last week—opposes this process. He wants a truly independent CDA and not a VVD satellite, but I doubt he can restrain those who advocate a rightist course. If he isn't able to hold them in check, we'll inevitably have a schism on our hands."

9992

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POLITICAL NORWAY

NEWSPAPERS DIFFER ON PROSPECTS FOR NEW COALITION GOVERNMENT

Socialist Organ: Center Party Dissatisfied

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 8 Jun 83 p 21

[Article by Gunnar A. Johansen]

[Text] Most people in the party expected much more after Party Chairman Johan J. Jakobsen started the ball rolling almost 2 weeks ago. It was he who in a surprise move demanded a prompt clarification of the basis for a three-party government. Paradoxically enough, it was his party which fared most poorly in the negotiations for a government.

Both Environmental and Agricultural Departments are regarded as "light" posts which do not provide the basis for the big political plays. Even if Johan J. Jakobsen has received an important department in the Communications Department, it is by no means sure that he will accomplish very much. The Conservatives continue to determine the economic framework within which the department must work.

The Center Party's representative from Oppland, Lars Velsand, is downright disturbed with the composition of the new government.

"The center of gravity will continue to lie with the Conservatives. I'll admit that I had hoped that the Center Party would have attained a more influential position in the new government. That which can be achieved in the three departments will to a large degree depend upon what happpens in other 'younger' departments, not least the Finance Department," Velsand says.

Many people in the party had indeed hoped to see Johan J. Jakobsen's task is not first and foremost to be minister of communications but the Center Party's chairman in the government.

Storting representative Ragnhild Q. Haarstad from Hedmark is also little pleased with the results the party obtained in the government negotiations.

"But I really did not have such big hopes in advance. I have learned to be cautious in regard to expectations. But looking at it realistically, the Center Party could have received one of the 'heavier' departments," Haarstad says.

are now doing all they can to characterize in a positive manner the decisions they reached on the new government, any observer can see that they did not haul any rich booty to land. When the division of cabinet positions and departments is judged, it is difficult to detect any place where Willoch gave way during the negotiations. The center parties obtained six departments, and it is impossible to structure a government in a manner that would have given the two parties a poorer distribution.

After the fact, it is easy to see that there were not any tactical calculations behind the initiative of the chairman of the Center Party over the Pentecost holidays regarding the government question. As is often the case in politics, it was quite a casual remark which started the political landslide of events. Johan J. Jakobsen's statement would surely have passed by unnoticed at any other time but precisely then. But because of the times, the climate and the media were waiting for just such a catalyst, and his words started a development which was not anticipated and over which the leadership in neither the Center Party nor the Christian People's Party at any time succeeded in gaining control.

Willoch, by deliberately taking the initiative and by introducing conditions, succeeded completely in taking over the leadership of the process. He maneuvered the two "cooperating parties" into a situation in which they are completely subordinate. All the negotiations were conducted in Willoch's domain, either at his office or at his home. Likewise, all discussions on the political basis of the new government has as a starting point the premises he formulated.

Those people from the two center parties who participated in the negotiations broke almost every basic rule in regard to the psychology of negotiation. And this hurt badly. In addition, the timing made it impossible for the peripheral elements in the party organizations and the ordinary members to come forward with their protests and viewpoints. The Christian People's Party and the Center Party consequently lost the peripheral support inherent in the extreme demands of their own party organizations.

Prime Minister Kare Willoch has emphasized in all his comments on a coalition government the relative strength of the parties, the number of representatives in Parliament, shades of opinion etc. But the central feature of the current political situation is not the number of representatives but the fact that none of the parties has a majority by itself in Parliament. All three parties are therefore just as vital for creating the basis for a government. Johan J. Jakobsen, Kjell Magne Bondevik and Kare Kristiansen apparently forgot this.

Conservative Paper Sees Promising Start

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Jun 83 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Apart from a little flawed dig by Lars Velsand of the Center Party, the debate on the announcement of the formation of a government in parliament on Wednesday and Thursday emphasized the desire of the three government parties

She is afraid that the working conditions for the Center Party's parliamentary group will be much more difficult than before. Now primary standpoints must be put aside. It is the time for compromise and negotiation—and that happens before matters end up in the parliament.

The Center Party's opposition editor, Andreas Hagen, in Ostlend is in general satisfied with the division of portfolios.

He himself also could well have wanted the Petroleum and Energy Department.

"But I regard all three departments as important for the party. When we also take into account that we obtained the undersecretary post in the Finance Department, there is reason to be satisfied," Hagen says.

Center, Christian Parties Yielded Too Much

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 9 Jun 83 p 8

[Editorial]

[Text] Apart from those people who routinely defend and applaud an outcome, judgment on the results of the negotiations for a government is unanimous: it has an obvious Willoch mark.

The only public and common demand of the center part'es during the negotiations was that the two parties together wanted seven of the government positions. The Conservatives had to be satisfied with retaining 10 of the government's 17 cabinet positions.

Not even that modest wish on the part of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party survived the negotiations unscathed. When Willoch calls the government to a meeting, he will have 11 of his own party comrades around the tables, while the center parties sit again with six and a half cabinet ministers. Anne Olaug Ingeborgrud, chair of the Christian People's Party and a member of Parliament, was not acceptable to the head of the government. The weak negotiators from the Christian People's Party took note and named instead a person without a shred of national political experience and without any special administrative capability as a new cabinet minister in a new position. It is a difficult enough task for any experienced and capable politician to force through new priorities, new routines, and to establish the cabinet minister's position in a reasonable relationship with the department's hierarchy. It is almost impossible for an inexperienced newcommer.

Irrespective of what side you look at, it is unbelievable that the key politicians participating from the Christian People's and Center parties were willing to leave the negotiating table with such meager results in their hands.

The outcome was what it was not only because of Willoch's merits. It was due just as much to the fact that the people he encountered from the Christian People's and Center parties were not up to the task. Even if those responsible

for binding cooperation across party lines. The positive spirit of cooperation which marked the negotiations for the political basis for the three-party government was the most prominent feature of the speeches of the coalition's parliamentary leaders, and not least in the speech of Prime Minister Willoch yesterday. Even if it is far from any secret that the three parties hold different views and priorities in some areas, speakers from the Conservative, Christian People's and Center parties asserted that the political disagreement here will not hinder constructive cooperation.

It can therefore be asserted as a main conclusion that the announcement debate is a good and promising start for the bourgeois coalition government. There is wide unity among the participating parties on all major tasks, of which the most important is to establish the conditions for our country's maintaining peace with freedom. Consequently there is no doubt that Norway's security policies are secure with the present government at the helm. When the chairman and parliamentary leader of the Conservatives, Jo Benkow, expressed his honest hope that the Labor Party can again be the party of the national solidarity, which is necessary in this matter, it is certain that he spoke also on behalf of a large majority of the Labor Party's own voters. They do not wish national security policies to be conducted on left—Jing premises.

From a bourgeois cooperation viewpoint there is a basis for underlining the government parties' emphasis on a common political responsibility to find good and appropriate solutions to the problems of Norwegian society. The chief goal of the government—to make secure for both the short and the long run the basis for the welfare state and full employment—is obviously binding when it comes to choosing political means. Social security cannot be created by merely creating the solid economic foundation on which to erect the welfare state. And if the cooperating parties shall succeed in preserving the basis for social welfare, they must be willing to follow austere policies until the economy once again grows. The announcement debate fully confirmed that the government parties stand together in this objective.

Prime Minister Kare Willoch added a new element to the debate on this objective when he emphasized that the objective of the government's policies go beyond the welfare state and point toward the welfare society. Therefore the government also wants to strive to give to moral standards and ties between human beings the strength they need to protect the individual. We should, Willoch said, support those forces which further community interests and the solidarity of society rather than a constantly better organized struggle for special interests at the expense of the community. The politician should not either forget the underlying values which can help the individual to find meaning and perspective. We are among those who have responsibility for promoting tolerance and respect for a philosophy of life and stimulating in a positive way variety both in cultural life and in the life of faith, the prime minister said.

Practical politics can hardly have a better base on which to build. This is a policy which wide segments of the people will support.

6893

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POLITICAL

FOREIGN MINISTER BODSTROM COMMENTS ON MADRID ESCE MEETING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Jun 83 p 2

[Article by Lennart Bodstrom: "Are the Superpowers Going to Reach a Settlement?"]

[Text] The differences in formulation between the Soviet viewpoint and the American viewpoint currently are minimal. If the negotiators in Madrid are given orders to come to a settlement, it could happen fairly fast. The deciding factor is whether the principal actors in Moscow and Washington want a settlement to occur. This is what Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom writes in the article below, a commentary on the negotiations at the security conference in Madrid, the so-called ESCE.

In September of 1980, delegates from 33 European countries plus the U.S.A. and Canada met together in Madrid for the third Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (ESCE). Hardly anyone would have guessed then that the participants would still be in Madrid almost three years later without having agreed on methods to continue de-escalation. One can imagine that the Spanish authorities will be heaving sighs of relief if the conference is brought to a successful conclusion.

It is against this backdrop that we should view the Spanish premier Gonzalez' actions last week. Expanding on a suggestion by one of the neutral, non-allied nations, Gonzalez made some small modifications, and it is now hoped that the participating nations will be able to work together to achieve his plan.

The conference in Madrid is taking place in an entirely different atmosphere than what was prevalent in the mid-seventies. When the first European security conference agreed on a concluding statement in August 1975, the event stood out as a high point in the de-escalation process which had had such a promising beginning in the first half of the 1970's.

The Helsinki document involves mutual relations between the nations in three main areas:

1. The area of security and military policy;

2. The area of economics, including trade, industrial cooperation, science, technology, and environmental protection; and

3. Areas of humanitarian and related interests, involving interpersonal contact, information dissemination, cultural exchange and educational cooperation.

In the Helsinki document, the participating nations declared themselves prepared in various ways to carry out the decisions which they had agreed upon. These would then be reviewed at follow-up meetings, where further development of de-escalation policy would be discussed.

The first follow-up meeting, held in Belgrade in 1977, was not a success. The only real result was a decision to hold a further meeting on a different occasion.

It is hard to say why the Belgrade meeting did not achieve any results. On the surface, it did not appear as if much had changed in the world situation. Possibly, though, the de-escalation of the first half of the 1970's had not been as thorough as had been believed. The agreement demonstrated by the Helsinki document concerning definite human rights had perhaps been more verbal than actual. NATO members accused the Warsaw Pact nations for not following up on their offers for reuniting families, etc. The latter nations, in turn, felt that they had been subject to external intervention in their internal affairs.

By the time the Madrid meeting came around, the international atmosphere had visibly worsened. As the meeting went on, external events cast a gloom over the proceedings—events in Afghanistan and Poland, and the hostage drama in Teheran, for example.

The Helsinki document talks about peace and de-escalation. But during the course of the Madrid conference, nations continued to arm themselves. Economic and technological cooperation were discussed in Helsinki. Now limits on technology dissemination are being discussed, and the maintenance of economic sanctions.

High-flown speeches were given in Helsinki about the importance of granting citizens the freedom to travel from one country to another, including the right to leave one's own country. But during the last few years, it has become more difficult for people to choose their places of residence. For example, the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations has almost completely stopped.

To work towards a positive outcome from the Madrid conference in this atmosphere has necessitated both optimism and perserverance. The responsibility has, to a large degree, fallen on the shoulders of Europe's neutral and non-allied nations (the so-called anonymous nations).

The anonymous nations went to work immediately when the Madrid conference opened. The pre-conference started on 15 September 1980, and the main

conference two months later. On 31 March 1981 the anonymous nations rendered an account of their version of a settlement. On 16 December of the same year, they presented a proposal for a concluding document, the so-called RM 39. If there had not been military troops sent into Poland three days previous to that date, the proposal might have been approved by all parties present.

But now a new setback had entered the picture. The anonymous nations, however, were not deterred by it. On 15 March of this year they presented a new, revised proposal, the RM 39 Revision. It differs from the original one in that the human rights specifications are more precisely outlined. As previously, a European disarmament conference, to begin before the end of 1983, is proposed. Sweden, by the way, has offered to be the host country for this conference.

The proposal from the anonymous nations has been evaluated variously. Of the Western powers, West Germany in particular has shown a positive attitude. In a widely noticed newspaper interview in April of this year, Genscher, the German foreign minister, explained how urgent the government of the Federal Republic thought it was that the European disarmament conference should take place. He emphasized the importance of strengthening human rights, and he warned against an "all or nothing" policy.

By means of various informational routes, the Swedish government has also been able to observe the satisfaction which a number of other nations have demonstrated with regard to the involvement of the neutral and non-allied nations. Meanwhile, it is clear that what will determine whether the Madrid conference results in progress or failure will be the positions assumed by the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

On 7 May the Soviet Union announced, through Andropov, that it was ready to approve the RM 39 Revision, under the condition that no further changes be made whatsoever. The U.S.A., on the other hand, has expressed that the final proposal of the anonymous nations is a good foundation to build on, but that certain changes in the formulation need to be made in order to guarantee the validity of certain principles of human rights. Among other things, they want the concluding document to determine that within the near future a conference will be called for the particular discussion of human rights issues.

That is what the situation was when the Spanish premier, Gonzales, made his move. He suggested that the formulation changes proposed by the Americans should be approved in some instances and not accepted in others. The U.S.A.'s wish for a particular conference on human rights would be honored in such a way that the participating countries would accept an invitation from Switzerland to such a conference.

As far as Sweden's general attitude towards the ESCE goes, we can note the following. Like the rest of the anonymous nations, Sweden thinks that a concluding document, in order to be approved by all the nations, should have approximately the same contents as the RM 39 Revision. Only small deviations should be allowed to still ensure general acceptance.

The RM 39 Revision document is not an accurate statement of what Sweden would like to see as regards conditions within nations. Our demands in the field of human rights go far deeper than what is outlined in the RM 39 Revision. But we do not think that it is purposeful at this point to raise the requirements. Human rights will not be served in the long run by making demands which are so idealistic that they are immediately rejected.

The diplomats who soon will have been negotiating for three years in Madrid are certainly skillful. But this does not mean, however, that they will determine the outcome of the negotiations. That will happen in Moscow and Washington. The differences which remain in formulation between the Soviet viewpoint and the American viewpoint currently are minimal. If the negotiators in Madrid are given orders to come to a settlement, it could happen fairly fast. The deciding factor is whether the principal actors in Moscow and Washington want a settlement to occur.

If the ESCE ends on a positive note, it will be a beacon of light in a dark world. If the conference breaks up, or is concluded by some vacuous communique announcing that the nations have met and will meet again in a few years, then that would be, in turn, a further sign of the frosty relations between the Soviets and the U.S., with the accompanying serious consequences for the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries—and not only for them, but for Europe as a whole.

9584

CSO: 3650/232

POLITICAL

PROPOSAL TO INCREASE TIME BETWEEN ELECTIONS FINDS AGREEMENT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Jun 83 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Excerpt] Increase the time between elections from 3 to 4 years, but continue to hold parliamentary and local elections on the same day. That is the basis on which the working group for constitutional matters, headed by Minister of Justice Ove Rainer and consisting of representatives of all the parties in Parliament, has agreed to work. The longer period between elections could go into effect in 1988.

The nonsocialist members of the working group are opposed in principle to holding both elections on the same day, but they have yielded to an ultimatum from the Social Democrats.

The Social Democrats cannot conceive of reintroducing separate dates for parliamentary and local elections unless the election system for Parliament is changed at the same time. As it now stands, the system treats all parties clearing the 4-percent hurdle with impartiality.

Indirect Election

The Social Democrats are thinking primarily of an election system that will result in overrepresentation for the biggest party—that is, the Social Democrats. They would achieve this through a system by which a limited number of Parliament's members—about 75—would be chosen through indirect elections by the county councils or similar local bodies.

There is a strong desire in all the parties represented in Parliament to increase the period between elections from the current 3 years to 4 years. The reason is the feeling that a government needs more than 3 years to carry out its program.

According to what Minister of Justice Ove Rainer told DAGENS NYHETER, the proposal to increase the period between elections from 3 to 4 years therefore has strong support not only from the leadership of the parties in Parliament but also from public opinion. The Social Democratic Party strongly supports a longer period between elections.

Since the nonsocialist parties are unable to put across their demand for separate parliamentary and local election dates, they have instead expressed the desire for certain minor constitutional amendments.

These include a strengthening of the referendum process, the introduction of so-called minority protection, municipal partial elections to encourage more active local political activity, reforms affecting committee work in Parliament, a vitalization of the questioning process in Parliament, and a change in the 4-percent rule governing representation in Parliament.

Referendums would continue to be merely consultative. The Conservative and Center Party representatives in the working group feel that a minority in Parliament should be able to demand a referendum.

"Minority protection" means primarily that a minority in Parliament could decide to postpone the final decision on an issue--for example, until after the next election.

It is chiefly the Liberal Party which is pushing the demand for more effective local democracy and committee reforms in Parliament. The VPK [Left Party-Communists] wants to change the 4-percent rule governing representation in Parliament by introducing some sort of sliding scale.

Before the time between elections for Parliament and local bodies can be increased, the working group will have to reach agreement on some of those questions of detail. On the other hand, it is not necessary to agree on all six of them. For example, it is not very likely that the VPK's demand for a change in the 4-percent rule will be adopted.

In Five Years

The timetable is very tight, but even so, it will take a long time for the 4-year terms of office to become a reality.

The timetable goes like this:

The working group must submit its proposal no later than sometime around New Year. After its proposal has been circulated for comment, a bill on the 4-year period between elections can be submitted to Parliament in the fall of 1984. The amendment to the Constitution can then be confirmed after the election in the fall of 1985, but in the 1985 election itself, members of Parliament and of the local bodies will still be elected for 3 years.

This means that the first election for 4-year terms of office in Parliament and the local bodies may cover the years from 1988 to 1992.

11798

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POLITICAL

PAPER BACKS IDEA OF ELECTIONS EVERY FOUR YEARS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Jun 83 p 2

[Editorial by C.S.: "Longer Periods Between Elections--Separate Election Days"]

[Text] Without looking into the facts, SVENSKA DAGBLADET has dismissed the reports in Thursday's DAGENS NYHETER concerning a longer period between elections as "rumors." The circumstances, which were correctly described in DAGENS NYHETER, are these:

Before the working group for constitutional matters met on 14 June, the members received a letter from the group's chairman, Minister of Justice Ove Rainer, which summarized the work done up to that point. Rainer noted that the Social Democrats were expressing an "unconditional desire" to increase the time between elections, while the nonsocialist parties had laid down the condition that separate dates for parliamentary and local elections must be introduced at the same time. The Social Democrats can agree to that only if the election system is changed.

In his letter, Rainer asked the nonsocialist members if they could consider a compromise that would satisfy the Social Democratic demand that both elections be held on the same day.

The answer from the nonsocialist members was that they were agreeable to further discussion. The working group agreed to commission the Ministry of Justice to work up a proposal for changes in the election law that will probably include an increase in the period between elections from 3 to 4 years while retaining a single election day. Naturally, however, no final decision was reached, and DAGENS NYHETER did not claim that one was.

Obviously, there is now agreement among the parties that the period between elections is too short. A new government barely has time to get government operations underway, let alone exhibit a change in political direction, before it is again time to meet the voters in an election. The short time between elections results in too frequent shifts in government and reduces the willingness to make uncomfortable decisions. In practice, it has also eliminated the instrument on new elections as a workable procedure. Negative experiences by both nonsocialist and Social Democratic governments lie behind the common desire for a longer period between elections.

On the other hand, the Social Democrats are still insisting strongly on holding parliamentary and local elections on the same day. In exchange for giving that up, they are demanding some form of return to indirect elections of the kind once held for the First Chamber. An explanation for the Social Democratic predilection for that system is provided by Carl Lidbom in his book of memoirs "Reformist," in which he cites Tage Erlander's view that indirect elections give the party board a better opportunity to control nominations and therefore the makeup of its parliamentary group. The current party leadership would certainly have no objections to that kind of opportunity.

There are other good reasons why the Social Democrats should reconsider their stubborn insistence on one date for all elections. In a temperamental editorial, the Social Democratic newspaper HALSINGE-KURIREN rejects the idea of a longer period between elections:

"Four-year terms of office and a single election date would mean general elections in Sweden only every 4 years. That would be very unfortunate from the standpoint of democracy. The parties would 'get rusty,' and popular enlightenment, which is what an election campaign really is, would occur less frequently."

The obvious solution--for the Social Democrats as well as anyone else--should be a 4-year period between elections but separate dates for parliamentary and local elections.

11798

CSO: 3650/222

POLITICAL

CENTER PARTY SECRETARY: SDP MUST DROP FUND PROPOSAL

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Jun 83 p 7

[Article by Ake Ekdahl]

[Text] Vanersborg, Saturday--The Center Party has put a price on its future cooperation with the Social Democrats. The price is abandonment of the wage earner funds. As long as the wage earner funds continue to be a threat, even agreement on specific issues will be more difficult.

That is the message which the Center Party has just given Palme's minority government as we approach the big economic problems that must be solved this fall.

Allan Pettersson, Center Party secretary, told DAGENS NYHETER: "If the Social Democrats continue to push the fund issue this fall, we will take it as a message that the Social Democrats do not seriously want to cooperate with us."

Meetings by the Youth League and the Women's League ended on Saturday, and on the same day, the party board and the conference of secretaries met and laid down the broad outlines for the party meeting that begins today (Sunday) with the traditional and colorful national assembly, in which there will be folk costumes and speeches by party chairman Thorbjorn Falldin on the Center Party's political course during the coming year.

Halftime

During that halftime lull in the conference proceedings, the party secretary described the party's feeling toward cooperation as follows:

"Palme has accused Falldin of deliberately pursuing a policy resulting in higher unemployment, while he himself has pursued a policy increasing the national budget by many additional billions of kronor in debt and, on top of that, has also made it clear that he wants to push through the wage earner funds. After that, any attempt at cooperation would meet with resistance in our party. The general feeling in the party today is that we should tell Palme: keep your hands in your trouser pockets—when you reach out with them, that is interpreted only as an appeal for help to get the government out of a mess."

Knut Nilsson, a member of the party board who is usually classed among those in the party leadership most eager to cooperate, is sharply critical of the

Social Democrats today. He says that Palme personally is responsible for the fact that the situation is in such a deadlock today. He says: "We can usually cooperate with the Social Democrats in the popular movements, but they are not the ones making the decisions in the Social Democratic Party today."

Generous Promises

He gets support from Allan Pettersson, who says:

"Palme used his time in the opposition to create confrontation and hand out generous promises."

"We are eagerly awaiting autumn to see how the Social Democrats will manage to reduce the budget deficit. The moment of truth will come in the January budget," says Pettersson, who recalls the tough campaign conducted by the Social Democrats against the Center Party when the latter tried to introduce a 2-day waiting period for health benefits as a way of cutting back on government spending.

He says: "The kind of politics engaged in by the Social Democrats while they were in the opposition and now that they are the government makes it very hard to cooperate even on specific issues."

Threat for the Future

The party board's message to the meeting on Monday will include the statement that in the current situation, the Center Party has no reason to seek any organized cooperation with other parties. That opinion was mentioned by several speakers during the preliminary meetings with the auxiliary organizations.

For his part, Karl-Erik Olsson of the party board also said that such cooperation would strengthen bloc politics, which are already strong, and become a direct threat for the future, since the alternatives to the centralizing policies of the Social Democratic and Conservative Parties would then be obstructed.

Over the past few days, the Women's League and the Youth League have both rejected closer cooperation with the Conservatives. The party board says in its statement that differences between the Center Party and the Conservative Party have increased over the past year.

"Gentry"

Pettersson says: "We cannot support the distribution policy being proposed by the Conservatives. Adelsohn elicits cheers for the exploit of saving the national treasury 25 billion kronor, but he says nothing about how his plan for retrenchment will hurt those who are having a rough time of it. Now everybody can see that it was not the Conservative policy which won out in the former three-party government. The Center Party won the struggle over the distribution policy within the government."

Knut Nilsson, a politician on the Stockholm County Council, says this about the new attitude toward the Conservatives:

"Conservative local politicians on the county councils and in the municipalities have begun to act like gentry. It is those young gentlemen surrounding Adelsohn who have irritated our people."

He says: "They are whipping up a sector of public opinion that sees society as an enemy and creating a state of opposition between society and the individual. In the long run, this will undermine democracy."

11798

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POLITICAL

PAPER WELCOMES GREATER ASSERTIVENESS FROM FALLDIN ON FUND

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Jun 83 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Kleberg: "(Center Party's) Chance in the Empty Middle"]

[Text] With the middle of the political spectrum empty, the beasts are snapping at each other.

The middle party government's obvious defeat left the political center field quiet and deserted. It is true that a violent quarrel started up among the remaining members of the Liberal Party, but it only strengthened the impression that the Liberal Party had enough to do settling its own problems.

But the Center Party, which had met with its third straight defeat and was back to where it had been in 1968, before the days of great successes, was quiet. There were some minor postelection groundswells, but nothing more. Its strong organization acted as a buffer against momentary discontent.

Thorbjorn Falldin said in a recent interview: "I believe that we would have been in the same situation as the Liberal Party if we had also chosen to wash our dirty linen in public."

No big theoretical debates or painful self-examinations are going on in the Center Party. That may be unsatisfactory in many situations because it reduces the possibilities for reappraisal. But it can be a strength. One recovers and comes back.

The KDS [Christian Democratic Union] has been hoping to fill the void in the middle. With the idealism and liberalism of the Liberal Party and an interest in the environment matching that of the Center Party, but also with the cultural conservatism abandoned by the Conservative Party-that would seem to be the KDS' combination.

The Environment Party might also have some chance of attracting voters who have given up on the Center and Liberal Parties. Not to mention the Conservative Party's ambitions.

The Center Party, which is currently holding its various meetings in Vanersborg, seems to have noticed the danger. When the party proper opens its meeting on

Monday, it will decide on proposals concerned with improved organization, educational work and finances, and a sharpening of the Center Party's image.

The adjustment from being the government to being the opposition has taken time. But the party board is now outlining the role that the Center Party should play: it is to use its position in the opposition to push and develop its own issues, which are decentralization, energy, environment, attempts to influence policy by reaching agreement on specific issues, and an emphasis on its distance not only from the Social Democrats but also from the Conservatives.

The Center Party wants to pursue its own policy between now and the election in 1985. The many compromises during its years in the government were distressing and weakened its credibility. Now there is no one else to consider. But it will not be easy to win back the enthusiasm and regain the breadth that existed in the years of the green wave. The economic crisis is now on center stage.

Organized cooperation with other parties is rejected. So is speculation as to what will happen after the election in 1985—the party board says that it will all depend on "the election results and the stands adopted by the various parties on specific issues at that time." The Center Party knows that the Conservatives and the Social Democrats are both eager for its support.

The Center Party is therefore avoiding the Liberal Party's weakness in talking about whether to go right or left and in committing itself already to a nonsocialist three-party coalition, which is what the Conservatives and some Liberal Party members want. That is a sensible path for the Center Party: a concentration on politics concerned with issues and commitment on certain questions, but no tactical discussions. That is how a middle party can create an image for itself.

Thorbjorn Falldin has been sharply critical of the Social Democrats ever since the election campaign. He continued his criticism in several interviews preceding the party meeting. He naturally views the wage fund issue as the big issue separating the two parties. But there is also the refusal by the Social Democrats to come to grips with government spending. His third and very bitter objection concerns the invitation by the Social Democrats to cooperate.

On the big issue on which the middle parties sought, at great risk, to reach agreement with the Social Democrats—the tax issue—the Social Democrats have behaved willfully and dictatorially. Before the election, they tried to claim that the middle parties had capitulated, but after the election they preferred to seek a new agreement with the LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] rather than with the middle parties. The Social Democratic Party's strikingly short—sighted conduct on the tax issue is just as fatal to the spirit of dialogue in politics as its fund proposal. It is not a matter of Falldin's personal bitterness, as the STOCKHOLMS—TIDNINGEN seems to believe.

But the differences with the Conservatives have also increased in the past year, says the Center Party. This applies both to a great number of specific issues and to the actual balance to be achieved between spending cutbacks on the one

hand and, on the other, efforts in the social field and the fight against unemployment.

After three defeats and the wear and tear of his years in the government, Thorbjorn Falldin ought to be an exhausted man. On the contrary, it seems that at this year's meeting, he will come back with new authority.

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POLITICAL

PAPER COMMENTS ON REASONS FOR POLL GAINS BY OPPOSITION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Jun 83 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Kleberg: "Wait Until the Fall"]

[Text] No matter how intense the debates may get about handouts, funds or foreign affairs junkets, voter opinion remains surprisingly stable. This is what the results of today's IMU poll show, as well as the results of the SIFO poll last week, both of which were conducted in the latter part of May and the beginning of June. It was during the time when the Riksdag was exploding apart, Falldin was coming back with strong criticism for the government, and the vendetta between Olof Palme and Carl Bildt was coming to a head.

The Social Democrats have a perfect right to be quite pleased with themselves after three-quarters of a year in power. They have succeeded in projecting an image of powerful action and belief in the future to many people, including some outside of their own party. They have developed better contacts with industry and the labor market than the nonsocialist governments. And they can point to the fact that devaluation so far has had a beneficial effect on industrial export capacity.

The slight downward trend in the opinion polls is entirely normal for a party in power. What will be interesting is how the voters will be reacting during the coming year. That is when the problems will be occurring. In the fall the Social Democrats will have to decide about the funds which have drawn criticism even inside of the party. But promises that have been made, declarations from the party congress and the pressure from the labor organizations will be hard to avoid.

In the fall the Social Democrats will also have to show what they mean by "saving." Up to now, the good side of their crisis program has been seen: increased social benefits and investments in the labor market. What will the voters say when (or if?) the other half of the program, the "saving" part, comes into effect? The risk is that far too many people have had the feeling that it would not be as drastic as the nonsocialists have been saying. But Sweden will not be able to stand very many more years of putting off belt tightening. But how will the government do it, without any real desire for cooperation between the two political blocs?

The Moderates continue to stay at a few percent over the election results, as usual, though, a little further down in the IMU poll than in the SIFO one. The often vehement agitation within the party has not increased this spring. The middle-of-the road parties have tried to lie low, both in opinion and political action. For the Center Party, and even more for the Liberals, it will take time to recover after the electoral defeat.

9584

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POLITICAL

LATEST POLL SHOWS NONSOCIALIST PARTIES GAIN BARE MAJORITY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Jun 83 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Voters' opinions remain stable, despite all the political transactions which have been going on. This is shown by DAGENS NYHETER's last voters' poll before the summer recess, conducted by IMU. All changes from the last poll are within the margin of error. The non-socialist bloc of parties has more supporters than the Social Democrats do on their own.

The biggest change since the last poll had to do with the Environment Party, which increased 1.5 percent to the four percent which is necessary for representation in the Riksdag. Detailed figures reveal, however, that the figure for the Environment Party was rounded up.

A voters' opinion poll is not comparable with an election prognosis. The question has to do with what party people think is best, not which party the voters intend to vote for.

Together, the bloc of socialist parties are favored by 48.0 percent of the voters, as opposed to the 45.5 percent of voter support for the three nonsocialist parties.

If we compare the figures for the three nonsocialist parties with the Social Democrats by themselves, the nonsocialist parties have a majority, with 45.5 percent compared to the Social Democrats' 43.5 percent.

The poll was taken between 16 May and 8 June, involving 886 voters up to the age of 75 years.

The results were as follows:

Moderate Party

Liberal Party

Center Party

Christian Democratic Party

27.0 percent (up 1 percent)

4.5 percent (up 0.5 percent)

14.0 percent (down 0.5 percent)

1.0 percent (down 0.5 percent)

Social Democratic Party

Left Party (Communists)

Environment Party

Other parties

43.5 percent (down 1 percent)

4.5 percent (down 1 percent)

4.0 percent (up 1.5 percent)

1.5 percent (same as before)

The percentage of voters which declined to reveal party sympathy declined from three to 2.5 percent.

As the politicians go away for summer recess after nine months of hectic activity, the above figures show that it is only the Moderates, of the five Riksdag parties, who show a clearly rising trend. All the other Riksdag parties are a little below or quite a bit below where they were at election time.

Various public opinion institutes, in their election prognoses, have been able to reflect fairly well the relative power balances between the two political blocs, but it has proven to be much more difficult to anticipate how the votes will fall inside of the nonsocialist bloc.

Hidden Results

One reason why it is easier to observe the divisions between the two blocs is that the splitting into two blocs is always well delineated.

There are very few voters who switch between blocs, and those who do switch tend to do it at an early stage.

Electoral specialists say often that the voters who switch from one bloc to the other tend to do it within one year after an election. This indicates that many of these voters who switch for some reason feel betrayed by the party they voted for in the election, and decide to go over to the opposition.

The Social Democrats are staying relatively stable at a level just under their election results. This means that the Social Democrats would lose points if there were an election today.

Within the nonsocialist bloc, quick changes can occur even very close to election day. The debate between Palme and Falldin before the last election had the result that the Center Party achieved significantly higher results in the election than what had been indicated by the opinion polls.

Both the Center Party and the Liberal Party are currently a little bit under where they were after elections; the Moderates, meanwhile, are competing for the dissatisfied nonsocialist voters' attention.

The Liberal Party's figure has been rounded down in this case to 4.5 percent. Last time they were rounded up to four percent.

It is generally the case that unsure nonsocialist voters hardly have a particular reason to start brooding now about which nonsocialist party they


will vote for in the next elections, in 1985. Figures from opinion polls regarding the divisions among the nonsocialist parties, therefore, are more tentative than those which refer to the divisions between the two political blocs.

(Table)

Poll Period	#22 21 March-	#23 18 April-	#24 16 May-
	14 April	11 May	6 June
	1983	1983	1983
Number of registered voters			
interviewed who indicated a			
sympathy for a particular party	010 1	000 1	006 1
(=basis for percentage figures)	910 total	883 total	886 total
Percent indicating "best party"	x	%	%
as follows:			
Moderate Party	28.0	26.0	27.0
Liberal Party	4.0	4.0	4.5
Center Party	12.5	14.5	14.0
Christian Democratic Party	2.5	1.5	1.0
Social Democrats	45.0	44.5	43.5
Left Party (Communists)	4.0	5.5	4.5
Environment Party	3.0	2.5	4.0
Other parties	1.0	1.5	1.5
	100.0	100.0	100.0
Percentage of registered voters			
who either cannot or will not			
indicate a "best party"	3.5	3.0	2.5

Since 1979, IMU has conducted 24 party sympathy opinion polls. All of the changes occurring between polls #23 and 24, including the Environment Party's 1.5 percent rise, are within the statistical margin of error (correct to 95 percent).

The polls were taken within nationally representative probability groups of Swedish citizens from 18 to 74 years of age. The interviews were conducted in the homes of the interviewees. The following question was asked: "What party do you think is best?" A voting situation was simulated; party preference was expressed by using "ballots" and "ballot envelopes."



hagrammet över DN/lMU:s väljarsympatier börjar i september 1981, visar sedan valre-(16)tatet ett år senare samt de förändringar som inträffat sedan regeringen Palme vertog ansvaret. Moderaterna är det enda parti som ligger klart över valresultatet.

(Key for Graph)

- 1. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. etc.)
- 2. Percent
- 3. Election Results
- 4. Social Democratic Party
- 5. Moderate Party
- 6. Center Party
- 7. Liberal Party
- 8. Left Party (Communists)
- 9. Socialist Parties
- 10. Social Democratic Party
- 11. Left Party (Communists)
- 12. Center Party
- 13. Moderate Party
- 14. Liberal Party
- 15. Nonsocialist Parties
- 16. This graph of DAGENS NYHETER/IMU's voters' opinion polls begins in September of 1981, showing the election results of one year after that, as well as the changes which have occurred since the Palme government came into office. The Moderates are the only party which has clearly gained since the election.

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9584

CSO: 3650/232

MILITARY EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

EAST, WEST CARRY OUT STEADY AIR SURVEILLANCE OVER BALTIC

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Jun 83 p 9

[Article by Morten Fyhn: "Series of Espionage Flights Over the Baltic: Intense Surveillance Daily Routine"]

[Text] At least once but more often twice a day, the alarm goes off at Swedish military air bases. Orders are then given to go up and show the military planes of a foreign power that Sweden guards its borders. For the Baltic Sea--the "Sea of Peace"--is not only heavily traveled by foreign planes but also by warships and submarines (with and without nuclear weapons on board) from various nations.

In the skies above the Baltic, ultra-modern spy planes and ordinary fighter planes from NATO and Warsaw Pact nations are carrying out an almost unbelievably intense daily monitoring of each others' movements. "We live close to reality in Sweden," Colonel Gunnar Unell of the Swedish Defense Staff said to AFTENPOSTEN.

Last year the Swedish Viggen and Draken pilots made eye contact 350 times with foreign military planes over the free ocean just off Sweden's coast. In more than 500 instances, the airborne Swedes were able to identify and turn away their uninvited flying guests, when it proved to be necessary.

But the foreign pilots clearly have orders to avoid the untimely provocation of Sweden. In 1982, only 82 violations of Swedish air space were discovered. (Airplanes are not as easy to hide as submarines.) NATO planes were responsible for most of these violations. Only three were committed by planes from the Warsaw Pact. For the most part they were encountered off the southern coast of Scania, when the NATO planes were on their way to and from maneuver areas east of Bornholm. The Swedes are assuming that most of the violations occurred by accident. The air space above the Baltic is crowded, and most nations have 12-mile limits.

Colonel Unell emphasized several times that the intelligence activity of both the two superpowers and their respective allies over the Baltic Sea is completely legal. The planes are operating over the free ocean, in international air space. The Swedes themselves are not merely interested and alert observers. Swedish spy planes have a long tradition. In 1952 the Russians shot down a Swedish DC-3 plane which was operating in an official capacity over the free ocean. Today Sweden has several old Caravelle planes, of the well-known passenger type, which often (how often, is a secret) take a spin or two along the coasts of other countries. The planes are filled with radar and listening equipment, which make is possible to keep an eye on what military and other activity is going on many hundreds of kilometers into the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany. The planes listen in on Denmark, West Germany and even Norway too for the same purpose; for Sweden is neutral and officially does not differentiate among nations. Their Defense Staff is careful to stress this fact.

But there is no doubt that geographical proximity to one of the two superpowers makes it natural for Sweden to concentrate its spying efforts toward the east. The entire Swedish defense system is based on the assumption that the country can depend on being warned a reasonable length of time ahead of time that a military attack is coming.

And so, for this purpose, Sweden has, besides its spy planes, not only extensive radar observation going on but also advanced equipment for the execution of what is called signal spying, which involves listening in on other countries' military communications. By continually monitoring these communications, they can note when anything out of the ordinary is happening.

The Swedes note, not without considerable pride, that they knew about the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 3 days before it took place. Sweden had observed the movement of the troops. Correspondingly, Sweden believes it had reassuring information when, no so long ago, it was being speculated whether a Soviet invasion of Poland was imminent.

Swedish monitoring for intelligence purposes falls under the direction of the Defense Radio Institute (FRA). This top-secret organization began activity during the last world war. Swedes monitored the German radio traffic between Oslo and Berlin and cracked the German codes. Today there are bases on the mainland and on Gotland where it is possible to "see" far into the Soviet Union.

The Baltic area is continually watched not only by nations with coastlines there but also by nations such as the U.S., France and Great Britain. "The Baltic Sea is clearly of great interest for both military blocs, since their activity there is so extensive," Colonel Unell said.

The larger NATO nations are conducting, first and foremost, military spying activity against the Soviet Union and its allies, Poland and the German Democratic Republic. But the Western powers also presumably wish to establish by their military presence that the Baltic Sea is an international ocean, which is open to nations other than those with coastlines there.

The Warsaw Pact nations use the Baltic Sea chiefly as a maneuver area for planes and ships. Of course, West Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Finland naturally use it for the same purpose. The nations on the Baltic naturally maintain

higher-level military activity of a different quality than what other individual nations in the area maintain. But all this results in as many as 10 nations with military planes in almost daily activity over the Baltic Sea. Sweden makes note of some thousand military flights annually from the West. If they count their own and last but not least the Soviets' flights, the figure rises to several thousand. It is almost remarkable that collisions do not occur.

The most advanced spy machine in activity over the Baltic--at least as far as efficiency goes--is the American SR 71. This large-scale technical wonder is the successor to the famous U-2 plane. The SR 71 is stationed both in West Germany and in Great Britain. At a height of 20,000 meters, at a speed fully three times the speed of sound, it often comes roaring over Denmark and West Germany on its way to the Baltic. The course of SR 71 seems to be carefully programmed. For the entire time since the Swedes discovered and photographed it 3 years ago, the route has been the same: in along the Baltic coast, then a swing around and back along the Swedish coast.

Great Britain regularly sends Nimrod planes to the Blatic, and France has its intelligence planes on location there. But nearly every other known type of military plane has been observed over the Baltic Sea. All have the same assignment: signal spying and photographing.

The Russians have also demonstrated for the Swedish pilots everything that their country has in the way of military planes. Sweden was the first country to take pictures of the Soviet strategic bomber plane "Backfire." This happened as early as 1978—over the Baltic.

Sweden has an exposed location. The foreign planes do not just fly off Gotland. Between that island and the mainland is a narrow air corridor which other nations often use.

"The Baltic Sea is a small and tension-filled area. We sit on the front row and watch the superpowers sniff each other out," Colonel Unell said. For Sweden can follow along, via its radar dishes, when the Soviet fighter planes go up-just as the Swedish ones do-to meet and deter the Western planes, when they come too near the border.

Military intelligence activity over the Baltic Sea is significant, but it is also routine and most often not very dramatic. It is only when the Warsaw Pact holds its large land maneuvers on the Baltic coast that Western interest increases markedly. Swedish interest increases too. It is not easy to see the difference immediately between a maneuver and an actual attack.

Colonel Unell assured us, meanwhile, that Sweden is observing matters closely. "With all probability, we will be able to detect an attempted attack," he said.

9584

CSO: 3639/124

MILITARY EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SWEDISH, NORWEGIAN ARMS TRADE BALANCE AGREEMENT IN DOUBT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Jun 83 p 9

[Article: "Uncertain of Agreement With Norway"]

[Text] It is uncertain whether an agreement will be reached with Norway on an arms trade balance by midsummer, as planned.

In the background of the talks is Norway's wish for extensive purchases of arms from Sweden in the coming years.

Norway has asked that these purchases be balanced by increased imports of Norwegian industrial products into Sweden. Track trucks and missiles would be traded for Norwegian computers, for example.

According to DAGENS NYHETER's sources, there are still many vexing questions to be resolved. A complete balance would mean that Swedish industry would place large orders in Norway, but the Swedish Government cannot force industry to buy goods it does not want.

Opinions also differ on the method of assessing the transfer of technical know-how and merchandising expertise.

The multibillion-kroner agreement is scheduled to be completed by 21 June.

They are still aiming for this date, but the agreement probably will not be ready until fall.

9992

CSO: 3650/212

MILITARY DENMARK

INTERIOR MINISTER DEFENDS CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Jun 83 p 11

[Article by Interior Minister Britta Schall Holberg: "It Is not So Bad Now in the Civil Defense Program"]

[Text] The speaker for reserve officers in the Civil Defense Corps, Bertel Thomsen, in a contribution to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE on 25 May 1983 commented on the Civil Defense Corps's situation after publication of "Civil Defense Review '82." Bertel Thomsen describes in strongly critical terms the Civil Defense Corps's situation as catastrophic after many years of economic starvation.

It must be acknowledged that Bertel Thomsen asks several central questions, including regarding the alerting service, which must be answered when the Civil Defense Corps is to be enlarged further in coming years. Bertel Thomsen's somewhat polemical account, however, must not be permitted to veil the fact that large parts of the Danish Civil Defense Corps function well relative to the problems which are to be solved in peacetime and under conditions of a war. In the international context the Danish Civil Defense Corps has been able to hold its own quite well for many years.

The education system is especially valuable. Through the years thousands of men and women—as enlisted personnel, volunteers, or those employed in the Civil Defense Corps—have received civil defense education and training. Through this a solid foundation has been created for our civil preparedness.

The Civil Defense Corps's preparedness will of course not be able to function effectively without suitable equipment and materiel. The Civil Defense Administration also in "Civil Defense Review '82" pointed out a number of current short-comings and shortcomings which will arise in coming years both on account of wear and obsolescence. The review contains proposals for replacements and improvements with alternative budget limits.

The Civil Decense Administration has at the same time begun planning of a modern alerting and communications system. The work includes also development of a siren which can function independently of the normal electrical system. A complete basis for political decision regarding the renovation of the alerting service and future siren coverage can be available in 1984. The administration is also preparing the

building of limited preparations against chemical warfare. The preparations will first take care of civil defense units and people taking care of vital functions. Within the existing appropriation limits the information system will be expanded so that the population's possibilities of gaining knowledge of measures for self-protection will be improved.

Compliance with all desires for improvements within civil defense will make colossal economic demands. Just the construction of nationwide preparations against chemical warfare is estimated to cost several billion kroner.

A heavy increase in civil defense resources can take place only at the expense of wishes and needs in other areas. With the socioeconomic conditions which we can expect to have to live under in coming years I consider this to be unrealistic. Considerations regarding our future civil defense must be studied within restricted economic limits based on present budgets. It would also not be reasonable, and certainly not in the present situation, if civil defense's possible contribution to the reconversion process which the private and public sectors are besides subject to is not considered.

The limits can seem low to some, especially when they are compared with other public expenditures. It must not be ignored, however, that expenditures for civil defense purposes are not only State expenses, but that the municipalities and the private sector also defray considerable expenses in this area. These expenses are estimated to become upwards of 650 million kroner in 1983. To be added to this is the value of the investments and purchases made in previous years for civil defense purposes. In times of economizing, expenses of this magnitude are after all a considerable amount.

The contemplated reorganization of the civil defense ambulance service is an example of a change which can make capital available for especially high-priority areas. The reorganization will make available annually 6 million kroner which, for one thing, are being contemplated for use in improving some of the shortcomings which Bertel Thomsen mentions.

The debate regarding "Civil Defense Review '82" has hitherto been quiet. I hope that there will be a public debate regarding these topics and that this will result in the population's knowledge of and active participation in civil defense being increased. I also hope that the debate can supplement the foundation for the considerations and decisions which must be made regarding Denmark's civil defense for some time to come.

8985 CSO: 3613/134 MILITARY FRANCE

ONERA TESTS AIR INTAKES FOR ROCKET RAMJET MISSILE

Paris L'AERONAUTIQUE ET L'ASTRONAUTIQUE in French No 98, 1983-1 pp 47-58

[Article by Gerard Laruelle, subdivision head at ONERA [National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research]: "Air Intakes for Rocket Ramjet Probative Missile"]

[Text] [Summary as published in English]:

Air Intakes for a Probative Missile of Rocket Ramjet

For the studies concerning the rocket ramjets, ONERA has developed, with the support of French Official Services, a probative missile powered by a solid fuel ramjet engine during the cruise flight.

This paper describes the methods and the experiments performed to define and optimize the air-intakes for ensuring the mission of the probative missile.

A special test rig allowing numerous variants has been built at a scale of about 1/3 for some experiments in the S 2 supersonic wind tunnel of the Modane Center, in the Mach number range 1,8-3.

The last test has been performed in the S 4 hypersonic wind tunnel, equipped for this case with a Mach 2 nozzle, on a real air intake with its duct, in the conditions of a flight at the altitude zero. The scale effect is studied and the results are compared to the ones obtained during the first ballistic flight.

In its work on rocket ramjet engines, ONERA has, since 1970, concentrated its efforts along several different lines of research*: New solid fuels, a ramjet combustion chamber that would be integratable with the booster motor, the exterior and interior aerodynamics of missiles.

Research was funded by the DTEN [Technical Directorate for Missiles].

All of these analytical studies, very encouraging though they were, had to be flight-tested to determine specifically the performance of these new engines under realistic missile-operating conditions.

ONERA was therefore given the mission, by the French Official Services, of designing, building and launching "probative missiles" powered by solid-fuel ramjet engines. The Tactical Missiles Division of AEROSPATIALE National Industrial Aerospace Company and the SNPE National Propellants and Explosives Company joined forces with ONERA for the building of these missiles.

Planning called for two phases:

- -- The first phase was completed in 1976 with the launching of two unguided missiles;
- -- The second, with guided missiles, enabled testing of the missile's maneuverability and of its effects on the operation of the engine.

Since 1974, and even more specifically during the carrying out of this program, a major effort was devoted to the study of air intakes from the experimental standpoint. This work on the various possibilities of incorporating air intakes into supersonic missiles was carried out with support from Official Services and enabled ONERA to provide guidance to the industrial firms involved (AEROSPATIALE and MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Company]) in the choice of a solution to the problem within the constraints of prudence. The optimization of this solution for the case under consideration became the object of subsequent specific studies in cooperation with the industrial firms.

The purpose of this article is to describe the efforts that went into defining the air intakes of the first missile, explain the choice made, and compare the results of the wind tunnel tests with those obtained in flight during the ballistic launches.

Notations Used Herein

Ao = infinite section upstream of the air-intake duct;

A₁ = frontal section of air intakes;

A2 = section of air intakes at end of inlet;

Aref = reference section: midship section of missile $(A_{ref} = \tilde{u} D^2/4)$;

C_x = drag coefficient referred to reference section;

D = missile diameter;

h = height of external boundary layer diverter;

H = height of bidimensional air intakes;

L = width of bidimensional air intakes;

Mo = infinity upstream Mach number;

p = pressure;

pio = infinity upstream generating pressure;

pi2 = mean generating pressure at end of diffuser;

R = radius of fuselage (D/2);

R_D = Reynolds number referred to fuselage diameter;

X,Y,Z = Trihedral coordinates [pitch, yaw, roll axes] bounded by the missile;

 α = angle of attack;

 β = angle of yaw;

 $f = flow coefficient (f = A_0/A_1);$

= angle of roll;

 $\eta_{02} = \text{air-intake efficiency } (\eta_{02} = P_{12}/P_{10});$

 \tilde{n}_{02} = useful efficiency.

Definition of the Probatory Model

Mission

Flight tests had two basic aims:

-- Verify the net thrust (thrust - drag);

--Obtain technological data enabling confirmation of the technical solutions adopted so as to permit their application to operational missiles.

To achieve these two aims, it was indispensable to design a highly realistic missile. Its general architecture was therefore defined on the basis of a typical mission: A seaborne surface-to-surface missile in low-altitude flight at Mach 2, having a range of around 100 km with some maneuvers.

Since the basic purpose of these launches was to study the cruise phase, acceleration was not optimized; for reasons of economy, an existing casing was used to provide the booster engine, which was mounted at the aft end of the missile.

The first launches were not guided; the missiles followed a ballistic trajectory, thus providing a substantial flight duration with a summit altitude of less than 5,000 m. Nevertheless, the design of these first missiles was identical to that of the future guided missiles. Thus, the onloaded fuel had still not been completely used up upon impact at sea, in the case of the ballistic launches.

Missile's Architecture

Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the complete missile. It consists of a jettisonable booster motor and of the missile proper, which cruises at a Mach number close to 2. The latter is 5.5 m long and has a caliber of 0.40 m. It is equipped with four air intakes followed by fairings that house, among other things, the control-surface actuators. This choice of four air intakes, based on the type of guidance involved, will be discussed in more detail later.

Located inside the missile, from nose to tail, are:

- -- The instrumentation for these test flights with telemetering;
- -- The equipment bay for the guided flights;
- -- The gas generator;
- -- The ramjet combustion chamber.

Flow Around Fuselage: General Considerations

If we consider the flow around the fuselage, a few simple remarks will serve as guidelines as to the positioning of the air intakes.

Generally speaking, the junction between nose cone and body does not have a constant curvature and induces a local overspeed. Figure 3 shows the Mach number distribution at the probative-missile wall for a Mach 2 flight at zero angle of attack. Since it is the function of the air intakes to slow the airflow, it would be ill-conceived to place them in an overspeed zone, that is, toward the rear of the nose cone or the forward end of the cylindrical body.

For a missile at an angle of attack greater than zero, the theory of launched bodies postulates a maximum local angle of attack at the flow-generating pressures positioned at 90 degrees with respect to those of the lower and upper surfaces, this maximum attack angle being twice that of the missile body. This means that, for a missile equipped with lateral air intakes, these intakes must be defined such that, isolated, they will operate properly at angles of attack α_{PA} [air intake] significantly greater than the maximum angle of attack of the missile α_{m} . Figure 4 shows the decrement of this local angle of attack α_{1} with increasing distance from the fuselage; a ratio of α_{PA}/α_{m} close to 1.5 is a good mean value for the mean flow entering the air intake.

In the case of missiles with four air inlets positioned in a "+" configuration, two air intakes will be at a yaw angle of large amplitude, which is particularly unfavorable for bidimensional air intakes; an "X" configuration helps to attenuate this local yaw.

The role of the air intakes being to obtain as high a recompression as possible, they must be placed so as to avoid a zone in which the flow is at an overspeed or at a low energy level.

Such situations are present when the angle of attack of the fuselage creates vortex structures or when the air intakes are situated in a region where the boundary layer is thick. Figure 5 shows that if the air intakes are placed distant from the nose cone, they may be affected (according to their position during roll) by the two vortices created at the upper surface of the missile body and, for smaller and smaller angles of attack, as the position of the inlets is moved aft. Figure 6 shows, for two longitudinal positions, the upper-surface boundary-layer thicknesses as measured in a wind tunnel at various angles of attack. The presence of the vortex at X = 9.9 D is visible from $\mathbf{C} = 6^{\circ}$.

Consequently, if the missile must fly at large angles of attack, the more remote aft positions will be unfavorable for the cruciform configurations.

Test Facilities

Three of ONERA's wind tunnels were used to test the missile air intakes in the Mach number range 1.5-3:

- --Wind tunnel S2 of the Modane Avrieux Center, where a complete large-scale rig was created to study the effects of the fuselage;
- --Wind tunnel S5 installed in the Paris region at Chalais-Meudon, where small-scale tests are performed on isolated air intakes;
- --Modane's hypersonic wind tunnel S4, modified with a rather large-size Mach 2 nozzle to permit the testing of an actual air intake under the exact generative conditions of a Mach 2 flight at altitude zero.

Modane-Avrieux Wind Tunnel S2

This wind tunnel operates continuously. It is pressurized (P_i =1.64 at Mach 2) and has two interchangeable test chambers: A transonic and a supersonic one. The latter one measures 1.83 m high by 1.75 m wide.

By varying the shapes of the walls at the throat, the Mach number can be varied continuously between 1.5 and 3.1.

For the study of air intakes, a 150-mm-diameter model is used, a schematic drawing of which is shown in Figure 7, and a view of it in the test chamber in Figure 8 [not reproduced here].

This model consists of a setup mounted on the wind tunnel's sting, which permits the varying of the angles of attack and roll. Different parameters can also be studied.

- -- Length of the nose cone;
- -- Shape of the nose cone;
- -- Height of the boundary layer diverters;
- -- Presence of troughs;
- -- Types and numbers (1, 2, 3 or 4) of air inlets;
- -- Lengths and shapes of diffusers.

Static- and dynamic-pressure taps located at the end of the inlet and inside the combustion chamber of the ramjet provided the data for calculating the efficiency. Flow was measured by means of a sonic-throat flowmeter placed downstream of an adjustable blanking cover that enabled simulation of the various air-intake operating conditions.

The Reynolds number obtained was about 1/6 that of a low-altitude Mach 2 flight.

Chalais-Meudon Wind Tunnel S5

This is also a continuous-running supersonic wind tunnel, with return tunnel, and with test chamber 30 cm on a side. Its generating conditions are close to ambient atmospheric conditions. By means of six pivot-mounted nozzles, all Mach numbers between 1.5 and 3.2 can be obtained.

The size of this wind tunnel made it possible to fine-tune the air inlets built for the model that was designed for S2MA [Modane-Avrieux Wind Tunnel S2]. Various tests were made possible; for example:

- --Effects owing to the sidewall edge profiles of yawed bidimensional air intakes;
- -- Tests of transitional flow onset;
- --Study of the cutwaters that comprise the external boundary layer diverter:
- -- Drag measurements on air intakes, by means of a wall balance (Fig 9).

Modane-Avrieux Wind Tunnel S4

The Modane-Avrieux hypersonic wind tunnel S4 is of the intermittently-operated type. Presently, it has just one 68.5-cm-diameter Mach 6 nozzle. Under the presently possible generating conditions, P_i = 25b and T_i = 1,600°K (1,800°K max), it is possible to simulate a real flight at Mach 6 at an altitude of 30 km.

For the tests concerning the present ramjet engines (Mach 2-3), only its facilities for storing and supplying a large flow of compressed and heated air were used; special nozzles were designed and built according to the missiles to be tested. For tests at Mach 2, actual flight conditions at an altitude of around 1 km (altitude of the Modane test center) could be reproduced. For a Mach number close to 3, altitudes of over 20 km could be simulated by connecting to spherical vacuum vessels placed downstream of the wind tunnel.

Figure 10 [not reproduced herein] shows a view of the wind tunnel with the 24.3-cm-diameter Mach 2 nozzle placed in front of a real air intake of the probative missile. Tests such as these enabled the carrying out of not only aerodynamic but also technological studies on the air intakes; the paragraph headed "Experimental Study" herein describes this setup in detail.

For the probative model, a second setup was also used, with four revolutional nozzles feeding the four air intakes, to verify the operational reliability (behavior of the heat shields) over test periods of long duration.

Choice of Air Intakes

Number of Air Intakes

In defining the mission of the probative model, maneuvers in all directions were assumed, which in turn required the seeking of the most axially symmetric configuration possible:

--A single front-end air intake was ruled out, so as to have a realistic missile with maximum decoupling between propulsion and operational (payload) sections.

-- Two air intakes favor only one plane of symmetry, requiring pilotage of an airplane type with response times too long for this type of missile.

--All configurations with at least three air intakes are possible. The use of four is justified by the missile designers' practice of using four empennages to decouple yaw and pitch commands; a missile with three air intakes and three empennages downstream would also have answered the problem.

Increasing the number of air intakes beyond four is of no interest.

Types of Air Intakes

Shapes Studied

For cruciform missiles, four types of air intakes were studied in wind tunnels together with fuselage (Fig 11):

-- Semicircular with one conic beak;

- --Circular with one conic beak (same definition as for the semicircular ones), then with two conic beaks;
- --So-called "conventional" bidimensional, with compression gradient placed on the fuselage side;
- --So-called "inverted" bidimensional, with compression gradient diverting the airflow toward the fuselage.

The semicircular and circular intakes were not equipped with internal boundary layer diverters, unlike the bidimensional ones.

Theoretical considerations

Figure 12 shows a schematic front view of the four families of air intakes. All four have two characteristics in common:

- -- The air intake/fuselage sectional characteristic $(A_1/A_{ref} = 0.4 \text{ for the four intakes})$;
- -- The height of the external boundary layer diverter, that is, the distance between the fuselage and the closest lip (h/D = 0.063).

The tinted portions denote the intake's hull and sidewall-thicknesses, and the cross-hatched portions the skin of the ramjet chamber at the section where the four air intakes open out into it.

A detailed study of the principal operational parameters (geometric and aero-dynamic) yielded a number of considerations of general applicational value, which are summarized below. They serve as guidelines for the orientation of choices and justify the trade-offs with which the architect of a missile must deal.

Position of Start of Compression

This position is indicated in Figure 12 by an arrow: For semicircular and conventional bidimensional intakes, compression begins in the vicinity of the fuselage, hence more or less within the boundary layer depending on the angle of attack of the missile. Thus, conventional bidimensional air intakes act as real boundary layer "scoops," resulting in lowered efficiency and heightened sensitivity to angle of attack.

In the case of circular intakes and a fortiori in that of inverted bidimensional ones, the flow is captured in a zone less subjected to viscous effects; hence, their efficiency is greater.

If compression is started in the vicinity of the fuselage, the hull will be on the opposite side, hence in the streamline flow, and the resulting drag will be increased (semicircular and conventional bidimensional intakes. For

circular intakes, the hull is partially in the streamline flow and in the boundary layer; but for inverted bidimensional intakes, if the height of the diverter is small, the hull will be located essentially within the viscous layer and the drag will therefore be lessened; furthermore, in the latter case, the height of the cutwater separating the intake from the fuselage will also be less.

A final interesting point is the interaction between the shock waves issuing from the air intakes, and the boundary layer of the fuselage, for flights at Mach numbers lower than the design Mach number; the shock waves from the compression ramps, in this case, travel upstream of the hull. For "Mach 2-Mach 3" flights at moderate altitudes, the boundary layer of the fuselage is turbulent, and the aforementioned shock waves generate slight separations that act as small precompression ramps and can thus enhance efficiency.

Width of Air Intakes

The wider the air intake, the wider will be the cutwater placed underneath it, leading to greater drag. From this standpoint, bidimensional and circular intakes are equivalent; only the semicircular intakes are penalized.

Similarly, the wider the intake, the greater will be the possibility of capturing the boundary layer flow. This is true also with respect to capture of the vortices emanating from the nose cone. As the missile's angle of attack increases, the vortices leave the fuselage; thus, with semicircular intakes, the probability of capturing vortices as a function of roll position and of small angles of attack, is maximal.

The final point in this analysis is technological: If the intakes are wide, the chamber inlets will necessarily be larger, which reduces the width of skin transmitting longitudinal stresses, thus necessitating a thicker, hence heavier, chamber frame, and as a consequence an aft displacement of the center of gravity.

Height of Air Intakes

Two opposing effects are to be noted: Reducing the height of the air intakes favors compactness of the missile but leads to a diminishing of normal loadings, which may in turn necessitate the presence of wings to enable high-altitude maneuvers.

Useful Efficiency

Figure 13 shows a diagram defining the so-called "useful" efficiency at $\alpha=0^{\circ}$, assuming possible maneuvers at a maximum angle of attack $\alpha=0^{\circ}$, regardless of roll position. The most critical angle of attack $\alpha_{\rm crit}$ is generally the maximum angle of attack $\alpha_{\rm o}$. Actually, missiles are generally designed with a fixed geometry for the air intakes and ramjet nozzle. If the fuel flow is injected, or slightly modulated (the case of solid fuels), the nozzle of the engine must be so dimensioned as to avoid any possibility of pumping onset in the air intakes.

Thus, the so-called "useful efficiency" $\overline{\eta}_{02}$ for a flight in which the angle of attack attains the value α_0 is the efficiency obtained at zero angle of attack with optimum adjustment of the throat enabling maneuvers ranging to angle of attack α_0 at the Mach number α_0 under consideration, and for all positions of roll, without onset of pumping.

It is to be noted that the angle of attack \propto used herein is the angle formed by the direction of airflow and the axis of the missile. Then the position of the missile about its axis is represented by the angle of roll $\not c$, which is zero when one of the air intakes is positioned at its undersurface.

Test Results

Figure 14 compares the evolution of useful efficiency at zero angle of attack as a function of the maximum angle of attack being considered, for the different air intakes studied. The intakes were placed on the missile body at around 8 diameters from the nose of the ogive with a boundary layer diverter 0.053 D in height (except for the semicircular intakes, wherein the sole test was carried out at h/D = 0.033).

At zero angle of attack, the efficiency of the semicircular intakes than that of the conic-beak circular ones, even though they have the same compression and the same internal section design, for the following reasons:

-- The presence of an additional wall in the semicircular intakes, and the angles thus formed, generate additional losses owing to friction;

-- The external diverter of the semicircular intake being of lesser height, the intake captures a larger portion of the fuselage's boundary layer.

The diverter being small in the case of the semicircular air intakes, these intakes were found to be highly sensitive to angle of attack. Of course, the height of the diverter can be increased and this sensitivity thus reduced, but the drag will increase rapidly.

Conic and biconic circular air intakes showed equivalent useful-efficiency curves; the difference is explained by the change in profile of the core (eisentropic compression would yield an even higher efficiency).

Bidimensional air intakes have an even higher efficiency at zero angle of attack: This is easily explained in view of the definition of the compression gradient (3 dihedrons) and of the presence of an internal boundary layer diverter.

Insofar as concerns the curve of efficiency versus angle of attack, the two types of bidimensional intakes considered—the conventional and the inverted—are very different. The performance of the conventional bidimensional intakes drops rapidly with attack angles above zero; the latter intakes are comcomparable to the semicircular ones, as had been been expected and was indicated in the section herein headed "Theoretical Considerations."

The inverted bidimensional intakes, on the other hand, definitely showed a sharply reduced sensitivity to angle of attack as compared with the other air intakes studied.

Air Intake Drag

For all airborne missiles, good performance results from a satisfactory compromise between drag and thrust, the latter being directly a function of the efficiency of the air intakes.

Figure 15 shows a theoretical comparison of the three large families of air intakes, from the standpoint of drag. The air intakes were broken down into components (hull, sidewalls, etc) for which the shock-wave drag was obtained by integration of the local pressure, which was calculated by an expansionwave method based on the uniform flow at infinity upstream; the presence of the fuselage was disregarded. Friction was estimated by likening the various surfaces to thin flat plates.

Conventional bidimensional air intakes exhibit higher efficiencies but at the price of an additional drag owing to the internal boundary layer diverter. At the same diverter height, the revolutional air intake conduces to a minimal drag.

One experiment carried out at the S5Ch wind tunnel enabled verification of these theoretical results for the revolutional air intake and the inverted bidimensional type, the latter having exhibited some very high-performance characteristics. Figure 9 shows a view of the model in the test chamber and the schematic diagram of the balance-gauge setup. With the inverted bidimensional air intake, the hull is then placed next to the fuselage at the level of the boundary layer; this reduces the drag. These tests demonstrated that the two air intakes were virtually equivalent from the standpoint of drag.

Effect of Boundary Layer Diverter Height

This effect is discussed here for conventional bidimensional intakes positioned at 8 diameters from the nose of the ogive and at Mach 2.

Figure 16 shows the useful efficiencies at $\propto = 0$ for different maximum angles of attack as a function of diverter height.

At zero angle of attack, the diverters rise above the level of the boundary layer and the efficiency remains nearly constant.

As the angle of attack increases, the upper-surface boundary layer thickens, entailing an increase in the low-energy airflow into the air intake, and efficiency falls off. The smaller the diverter, the more marked is this effect. A certain saturation is evident, however, in the case of diverters of lesser height h, at high angles of attack: Efficiency in this case is poor and varies little with angle of attack.

In comparison with these efficiencies, Figure 16 shows the drag of the four air intakes as a ratio with respect to that of the missile, and points up the part played by the external diverter.

These two diagrams clearly demonstrate that, for a given maximum angle of attack of the missile, a compromise must be reached between efficiency and drag to define the height of the boundary layer diverter: A calculation of the sensitivity of the parameters is necessary.

A good compromise is obtained at a diverter height close to the height of the boundary layer at zero angle of attack, to allow for attack angles of the order of 5 to 6 degrees.

Effect of Longitudinal Position

Figure 17 shows some of the results obtained at Mach 2. If the air intakes are placed at the end of the ogive, the boundary layer is thin but there is a local overspeed that sharply lowers the efficiency. On the other hand, if the intakes are placed farther downstream on the missile body, the overspeed is attenuated and the efficiency is increased. However, with aft displacement of the air intakes, the local boundary layers become thicker (particularly at greater than zero angles of attack) and, above all, the zones affected by vortices become greater, resulting in a fall-off of efficiency.

Effect of Roll Position

The interest of a cruciform missile lies in its maneuverability in all directions, hence without roll control. Thus, the air intakes will, at one moment or another, be in unfavorable positions, that is, in the axis of the vortices emitted by the ogive.

Figure 18 shows the curves of the coefficients of flow captured by an inverted bidimensional air intake, for two Mach numbers and at different angles of attack, as a function of roll position ($\phi = 0$ corresponding to the upper surface). The maximal efficiency curves are comparable.

These curves illustrate the detrimental effect of these vortices on the performance of the air intakes. Work done on the disruption of the vortices emanating from missile fuselages at angles of attack greater than zero, or on their capture by means of longitudinal troughs placed between the air intakes, has shown that significant gains can be achieved for flights at medium angles of attack (5-6 degrees). At low angles of attack, the drag of these troughs is not offset by the gain in efficiency of the air intakes.

Design Mach Number

The design Mach number must be slightly larger than the nominal flight Mach number, so as to allow for small variations in local angle of incidence that cause the shock waves formed on the ramp of the air intake to penetrate below

the hull, resulting in a loss of efficiency. The slight difference between the design and flight Mach numbers ($\triangle M \sim 0.1$) induces a very slight additive drag.

Air Intakes of the Probative Model

Definition of the Air Intake

The comparative study of the various air intake solutions for cruciform missiles showed that the inverted bidimensional air intake was a very good solution, as was that of revolutional air intakes, which yielded results very close to those of the inverted bidimensional type.

Since the assumed range of variations in angle of attack for the probative model was limited, and for reasons of technological simplicity, the revolutional air intake was chosen.

It consists of a biconic central beak with a half-angle of 20-28 degrees at its apex; the core is attached to the hull by three internal streamlined spars (Fig 19).

The air intake is separated from the fuselage by a cutwater with a half-angle of 12.5 degrees at its apex, which serves as the external boundary layer diverter.

The exact longitudinal position adopted was that of a gas generator harness, which was used as one point of attachment.

For this configuration, preliminary tests were carried out on a real intake to verify its performance under flight-based generative conditions, as well as its mechanical reliability, especially prior to firing of the ramjet and in case of pumping.

Experimental Study

Setup at Modane S4 (Figs 20 and 10[not reproduced herein])

As was indicated in the section of this article headed "Modane-Avrieux Wind Tunnel S4," this tunnel was used, for the purpose of this test, as a heated-gas generator. It supplied about 40 kg/sec of air at 540°K for a period of 2 minutes.

For this test, the entire flow passed through a Mach 2 nozzle, 242 mm in diameter in the plane of its outlet, located downstream of the wind tunnel's normal plenum. The model assembly was then placed in an enclosure providing the wind tunnel's diffuser in its hypersonic version.

The "air intake plus duct" assembly was then mounted on 400-mm-diameter sheet-metal roll simulating the missile's fuselage. The fastenings of this assembly fore and aft conformed to those of the missile.

The ramjet's combustion chamber was simulated by a half-cylinder drum, flat side up.

Downstream of this drum was a valve enabling adjustment of the flow through the air intake and a sonic-throat flowmeter equipped with grills designed to homogenize the flow.

The drum-valve-flowmeter assembly was fixed, and positioned in accordance with the axis of the wind tunnel. To simulate yaw, the air intake assembly together with the simulated fuselage was rotated about a vertical axis situated in the plane of the nozzle outlet; the downstream end of the intake glided over the flat side of the drum. Several sets of indexing holes provided a rather adequate number of yawed positions, with an upper limit of 12 degrees.

At the end of the intake, a "comb" equipped with 19 stagnation-pressure taps and associated with 4 static-pressure taps enabled local calibration of the airflow and calculation of the efficiency.

A Schieleren-method test bench was used with the setup.

Results

Figure 21 shows the characteristics obtained at S4MA for yaw angles $\mathcal{A}=0^{\circ}$, 4° and 8° . It is to be noted that, considering the aerodynamic field of the fuselage at angles of attack greater than zero, these yaws simulate only partially the flows at the entrance to the lateral air intakes ($\beta=90^{\circ}$) located on a missile at angles of attack of 0° , 2.5° and 5°. For $\mathcal{A}=0$, the simulation is correct.

The results obtained are compared, in the same Fig 21, with those obtained from the tests carried out at S2 MA; some differences were recorded.

The flow coefficient obtained at S4 Modane is around 1.5 percent higher than that of the S2 tests, particularly for β = 0. This can be explained by several reasons:

- -- The Reynolds number is multiplied by 6 at S4;
- -- The leading edges of the air intake are very thin at scale 1:1;
- -- The air intake at S4 could not absorb any of the boundary layer, owing to it position in the nozzle;
- --The generating temperature being at 540° , the entry section expanded by around 0.5 percent, which is not allowed for in the reference section taken, it having been assumed to be constant and calculated at ambient temperature.

As in the case of flow, the efficiency was also higher in the S4 Modane tests; several facts can explain this:

- -- The Reynolds number was higher at S4;
- --At S2 Modane, the captured flow traversed the shock wave of the ogive $(\eta \sim 0.995$ at the nose);
- --At S2, an artificial transition was obtained, using carborundum, to position the shock waves at the base of the second cone of the air intakes;
- --The essential difference stems from the shape of the diffuser, which is pure at scale 1:1 and quite complex at reduced scales, since the model, which is adaptable to all forms of air intakes, has revolutional diffusers immediately downstream of the intakes that then are transformed to obtain a rectangular section before the turn in the ramjet chamber.

On the other hand, as can be noted from these curves, the pumping limits obtained in the two wind tunnels were very close to each other and the stable subcritical speeds were quite limited.

Flight tests

The last figure (Fig 22) shows the curves, as a function of time, of the efficiency of the air intakes during the first two ballistic flights of the probative model; they are shown compared, by instantaneous Mach number, with the maximal efficiency deduced from the tests at S4 Modane. As can be seen, based on the choice of the throat section of the two ramjets, the supercritical headrooms were respectively 15 and 5 percent within the Mach 2-Mach 2.2 envelope for flights V1 and V2, which was very close to optimum.

Conclusion

In defining a new missile, the architect now has available a number of general rules to guide him, subject to the mission to be undertaken and to the existing constraints.

The number of air intakes to be used is determined, generally speaking, by the mission and consequently by the type of guidance involved. The positioning of the air intakes is a function of the maximum angles of attack assumed in the design. Large angles of attack conduce to advancing the air intakes without, however, placing them in the vicinity of the junction between nose cone and fuselage, where an overspeed can appear. The type of air intake also depends on the assumed maximum angles of attack, but above all on the required performance characteristics. In any case, a compromise is necessary between high performance (inverted bidimensional intakes with internal boundary layer diverters) and the lower cost factor involved in a simpler and lighter construction (circular air intakes).

Having completed the preliminary design of an air intake, its actual performance characteristics cannot be known except by way of wind tunnel tests, for which ONERA has available an array of complementary facilities. S5 Chalais

enables the fine-tuning of the design of isolated air intakes. S2 Modane, with its existing setup, provides the internal characteristics of air intakes in the presence of the fuselage, and S4 Modane enables synthesized testing of aerodynamic, propulsive and technological aspects of the air intakes-ramjet assembly.

With respect to the development of the probatory model of a solid-fuel ramjet engine missile, the first of a new generation of missiles, ONERA followed the various stages described above and culminating in test flights that confirmed the validity of the performance characteristics measured in wind tunnel tests and that have given full scope to the development of tactical ramjet missiles in France.

[Charts and illustrations follow]:




Fig 1 - Schematic of missile.

- 1. Guidance and control.
 - 2. Air intake.
- 3. Injectors.
- 5. Flight test instru-
- engine.
- 7. Combustion chamber. 6. Gas generator. mentation.




Fig 3 - Mach number at wall.

Key:

1. Probative model.




Fig 4 - Local angle of attack.

Key:

- 1. Test results (S2 MA).
 - 2. Theory.




Fig 5 - Vortical separation.

1. Separation zone.




Fig 6 - Boundary layers.

Key:

1. Tests at S2 Modane. 2. Upper surface.




Fig 7 - Schematic of assembly with fuselage.

1. Locations of taps.

2. Blanking cover. 3. Flowmeter.




Fig 11 - Air intakes studied.

Key:

1. Semicircular.

5. Circular -4. Inverted. Bidimensionals.
 Conventional.

l or 2 cones.

dynamométriques Jauges

Fig 9 [less photo]: Schematic of setup for measuring drag at S5 Chalais.

Key:

1. Dynamometric gauges.




Fig 12 - Frontal outline views of air intakes.

Key:

1. Semicircular.

2. Circular.

3. Bidimensionals.

4. Conventional.

5. Inverted.




Fig 13 - Definition of useful efficiency.

1. Efficiencies.

2. Maximum. 3. Useful at $\alpha = 0$ for $\alpha = \infty = 0$. $\tilde{7} | 02$.




Fig 14 - Comparison of the different air intakes studied.

Key:

1. Inverted bidimensional.

2. Circular.

3. Biconic.

Conic.

5. Conventional bidimensional.

6. Semicircular.




Fig 15 - Drag analysis.

Drag.

Missile.

Internal diverter.

External diverter.


Hull + sidewalls. 4.2

Additive. . 9 Air intake.

Conventional bidimensional.

Semicircular.

Circular.



X/D ... 8

Z = 2

Fig 16 - Effect of diverter height.

Key:

1. Useful 702. 2. Air intake.

3. Missile.




Fig 17 - Effect of air intake distance from nose of missile.

Key: 1. Useful η_{02} .




Fig 18 - Effect of roll position.

Key:
 l. Inverted bidimensional air intake.




Fig 19 - Definition of probative model air intake.

Key:

1. Three spars.




Fig 20 - Schematic of setup at S4 Modane.

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μ	۰	۰

6. Axis of rotation.	. Plenum chamber.	8. Cutwater.	9. Fixed portion.	10. Simulation of fuselage.
9	7.	8	6	10.
1. Air intake.	2. Glide surface.	3. Valve.	. Flowmeter.	. Sonic throat.
Ai	G	Va	FI	So
4	2.	e,	4	5




Fig 21 - Comparison of air intake characteristics obtained at S4 MA.




Fig 22 - Flight-demonstrated efficiency.

- 1. Critical conditions.
- 2. Flight-demonstrated performances (supercritical speed).

 - 3. Flight 1.

BOEING OFFERS AIR FORCE TANKERS TO INCREASE F-16'S RANGE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Jun 83 p 27

[Article by Knut Lovstuhagen: "Boeing Offers Norway Tanker Planes"]

[Text] Paris, 1 May. If Norway acquires tanker planes, which can serve as flying "gas stations" to serve its F-16 planes, the effectiveness of the fighter planes would be multiplied several times. This is what is pointed out by the American firm Boeing, which has Norway on its list of potential customers for its newest military product—a used passenger plane of the Boeing 707 type, remodeled for its role as a combined tanker and transport plane. Studies undertaken by the firm indicate that Norway should acquire four to eight tankers of this kind and station them at airstrips like Banak, Bodo, Orlandet and Rygge.

"According to our prospectus for Norway, each plane will cost approximately 90 million kroner. That is a very reasonable investment, considering the 300 million which a specially built tanker plane can cost new from the factory these days," Delbert W. Torkelson, head of Boeing's military aircraft department in Wichita, Kansas, said. "The Norwegian version will have a filling beam under the tail and will be able to service one F-16 at a time. For 105 million kroner, we can provide a plane which can service two fighter planes at the same time, of which one could be any one of the types of planes currently used in the NATO nations."

Boeing, which is probably best known as a producer of passenger planes, has researched the demand for military planes in most of the Western nations. They have concluded that many places, particularly nations which extend over large areas, have too few planes and that it will cost too much to make the investments which filling in all the gaps would require.

Using these studies as a basis, Boeing came up with the idea of remodeling older passenger planes of the 707 type into combined tanker-transport planes. As transport planes, they will take a 40-ton cargo. There are a number of used 707s for sale, and they do have many years of use left in them. For a relatively small amount, then, it becomes possible to obtain a fully effective way to improve the effectiveness of one's fighter planes.

The Norwegian acquisition program for F-16s involves 72 planes, which, after all, is a small number, considering our expansive geographic interests. The

possibility of war would also weigh heavily on both equipment and personnel, because a war situation would involve many false alarms which would result in unnecessary flights. But alarms have to be answered and the planes have to go up, because it isn't possible to know ahead of time what set off the alarm.

"With airborne tankers, the Norwegian F-16 planes will increase their effectiveness to the equivalent of some 200 planes," Torkelson said. "A flying fuel pump of this kind makes it possible to utilize plane forces with much more flexibility than is possible without it, because the refueling happens right where the planes are. They can take off with a minimum fuel supply, which means they can take along a larger amount of weaponry, or they can get into the air from shorter runways than is usual. The latter is particularly important if parts of a runway are made unusable in an attack. The radius of action of the planes will be substantially increased, and they can maintain themselves for a longer time in the area of action. Another advantage which we consider significant is that damaged planes which otherwise would be doomed because of an abnormally high level of fuel consumption can be helped back to home base by using tanker planes. One single fighter plane saved in this way could involve more money saved than it costs to buy one tanker plane," he said.

Following this line of thought, though, one can see that a tanker plane could become a priority target for the enemy and that it would quickly be put out of the picture. But it could, on the one hand, surround itself with a small force of fighter planes which would protect it; or, on the other hand, it could be moved to more protected areas and still play an effective part. "In a pinch, tanker planes could operate from bases in Great Britain, for example, or Iceland," Torkelson said. "Or they could be equipped with electronic diversion devices which would limit the enemy's capacity for communication, making them hard to find."

If Norway decides to obtain tanker planes of this kind, Boeing will go out into the marketplace and buy the necessary number of used 707 passenger planes, overhaul and completely remodel them and deliver them in the course of 16-18 months. The planes are expected to last until well after the year 2000.

9584

CSO: 3639/124

VIGGEN PILOTS BEGIN TRAINING TO SHOOT DOWN CRUISE MISSILES

Stockholm DAGEN NYHETER in Swedish 5 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by Jan Kallman: "Training for The Future"]

[Text] Two Viggens in pursuit of a cruise missile: that is the picture as the Swedish army trains for the future. So it is not another case of foreign submarines in our waters. Cruise missiles, too, have become an element in the scenario of threats, claims the Defense Ministry.

For this reason, the Swedish air force is training to shoot down missiles that encroach on Swedish territory. Things are going a little better than with the subs.

At least they did on Saturday during the major exercise for the Central Air Defense Sector in central Sweden.

The Inland Wing was alerted to a cruise missile. Two Viggens took off and headed out over the lower Gulf of Bothnia. A few minutes later, the missile was knocked out of commission: downed.

"They're fairly light machines," said Bernt Weimar, a pilot of one of the planes.

At least 50 planes and 2,000 men are involved in these exercises, the first where the air force has seriously allowed for cruise missiles in the exercise program.

"We are going to show that we can handle them ourselves, in case somebody thinks about using such missiles over our territory," said Karl-Erik Fernander, sector head.

The conditions of the exercise: Sweden has been drawn into a war.

The major powers Gul and Bla are at war in Central Europe. Gul has mounted an air attack on Sweden and its bases.

The major powers send cruise missiles over neutral Sweden's territory, and we try to defend ourselves.

"Our System is the Best in Europe"

"Our air force is one of the best in Europe," continued Karl-Erik Fernander.

He is thinking primarily of the Viggen, the fighter version, a very advanced plane costing around 100 million kroner.

It is equipped with two radar missiles, costing a million kroner each. Bernt Wiemar downed his cruise missile over the Gulf of Bothnia with one of these missiles.

In the exercise, the cruise missiles were played by Swedish training planes, which was not completely realistic.

Cruise missiles are little rascals, about 5 meters long, but they're easy targets," thinks Bernt Weimar.

The American Tomahawk or Boeing versions of the cruise missile follow the terrain, flying low (60 to 300 meters in altitude) and slow (900 km per hour).

The Swedish army calculates that none of the cruise missiles that overfly us will be carrying nuclear warheads.

"Conventional War"

"No, if that's the case, we're in for a large nuclear war that no one can do anything about. Our games are based on conventional war," said Karl-Erik Fernander.

But what happens if a cruise missile with a nuclear warhead is shot down over Sweden from an altitude of 60 meters?

"Nothing. They don't explode because the missiles aren't cocked until they reach the target area," said Karl-Erik Fernander.

The army did not train just to shoot down cruise missiles today. At small bases in Karlkoga and Tierp, there is another kind of devil's work being carried out.

New surface bombs dropped on our airfields would destroy everything in the vicinity. The bases are simply too small.

Therefore, the landing strips, personnel, gas tanks, everything, must be distributed over a large area.

The army calls this mobile readiness.

Small groups of well-trained soldiers ride in vehicles over a large area, maintaining a distance of up to 15 km between themselves and carrying all the equipment needed to keep a plane ready for action.

By the early 1990's, the system will be ready and operational.

9992

CSO: 3650/212

EXPERT SAYS MILITARY SHOULD BUY MISSILES, NOT JAS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jun 83 p 17

[Article: "FOA Researcher: Robots Instead of Attack Planes"]

[Text] Land and cruise missiles, instead of a prospective expensive attack plane, are advocated by the research head of the Swedish Defense Research Institute (FOA), Ola Dahlman, in the FOA newspaper.

Dahlman is an expert in the disarmament negotiations in Geneva. He hopes that his proposal will find an audience as a method to disarmament.

"We possibly won't need a fighter aircraft and armor in the 21st century. A warning system, missiles and lighter weapons are probably as good."

Dahlman wants to have defense weapons that will protect Sweden from a surprise attack. Electronics or sensors can be built in peacetime. Mines can be deployed against submarines, and cruise missiles could replace fighter planes.

"Not nuclear missiles, of course, but cruise missiles equipped with conventional explosive devices."

9992

CSO: 3650/212

FIRST WOMEN BEGIN INFANTRY OFFICERS TRAINING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Jun 83 p 31

[Article by Ylva Floreman: "Charlotta Jern Joins Up: The Gals Are Doing Military Service"]

[Text] For the first time, women are entering the army's military training program. At Ing 1 in Sodertalje, they point with pride at the girls: there really are people who want to do military service.

"Yes, some of my friends think that it's not wise to volunteer when others are trying to avoid it," says Charlotta Jern, 20.

Of the 200 women who applied for officer training, 45 passed the test. Eight girls were assigned the Ing 1 in Sodertalje.

Monday is their first day. The girls are standing in a long line, together with the 115 boys also reporting for service, to pick up their equipment. They all flock around the girls, who patiently endure the attentions of the fellows. A young draftee asks how long they're in for. "Fifteen months," answers one of the girls. "Wow," he says impressed.

They Are Treated the Same

But the officers in Sodertalje stress that there is nothing unusual about it.

"They'll be treated in the same way as the boys," says Regiment Chief Sven-Erik Nilsson.

They will perform the same drills and receive the same training but have their own lodging and toilet facilities.

"But even though we say that we're not going to treat them differently, there is one point we'll have to take into consideration. They won't build bridges, for instance, but there's other, lighter work. Some of the boys are not so strong either, you know," said Sven-Erik Nilsson.

Charlotta Jern, who hails from Skara, is the oldest of the girls here. She did a 2-year stint in social services and worked on a mink farm and in a hospital before applying for officer training.

"First and foremost, I'm doing this to defend Sweden, just as the fellows are doing. It's interesting but they say it will be hard," said Charlotta.

Strong Defense

The uniforms are being issued, and they are trying to find a uniform that fits. Most are too big because the girls are all fairly short.

"I'm not going to grow any taller," shot back Christina Johansson, 18. Christina Johansson is from Skovde and she would like to become a career officer or a policewoman.

"Why? I don't know. It's hard to say. I thought it sounded good and I want to try the same things the fellows do," said Christina.

Christina thinks it important that Sweden have a strong defense; she has no faith in disarmament. If there is a war, she will do what she is being trained to do.

"Yes, I hope so, if I get through the training. If not, I'll probably go into the Women's Service or something," said Christina.

9992

CSO: 3650/212

BRIEFS

NEW SUBMARINE ALARM—Personnel from the Upper Norrland military district are looking for a foreign object which was observed on Thursday near the island of Rodkallen, some five miles southeast of Lulea. The object was observed from a customs boat which was pursuing its routine movements in the area. There may be a foreign submarine involved, but military authorities will say nothing more precise than that "a foreign object" was involved. "We take every report of this kind very seriously," said Colonel Sven-Ake Jansson to the Press Wire Service on Saturday. Observation will continue until further notice, using resources available to the military. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Jun 83 p 3] 9584

OCEAN ISSUES EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DENMARK, NORWAY IN ARGUMENT OVER GREENLAND SEA LIMIT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Jun 83 p 4

[Article: "Dissatisfaction With the Border Negotiations: Denmark Threatens With Arbitration"]

[Text] Denmark is not satisfied with the pace of the border negotiations with Norway, and is currently threatening to bring the argument, which has to do with sea limits off Greenland, in for arbitration if the negotiations show no further progress. This move on the part of the Danes was a surprise to Norwegian authorities, and AFTENPOSTEN has heard that they would like to un-dramatize the situation and resume continued netotiations.

The issue has to do with a marine area of 70,000 square kilometers between Jan Mayen and eastern Greenland. Norway would like to see the area divided according to the midline principle, whereas Denmark is hoping to maintain its border at 200 nautical miles. The area is primarily of interest because of fishing resources, but the possibilities are not being ignored that gas and oil may also be found in the area.

It was the Danish foreign minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who expressed Denmark's impatience in an interview with the Danish telegram office, RB. He pointed out that negotiations have been going on since 1980 without either party getting any closer to a compromise. Confrontations at sea have been avoided, since there has been a ban on capelin fishing in the disputed area. Ellemann-Jensen would currently like to take the matter up directly with the Norwegian foreign minister. If no solution is reached, he would like a solution by arbitration.

The two foreign ministers will have the opportunity to meet together very soon. Next week is a meeting of all the foreign ministers in NATO, at which both Norway and Denmark will be present.

This move on the part of the Danes was a surprise to Norwegian authorities, who see no reason for any particular haste in this matter. Press spokesman Geir Grung told AFTENPOSTEN that Norway is hoping for a solution through negotiation and that the Foreign Ministry cannot imagine that it would not be possible to find a good solution to the conflict.

"Besides, we don't understand why this is such an urgent matter. There isn't any fishing going on in the area, and so we aren't having any supervisory problems," said Geir Grung to AFTENPOSTEN.

- END -

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August 3, 1983